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It has been suggested that the migration of proportionality as a standard of 
constitutional review is bringing about a degree of convergence in rights norms across 
common and civil law jurisdictions. While scholars have noted its potential to shape 
rights norms in legal systems into which it is incorporated, few have analysed the ways in 
which proportionality is affected by the constitutional culture in which it is received. 
 This thesis is a comparative analysis of the application of proportionality in 
Canada and the French Republic. It sheds light on the extent to which the operation of 
that standard is affected by constitutional culture; that is, by interpretive perspectives and 
modes of reasoning prevailing in a given jurisdiction. It isolates the ways in which the 
standard is modified, both consciously through the efforts of judges to give meaning to its 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
i) Introduction  
 
This thesis lends critical insight into the use of proportionality as supra-national 
tool of rights adjudication by analysing the role of rights normativity in the application of 
that legal standard. By rights “normativity” it is meant the extent to which rights are 
historically and culturally contingent, rather than merely the result of positive law. This 
analysis is intended to counter-balance the claims of scholars who stress proportionality’s 
potential as a universal standard for determining permissible limitations on constitutional 
rights. It is suggested that such claims are insufficiently reflective about the relation 
between proportionality’s three-step structure and the constitutional culture in which it is 
applied. The use of proportionality to review statutory restrictions on religious expression 
in the public sphere in Canada and the French Republic is analysed to illustrate this point. 
Indeed, the application of proportionality as a standard of constitutional review is 
widely regarded as a key vector driving global convergence in constitutional rights 
norms. As a three-step means-end rational review for the constitutionality of sub-
constitutional laws (i.e. statute or common law), it involves a “hybrid” exercise of 
inductive, fact-sensitive reasoning and deduction from general principles.1 Accordingly, 
it has migrated easily across common and civil law jurisdictions. Developed in German 
Basic Law, review on a proportionality standard was first adopted by the European Court 
of Justice (the “ECJ”) in 1970, followed by the European Court of Human Rights (the 
“ECHR") in 1976, and by the Supreme Court of Canada (the “SCC”) in 1986. Its primacy 
in European law lead in turn to its gradual incorporation into the law of most EU member 
states.2 It is for this reason that proportionality has been identified as affirming a 
convergence of common and civil law into a “globalised jus commune.”3 The principles 
                                                          
1 Eric Engel, “The History of the General Principle of Proportionality: An Overview” 
(2012) 10 Dartmouth LJ 1 at 1. 
2 For a history of the migration of proportionality see Aharon Barak, Proportionality: 
Constitutional Rights and Their Limitations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2012) at 181-210. 
3 Engel, supra note 1. Note that the term jus commune is Latin for “common law” and 




of that hybridized body of law it is argued, drive substantive national laws toward 
uniform global standards. 
It is perhaps unsurprising that many scholars ascribe “neutrality” to the 
proportionality standard given the ease with which it has been woven into both common 
law and civilian fabric. It is widely contended that the test’s three-step structure, which 
again requires both inductive reasoning by analogy and deduction from general 
principles, can exert the same methodological pressures in both common law and civilian 
legal systems. As David M. Beatty has put it, the proportionality principle is not only 
“neutral” but possessed of a “capacity for rationalism” sufficient to justify its status as an 
“ultimate rule of law.”4 For their part, Moshe Cohen-Eliya and Iddo Porat have argued 
migration of proportionality as a constitutional methodology may in fact be more 
effective at transmitting substantive legal doctrines than efforts to secure their direct 
adoption.5 The implication is that the formal methodology of proportionality can be 
incorporated more or less seamlessly into jurisdictions with different juridical structures 
and modes of legal reasoning and yield substantively similar results.  
Yet in spite of this “standardizing effect,”6 the three-step proportionality test does 
yield different results on similar sets of facts when applied by different constitutional 
courts, a point implicitly acknowledged in the European Court of Human Rights’ (the 
“ECHR”) decision in SAS v France.7 In its judgment of 1 July 2014, a majority of the 
court upheld Law no. 2010-1192 of the French Republic as being a “proportional” 
infringement of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms (the “Convention”).8 Enacted on 11 October 2014, the impugned 
statute had affected in France and its overseas territories a full ban on the wearing of 
clothing designed to conceal the face in public places. The applicant SAS challenged Law 
                                                          
4 David M. Beatty, The Ultimate Rule of Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004) at 
171. 
5 Moshe Cohen-Eliya and Iddot Porat, Proportionality and Constitutional Culture 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013) at 139-140. 
6 Ibid. 
7 SAS v France [GC], no. 43835/11, ECHR 2014.  
8 Council of Europe, European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms, as amended by Protocols Nos 11 and 14, 4 November 1950, 
ETS 5, online: European Court of Human Rights <http://www.echr.coe.int> 
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no. 2010-1192 as violating her right to freedom of religion under Art. 9(1) of the 
Convention, because it prevented her from covering her face with a veil or niqāb in 
accordance with her Islamic faith. The applicant’s Art. 9(1) rights were determined to be 
adversely affected, but a majority of the ECHR proceeded to find the law to be a 
“proportionate” limitation under Art. 9(2) of the Convention. 
Article 9(2) holds that the right to freedom of religion “shall be subject only to 
such limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society.” It 
proceeds to define proper legislative purposes in a democratic society as “public safety, 
health or morals, [or] protection of the rights and freedoms of others.’9 The French 
government submitted that all Art. 9(2) purposes were engaged by Law no. 2010-1192. 
The only argument accepted by the majority, however, was that the impugned legislation 
was required to reinforce the egalitarian and fraternal civic bonds at the heart of the 
French republican pact, and as such, in Art. 9(2) terms, necessary to “protect the rights 
and freedoms others.” This formulation served as the objective of Law no. 2010-1192 
that grounded the ECHR’s proportionality analysis. It is in the majority’s application of 
that three-part test that an acknowledgement of proportionality’s limitations as an 
instrument of rights harmonization can be inferred. 
Indeed, having found the prohibition imposed by Law no. 2010-1192 to be (1) 
rationally connected to the legislative objective and (2) necessary for its realization, the 
majority in SAS proceeded to the more evaluative exercise of (3) determining whether the 
ban was proportionate in its effects; that is, whether the salutary effects of the ban were 
proportionate to its deleterious effects on the Art. 9 right. A majority of the ECHR 
concluded that the legislature of the member state was owed a degree of deference in 
formulating legislative policy on which “opinions within a democratic society may 
reasonably differ.”10 Specifically, while acknowledging that “from a strictly normative 
standpoint, France [was] very much in a minority position in Europe,”11 its legislature 
was owed “a broad margin of appreciation” to determine the minimum standards 
                                                          
9 Ibid at Art 9(2).  
10 Supra note 7 at para 16. 
11 Ibid at para 156. 
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necessary for democratic life.12 In so deciding, the ECHR was applying its long-standing 
practice of conferring latitude on member states to craft legislation in light of local 
factual and normative conditions as determined by the legislature. 
By relying on the “margin of appreciation” doctrine with explicit reference to the 
practices of other EU jurisdictions, the majority in SAS acknowledged that other courts 
might legitimately arrive at different conclusions as to the proportionality of such bans. 
The review of Law no. 2010-1192 by the French Constitutional Council in Decision 
2010-613 DC of 7 October 2010 provides such an instance of a court reaching a 
“minority position” in Europe, normatively speaking. In this thesis, the Constitutional 
Council’s decision in Decision 2010-613 DC respecting concealment of the face in public 
will be analysed in light of related case law of the Supreme Court of Canada. In doing so, 
it seeks to isolate points of divergence in the application of the proportionality test and to 
explain them by relating them to constitutional culture. It is suggested that proportionality 
has been modified, both consciously and unconsciously, by Canadian and French jurists 
to ease its incorporation into their respective legal systems. Accordingly, it is urged that 
there are limits to the potential of proportionality as a standard of review to act as a 
vector of constitutional norm convergence across legal systems. 
 This thesis is divided into three chapters. The first lays the ground-work for 
comparative analysis by reviewing the incorporation of proportionality in Canada and the 
French Republic, both of which until recently were systems of legislative supremacy. The 
focus is mainly on how that inductive-deductive “hybrid” standard is applied in systems 
with different modes of legal reasoning. In the second chapter, the actual application of 
proportionality is analysed, with reference mainly to Decision 2010-613 DC and relevant 
Canadian case law. It is proposed that the decisive step of the proportionality test from a 
comparative standpoint is the final step of “proportionate effect” or “balancing,” because 
it allows for the expression of culturally-based value judgements. The last chapter 
focuses on the way in which balancing is conducted in each jurisdiction, revealing how 
the rules of its application have been judicially-developed to reflect local modes of legal 
reasoning and established rights norms. 
                                                          






This thesis attempts to initiate a discussion about constitutional culture, and its 
methodology has been developed to that end. The term “constitutional culture” is used to 
refer to what might be called the “cultural grounding” of a particular constitutional text; 
that is, the socially-construed and historically-transmitted “shared meanings” and 
interpretive perspectives which guide its operation as a legal instrument in a given 
society.13 It presumes, therefore, that constitutional texts are not “fixed orders,” but 
instruments for the expression of notions of order that have been arrived at through 
historical development. In other words, all constitutional texts are embedded in a culture 
which gives to them their authority and substantive content. Cultural notions are 
expressed through the text, both consciously by way of judicial efforts to give meaning to 
particular provisions, and unconsciously through the modes of legal reasoning and 
normative presumptions that are brought to bear in that task. 
This thesis uses a contextualist methodology derived from the precepts of legal 
historicism to shed light on differences in the application of proportionality related to the 
interaction of that standard with the constitutional culture in which it is applied. As it is 
used in this project, the term “historicism” does not denote an effort to comprehensively 
review particular aspects of Canadian or French legal history. Rather, legal historicism is 
best understood as an interpretive tool based on a recognition of the organic embededness 
of law in culture. It is suggested that the application of proportionality should not be 
analysed merely as matter of positive law, but with a view to the ways in which it 
intersects with intellectual and cultural life. Legal historicism presumes the organic and 
particular nature of such disciplines to a given jurisdiction. Thus, cultural and intellectual 
history may be leveraged as part of a cautious, rigorous, and contextual interpretation of 
the law’s operation in that jurisdiction. In this way, differences which are not readily 
apparent from the law’s text alone may be better analysed. 
                                                          
13 Hands Vorländer, “What is ‘Constitutional Culture?’” in Silke Hensel et al, eds, 
Constitutional Cultures: On the Concept and Representation of Constitutions in the 
Atlantic World (Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2012) at 28. 
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As Frederick C. Beiser has documented, the historicist tendency in law first 
emerged in the early nineteenth century in reaction to the alleged “ahistorical” or 
“philosophical” character of “natural law” theories. Indeed, modes of thinking associated 
with the eighteenth century Enlightenment tended to insist that law should reflect a 
conception of human nature as absolute, eternal, and universal. In contrast, historicists 
held that human nature, including morality and reason itself, was relative, particular, and 
determined by historical context.14 It was inadvisable, on the historicist view, to abstract 
what are essentially local and variable cultural constructs and to represent them as 
holding for humanity in general. It is for this reason that the Italian intellectual Benedetto 
Croce (1866-1952) defined historicism broadly as an “affirmation that life and reality are 
history alone,”15 and not the result of absolute or universal “natural” laws. 
Given that a range of different and often contradictory meanings have been 
ascribed to “historicism,”16 it is urged that the term should be thought of less as a uniform 
intellectual tradition and more as an epistemological orientation. As Beiser has suggested, 
to “historicize” one’s thinking is merely to recognize that law, like everything in the 
human world is made by history.17 For the historicist, the essence or identity of 
everything, including law, is entirely the product of the particular historical processes that 
brought it into being.18 While it is not possible to attain a comprehensive knowledge of 
those processes, it is possible to shed some light on them by identifying parallels and 
points of intersection in the historical development of a range of disciplines such as 
philosophy, literature, art or other aesthetic disciplines. Those points of commonality 
speak to underlying intellectual and cultural currents which exert a formative influence 
even if they are difficult to account for empirically. The objective of historicism is to 
situate one type of cultural development (i.e. the formulation of legal doctrine) within a 
                                                          
14 Frederick C Beiser, The German Historicist Tradition (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2011) at 1-2. 
15 Benedetto Croce, History as the Story of Liberty (London: Allen & Unwin, 1941) as 
cited in Christopher Thornhill, “Historicism” in the Routledge Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy (London: Routledge, 1998), IV, at 445. 
16 For an overview of the different intellectual traditions which have been described as 
“historicist,” see Thornhill, ibid at 443-446.  




broader context of intellectual development in order to deepen understanding of law as 
culture. 
It is critical to appreciate, however, that by referring to historical “processes” this 
thesis is not invoking forms of historicism which incorporate metaphysical claims about 
historical progress or history’s ultimate ends. A range of philosophies that have been 
described as “historicist” have suggested that the acquisition of historical knowledge is 
necessary in order to uncover general laws of history in a metaphysical sense. For 
instance, both Hegel and Marx saw history as a process of “dialectical” development 
toward a particular end.19 On a dialectical reading, any historical subject would be 
analysed with a view to its situatedness in the progress of history toward its ultimate 
ends. Forms of historicism suggest dialectical or other fixed laws or patterns of  historical 
development, including but not limited to Hegel and Marx, are not relied on in this thesis. 
To the contrary, the historicism used here repudiates all metaphysical claims, and rejects 
the suggestion that the study of history can have a predictive power.  
References to historical “processes” are above all meant to indicate a “holistic” 
interpretation of law as organic to cultural history. As a basic precept of early legal 
historicism, interpretive “holism” suggests that for all aspects of human anthropology, 
including law, the cultural “whole” is prior to its parts and irreducible to them.20 On a 
holistic view, then, a given legal rule is not to be regarded merely as a singular, 
autonomous element, but one which derives its very meaning from the broader social and 
historical context of which it is a part. This is not to say that the “whole” – be it society, 
epoch or culture generally – is to be thought of as an aggregate or composite of otherwise 
autonomous parts, but rather as a unity determining the essence of its parts.21 In 
                                                          
19 Hegel’s conception of the dialectical development of history is often described as 
involving three stages: a thesis gives rise to an antithesis which contradicts the thesis, and 
the resolution of the tension between the two yields a synthesis. For Hegel, such 
development took place in geist, a concept associated with the workings of the human 
mind. The real world merely reflected in an external, phenomenal sense changes in geist. 
In contrast, Marx argued that dialectic development took place primarily in the material 
world, and that development was reflected in human thought. See Anthony Kenny, The 
New History of Western Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010) at 585-586 
and 769-773.  




contemporary terms, this project may be said to embrace a deeply “relational” approach 
to interpreting law. A holistic approach assists comparative analysis by relating the 
operation of positive law to established norms and entrenched modes of reasoning. 
In order to give some form to the cultural “whole” in which law is embedded, the 
German jurist Friedrich Karl von Savigny (1779-1861) used the term “Volksgeist,” or the 
“spirit” of a given people. While that term is now considered antiquated given its 
methodological obscurity and somewhat mystical associations, its basic methodological 
function is served by what are now referred to as “contextualist” approaches to 
intellectual and cultural history. As Mathias Riemann has written, the notion of 
Volksgeist was essentially a cultural notion,22 and “culture” for Savigny and early legal 
historicists was seen not so much as an anthropological term as an intellectual one.23 The 
purpose of the Volksgeist concept was to attune legal methodology to the formative 
influence of history and the intersectionality of law with other intellectual disciplines, 
given their situatedness within a larger context. It is here argued that through assiduous 
study of the intellectual history that may reasonably affect the operation of the legal 
instrument being studied, (be they linguistic, aesthetic, or otherwise) meaning may 
ascribed to given legal rules in way that recognizes their inextricability from culture. 
 While unempirical, a holistic or contextualist interpretation need not be 
excessively broad or ill-focused. Legal historicism has long been concentrated on the 
study of “discourses.” By referring to “context,” an historicist in fact signals an effort to 
analyse what Jacco Bomhoff defined as “the system of words and concepts within which 
[a] relevant community of disputants moved at [a] relevant time.”24 In this thesis, 
historical sources are analysed with a view to shedding light on the historical 
development of relevant discourses. This requires knowledge of the way in which 
particular language is used in conveying certain concepts, for linguistic choices are in 
every temporal period leveraged to “perform rhetorical and paradigmatic functions 
                                                          
22 Mathias Reimann, “Nineteenth Century German Legal Science” (1990) 31 BCL Rev 4 
at 853. 
23 Ibid at 854. 
24 Jacco Bomhoff, “Comparing Legal Argument” in Maurice Adams and Jacco Bomhoff, 
eds, Practice and Theory in Comparative Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2012) at 81. 
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related to the conceptualization and conduct of politics.” This thesis assumes that 
proportionality as a matter of positive law should be analysed with the understanding that 
it is subject to the influence of locally variable legal “grammars,” which can only be 
apprehended through familiarity with the intellectual and cultural context of the 
jurisdiction in which it is applied.25 
This methodology can be contrasted with what has been called an “abstracting” or 
“analytic” approach to comparative law. Such approaches attempt to filter out what is 
historically and culturally peculiar to a constitutional text in order to facilitate a 
comparative analysis of solutions to legal problems.26 While such an approach may be 
suited to comparative law with an explicit reform or advocacy objective, it is not 
appropriate for a project such as this, which is oriented to developing understanding 
rather than reform of the law. It suggested, however, that reform-oriented comparative 
scholarship might benefit from an effort to read law on its own terms, as embedded in a 
context of particular historical, political and social forces. 
Accordingly, doctrinal sources are used in this thesis in an expository, rather than 
evaluative or critical manner. For the purposes of this analysis, the word “doctrine” is 
used in such a way as to reflect its Latin root “doctrine,” connoting “instruction, 
knowledge [and] learning,”27 rather than critical engagement. Again, the analysis is not 
reform-oriented but concerned with what may be called “legal science in its narrow and 
most basic sense.”28 Thus, prevailing juridical structures and modes of legal reasoning in 
each jurisdiction are not only the object of the inquiry, but also as its (principle) 
theoretical frame of reference.29 In sum, this thesis adopts a comparative method that 
strives for the interpretation of laws individually and in detail, coupled with a thorough-
                                                          
25 Ibid at 82.  
26 Cécile Laborde, Critical Republicanism: The Hijab Controversy and Political 
Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007) at 2-4.. 
27 Terry Hutchinson and Nigel Duncan, “Defining and Describing What We Do: 
Doctrinal Legal Research” (2012) 17 Deakin LR 83 at 84. 
28 Robert Alexy, A Theory of Constitutional Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2002) at 6. 
29 Pauline Westerman, “Open or Autonomous: The Debate on Legal Methodology as a 
Reflection on the Debate on Law” in M v Hoecke, ed, Methodologies of Legal Research: 




going effort to analyse the ways in which the operation of law is affected by unarticulated 














Chapter 2: How Proportionality is Shaped in its Application by Established Modes 




In Canada and the French Republic, the constitutionality of legislative limitations 
on freedom of religion is determined by the use of a proportionality test in its standard 
triadic formulation. However, application of the test’s substantive requirements procedes 
very differently in each jurisdiction. Canadian courts tend to apply proportionality’s 
adjudicative machinery in a formal, three-step structure, with each step initiating a 
searching and thorough-going inquiry into facts of the case. In contrast, the French 
Constitutional Council applies the test by way of a distinctively terse and syllogistic form 
of legal reasoning, whereby application of each requirement is often perceptible only in 
references to “disproportion manifeste,” “atteintes excessives,” or “mesure approprié.”1 
Facially, the difference between Canadian and French modes legal reasoning are stark, 
and must be accounted for before a comparative analysis of the legal texts and case law 
relevant to this thesis can be undetaken. 
The aim of this chapter is to set the stage for analysis of legal dotrine by 
explaining why application of proportionality in Canada is so facts-oriented, while in 
France it is essentially syllogistic. In doing so, light will be shed on how the use of 
proportionality is affecting a degree of convergence in rights adjudication across common 
law and civilian jurisdictions. It may be recalled that proportionality is a “hybrid” 
exercise, involving inductive, fact-sensitive reasoning and deduction from general 
principles.2 The facts of a case are invariably measured against general principles. It will 
be argued that the difference between Canadian and French application of the test is a 
matter of the extent to which each legal system focuses on facts or principles, both of 
which are, again, inherent in the test. That orientation is shaped largely by traditions of 
legal reasoning prevailing in each jurisdiction.  
                                                          
1 Daphne Akoumianaki and Georges Katrougalos. “L’application du principe de 
proportionalité dans le champ des droits sociaux” (2012) 5 Revue du droit public et de la 
science politique en France et à l’étranger 1221 at 15-16. 
2 See for example Eric Engel, “The History of the General Principle of Proportionality: 
An Overview” (2012) 10 Dartmouth LJ. 
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In this chapter, it will be argued that modes of legal reasoning in Canada and 
French Republic are predicated on very different conceptions of the relationship of facts 
to legal principles, and that this difference is due to historical divergence in the normative 
underpinnings of legislative supremacy. Indeed, before the incorporation of a postiori 
judicial review for rights violations in Canada and the French Republic, both jurisdictions 
had histories of what may be called legislative supremacy. But as this chapter will argue, 
the normative bases of legislative authority in each jurisdiction were (and arguably 
remain) different. Those historically-contingent differences account for divergent 
conceptions of the judicial function and have powerfully shaped accepted methods of 
judicial reasoning. Thus, while proportionality always involves both fact-dependent 
induction and principle-based deduction, prevailing common law and civilian norms in 
each jurisdiction have heavily influenced its application. 
This chapter procedes in five sections. First, the normative bases of legislative 
supremacy in Canada are assessed. This involves an inquiry into the historical emergence 
of the notion of legislative sovereignty as an institutional concept. The second section 
examines the French principle of national sovereignty in historical perspective. The third 
and fourth sections of this chapter detail how established practices of judicial review for 
jurisdiction issues in each country influenced the incorporation of judicial review for 
rights violations on a proportionality standard. Finally, the fifth section reveals an 
ongoing convergence in the way in which proportionality is applied in each jurisdiction. 
It is concluded that differences in application are deeply-rooted but whatever substantive 
differences they yield are decreasing as a result of ongoing convergence.  
 
ii) The Nature of Legislative Supremacy in Canada 
 
Any account of legislative sovereignty in Canada must concentrate heavily on the 
development of parliamentary institutions in Britain. The preamble of the British North 
America Act, 1867 (the “BNA Act”), prescribed that Canada is to have a constitution 
“similar in principle to that of the United Kingdom.”3 Indeed, the Supreme Court of 
                                                          
3 Now the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982) 
c. 11, pmbl. 
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Canada has held that the preamble of the BNA Act “gives expression to the nature of the 
legislative bodies that were continued or established by it.”4 To discern the normative 
bases of legislative sovereignty in Canada, therefore, reference must be made to the 
competence “historically ascribed” to the Parliament at Westminster.5 It is critical to note, 
however, that the “nature” of such authority is not coterminous with its scope. Canadian 
legislatures were long bound by jurisdictional strictures set by the U.K. Parliament. But 
within such limits, legislative sovereignty in Canada may be said to be akin to that 
enjoyed by Westminster in terms of the normative bases from which it derived its 
legitimizing force. 
The legislative sovereignty to which federal and provincial legislatures in Canada 
may lay claim is a form of what may be called “inherent” sovereignty. That is, it is 
generally recognized that the British Parliament is not representative of a sovereign 
people, but enjoys sovereignty in its own right, in the sense that its authority to legislate  
neither derives from nor depends on popular consent. In other words, Parliament is not a 
“trustee” of its electors.6  Rather, the term “parliamentary sovereignty” in the U.K. 
connotes institutional independence and the right to make law without being fettered by 
external quarters. This jealously-guarded institutional independence was not deduced 
from some higher principle of natural law, but emerged slowly and half-consciously 
through a process of gradual historical development. The “nature” of the legislative 
supremacy, which the BNA Act sought to retain is thus deeply historical, and in the U.K., 
legitimated by appeals to inherited right and precedent. 
Indeed, as this section will explain, the “nature” of parliamentary sovereignty in 
Canada and the U.K. (in a normative sense) remains contentious. The most that can be 
discerned from constitutional scholarship, taken in historical perspective, is a shifting 
orientation between polarities of strict parliamentary sovereignty and what may be called 
                                                          
4 New Brunswick Broadcasting Co v Nova Scotia (Speaker of the House of Assembly), 
[1993] SCJ No 2, 100 DLR (4th) 212 at para 93. 
5 The Supreme Court of Canada has also said that the preamble evinces “the clear and 
stated intention of the founders of our country that Canada retain the fundemental 
constitutional tenets upon which British Parliamentary democracy rested.” Ibid at paras 
112 and 116. 
6 Elizabeth Zoller, Introduction to Public Law: A Comparative Study (Leiden, 
Netherlands: Konkinklijke Brill NV, 2008) at 105. 
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“ancient” or “common law constitutionalism.” Simply put, while the former gives 
parliament an absolute peremptory right to make law, the latter situates every legal text – 
whatever its formal status – within a larger constitutional structure. As T.R.S. Allan put 
it, legislative competence within a common law constitution is less a right to “make” law, 
than a right to participate in its adaption.7  That is, laws may be enacted and applied, but 
only within a range of “reasonableness,” within an organic constitutional framework. To 
be sure, these are merely “orientations” in legal scholarship which have long ebbed and 
flowed, but they do lend insight into the “nature” of parliamentary sovereignty in British 
and Canadian constitutionalism. 
While it is beyond the limited scope of this inquiry to undertake a thorough-going 
review of the ascendency of strict parliamentary sovereignty relative to various forms of 
“ancient” or “common law” constitutionalism, some attempt must be made to give a 
sense of this development in order to convey the true “nature” of legislative sovereignty 
as contemplated by the BNA Act in 1867. This chapter thus proceeds with a brief and 
necessarily reductionist account of the emergence of parliamentary sovereignty since the 
period 1800 to 1830 when common law constitutional thought last crested in English 
constitutional scholarship. It is argued that this period, referred to by A.V. Dicey as an 
era of “Old Toryism” or “legislative quiescence,” yielded to a gradual rise of 
parliamentary sovereignty that would not abate until the late-twentieth century. An 
analysis of the emergence of parliamentary sovereignty in this period will reveal a form 
of legislative supremacy that is less a premise of constitutional order, than a postulate of 
it. 
To begin, the work of English jurists and legal theorists in the period 1800 to 
1830 must be read in light of a broader reaction against the strict rationalism of the 
French Revolution of 1789-99. As Maniquis has written, for late-Georgian constitutional 
theorists, the violence of the Jacobin project was something so unsettlingly new, so as not 
to fit within the normal “dystoles and systoles of [the] organic rhythm” of human life.8 
                                                          
7 TRS Allan, “Text, Context, and the Constitution: The Common Law as Public Reason” 
in Douglas E Edlin, ed, Common Law Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2007) at 186. 
8 Robert M Maniquis, “Holy Savagery and Wild Justice: English Romanticism and the 
Terror” (1989) 28 Studies in Romanticism 365 at 370-371. 
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Writers from Burke, to Halam, to John Scott, Lord Eldon reacted against the puritanical 
rationalism they attributed to the Revolution by extolling an “ancient constitution” which 
they felt had grown in a decidedly uncontrived way. In the distinctive tones of British 
Romanticism, they appealed to antiquity, indulged heavily in organic metaphors, and 
wrote in forms (notionally) construed in local and rural terms. As A.V. Dicey later 
observed, for these writers, the English constitution was “a fabric more subtly wrought 
than any work of conscious art.”9 In their view, it had been built up “much as bees 
construct a honeycomb,”10 through slow, half-conscious growth, rather than discursive 
reason. 
As Leo Strauss put it, the turn of the nineteenth century affected a kind of 
“emancipation of sentiment and instinct from reason.”11 The era’s juristic fixation on 
things “organic” was part of this preoccupation with feeling, for by definition, the 
sensory required taction or a certain closeness. The focus, then, was not on the object 
studied per se, but on how it was experienced by an inquiring mind. Accordingly, the 
work of jurists and legal theorists in the late-Georgian period was markedly emotive in its 
tenor. The sort of history which they expressed was deeply subjective and ideational; that 
is, premised on a view that it is ideas that make history and that ideas must be imparted 
aesthetically. For example, Burke’s Reflections on the Revolution in France is infused 
with lofty repetitions of the hereditary principle in English constitutionalism, with only 
cursory reference to its actual historicity.12 This sort of legal scholarship yielded a 
nebulous yet deeply felt form of ancient or common law constitutionalism which flattered 
the period’s prevailing institutional norms. 
                                                          
9 AV Dicey, Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution, 8th ed, (London: 
MacMillan, 1915) at cxxvi. 
10 Henry Hallam, History of Europe During the Middle Ages (London: The Colonial 
Press, 1899) at ii. 
11 Leo Strauss, Liberlism: Ancient and Modern (Ithica, NY: Cornell University Press, 
1989), at 17. 
12 Edmund Burke, Reflections on the Revolution in France and on the Proceedings in 
Certain Societies in London Relative to that Event, by Conor Cruise O’Brien (London: 
Penguin Books, 2004). 
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The effect of such appeals to organic growth and heredity was a tendency to 
recognize “rights” as vested in a multiplicity of institutions.13 For example, Burke felt 
that the British constitution was predicated on an institutional balance arrived at by 
“slow, but well sustained progress.” By resisting excessive speculation, he wrote: 
 
[o]ne [institutional] advantage is as little as possible sacrificed to another. 
We compensate, we reconcile, we balance. We are enabled to unite into 
a constituent whole the various anomalies and contending principles that 
are found in the minds and affairs of men. From hence arises, not an 
excellence in simplicity, but one far superior, an excellence in 
composition.14 
 
This short excerpt from Burke’s Reflections, written to a young partisan of the French 
Revolution,15 captures both the emotive tenor of the era’s writing, and the essence of 
“ancient” or “common law” constitutionalism, which sees legislative authority as 
embedded within a larger body of customary and common law principles. 
A century later, Dicey would argue that constitutional scholarship in the years 
1800 to 1830 was of little use to modern legal science given the extent to which it was 
tied-up in a dialectic with French Jacobinism.16 In his view, English jurists and legal 
theorists had been so preoccupied with the disorder and blood-letting of the Revolution, 
that they had taken up as their “proper task” the work of “pacification.”17 By extolling the 
virtues of an “ancient constitution” they had reinforced in the law the late-Georgian and 
Regency era status quo. It was in part from the holy awe with which they had dealt with 
their subject that Dicey sought to distance himself in his 1885 treatise An Introduction to 
the Study of the Law of the Constitution. Urging his readers to eschew the “religious 
                                                          
13 In his Reflections, Burke wrote: “We have an inheritable crown, an inheritable peerage, 
and a House of Commons and a people inheriting privileges, franchises, and liberties 
from a long line of ancestors.” Ibid at 170. 
14 Ibid at 160. 
15 Burke wrote Reflections on the Revolution in France in 1790 in response to a letter he 
received from the French deputé Charles-Jean-François Depont who had written Burke 
asking for his impressions of events in France since the storming of the Bastille on July 
14, 1789. 
16 AV Dicey, Introduction to the Relation between Law and Public Opinion in England 
During the Nineteenth Century, by Richard VandeWetering (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund 
Inc, 2008) at 52-53. 
17 Ibid at 56. 
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enthusiasm of Burke,” and the “fervent self-complacency of Hallam,” Dicey proposed a 
“modern view of [the] constitution.”18 His work would reflect the high point of a gradual 
shift from a methodology imbued with British Romantism to a form of “positivism” 
according to which law as to be regarded as a scientific discipline.  
Again, this shift was gradual, and part of broader changes in intellectual and 
cultural life. Changes in philosophical and especially epistemological concerns, strongly 
affect notions of what makes for sound methodology. As Richard Bowser and Stanley 
McQuade have suggested, in the mid-1800s, both the rational and the Romantic impulse 
yielded increasingly to an empiricism associated with the physical sciences.19 Indeed, the 
air of objectivity which Dicey sought to give his Law of the Constitution in 1885 
reflected the spirit of an age which, as Bernard Hibbits put it, equated the “scientific’” 
with “the ‘modern,’ the ‘good,’ and the ‘true.’”20 His focus on the empirical precluded 
reliance on either the strict rationalism of natural law, or modes of thinking enamoured of 
subjective human feeling. Again, methodological priorities reflect the ends to which legal 
scholarship is to be put, and those ends are related to culture. In Dicey’s age, legal 
scholarship was to assist in progress of an empirical kind, which did not fixate on ideal 
standards. 
While the constitutional theories of the late-eighteenth century had been 
impressive in their theoretical depth, the “methodologies” they yielded were (by later 
standards) shallow and confused. If theorists had sought truth in “reason,” and others had 
sought it in the subjective experience, after about 1830, legal scholars self-consciously 
demurred on questions of the law’s normativity. They instead focused on the law’s black 
letter as an empirically-verifiable object of study from an objective standpoint. 
                                                          
18 Dicey, Law of the Constitution, supra note 10 at cxxvi. 
19 Richard T Bowser and J Stanley McQuade, “Austin’s Intentions: A Critical 
Reconstruction of his Concept of Legal Science” (2006) 29 Campbell Law Rev 46 at 46. 
20 Bernard J Hibbits, “The Politics of Principle: Albert Venn Dicey and the Rule of Law” 
(1994) 23 Anglo-American Law Review 1 at 7.  Dicey wrote a series of articles on the 
subject of legal education in which he repeatedly referred to law as a “scientific” 
discipline. See AV Dicey, “Legal Education” (1871) 25 MacMillans 115; AV Dicey, 
“The Teaching of English Law at Harvard” (1899) 76 Contemp Rev 742; AV Dicey, 
“The Study of Jurisprudence” (1800) 5 L Mag & Rev 382; AV Dicey, “Law Teaching, 
Oral and Written” in Hebert Hensley Henson, ed, A Memoir of the Right Honourable Sir 
William Anson (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1920) 84. 
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Accordingly, they elevated methods of “doing” legal science to a higher level of concern. 
A new emphasis was placed on the systematization of positive law, either as an end in 
and of itself, or for the more forward-looking aim of reforming the law along utilitarian 
lines. What is notable is that is a general retreat from theory and speculative approaches 
to the law in favour of what was objectively knowable. Still, as with any cultural 
development, traces of past practice remained discernable within the discipline. 
The subtle pull exerted by the natural law and Romantic eras remained evident. 
This was particularly so in the role played by history within legal science. Positivists like 
Jeremy Benthem and John Austin, both utilitarians,21 eschewed the use of historical 
insight, dismissing “what directions of human effort” went into the law’s creation as 
“irrelevancies.” Neither felt that the work of a legal scholar should extend beyond the 
objectively “observable phenomena” of the law’s black letter.22 In contrast, as Hoefich 
has documented, the historicist methodology developed by the German jurist Friedrich 
Carl von Savigny exerted a formative effect on work of English legal scientists, including 
John Phillimore, William Burge, and Dicey.23 While Savigny also sought to raise 
jurisprudence to the status of a science, he felt that doing so involved stressing the law’s 
local origins and historical context.24 For Savigny, assiduously systemizing the law as an 
organic and historically-contingent whole was meant to sustain order, not to facilitate 
reform along utilitarian lines. 
Thus, in spite of the discipline’s new objectivity, legal scholarship remained 
affected by the polarities of the rational and the Romantic. Between the two, Dicey’s Law 
                                                          
21 Note that Bentham was an act utilitarian, while Austin was a rule utilitarian. Rule 
utilitarians hold that an action is morally right if it conforms to a rule that leads to the 
greatest good. In contrast, act utilitarians judge an act in terms of the consequences of 
that act alone. See Kent Greenwalt, “Too Thin and Too Rich: Distinguishing Features of 
Legal Positivism” in Robert P George, ed, in The Autonomy of Law: Essays on Legal 
Positivism (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996) at 25. 
22 Lon L Fuller, The Anatomy of Law (New York: Praeger, 1968) at 160. 
23 Michael H Hoelich, “Savigny and his Anglo American Disciples” (1989) 37 Am J 
Comp L 17 at 18. 
24 Savigny felt that to assume that there is a natural law that transcends history, its 
specific time and place, is only an “hypostatis”, an illegitimate abstraction of positive or 
customary law from its local origins and context. See Frederick C Beiser, The German 
Historicist Tradition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011) at 216. 
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of the Constitution was clearly closer to the unhistorical, reform-oriented end of the 
spectrum. While replete with historical references, his seminal work was very much a 
positivist treatise, aimed at showing, among other things, the “existence” of 
Parliamentary sovereignty “as a legal fact.”25 To be sure, as Hoeflich has suggested, 
Dicey was not unaffected by historicist trends in legal science, but his use of historical 
methodology, particularly in his Law of the Constitution, was quite secondary. His use of 
historical sources was aimed at substantiating the “fact” of legislative sovereignty rather 
than legitimating it in a normative sense. This methodological choice was of course a 
result of the ends to which Dicey’s work was directed.  
In his view, his task as a legal scholar was primarily to analyse and codify formal 
legal rules so as to facilitate pedagogy and a “renovation of legal literature.”26 He 
accordingly sought to cast his work as that of “neither a critic, nor an apologist, nor of an 
eulogist” but merely of an “expounder.”27 Situating his work within the school of 
Bentham, a man he extolled as a “genius of the rarest quality,”28 Dicey felt that law could 
be thought of mathematically, and the greatest good secured by way of a utilitarian 
calculus. The “Orthodox” or “Diceyan” method of constitutional theory has thus been 
described as “analytical, formalist, scientific, mechanical, descriptive and positivist,”29 
with little heed given to the normative questions which had so concerned jurists in the 
late-Georgian period. In Dicey’s view, an era of “Benthamite Individualism” had eclipsed 
the age of “Old Toryism”  or “legislative quiescence” and affected a cleansing of legal 
scholarship of its Romantic intonations. 
A self-styled “unrepentant Benthamite,”30 Dicey’s work typified the utilitarian 
school in its methodological preoccupation with systematizing and codifying the law. 
                                                          
25 Dicey, Law of the Constitution, supra note 10 at 3. 
26 AV Dicey, Can English Law Be Taught At The Universities? An Inaugural Lecture, 
Delivered At All Souls College, 21st April 1883 (London: Macmillan & Co., 1883) as 
cited in Matthew Lewans, “Rethinking the Diceyan Dialectic” (2008) 58 UTLJ 75 at 80-
81. 
27 Dicey, Law of the Constitution, supra note 10 at cxxvii. 
28 Dicey, Lectures, supra note 14 at 93. 
29 Mark D Walters, “Dicey on Writing the Law of the Constitution” (2012) 32 Oxford J 
Legal Stud 21 at 22. 
30 Richard A Cosgrove, Albert Venn Dicey: Victorian Jurist (Chapel Hill: University of 
North Carolina Press, 1980) at 184. 
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Admirers of Bentham, Dicey included, sought to restate the law in prospective, ordered, 
textual instruments. This meant that Law of the Constitution took the form of a deliberate 
effort to systematize a body of law that had to that point remained self-consciously 
unsystematic. Dicey set out to “state” the laws of the constitution, to “arrange them in 
their order,” to “explain their meaning,” and to show their “logical connection.”31 He 
proceeded to identify three principles of British constitutionalism, of which parliamentary 
sovereignty was “most dominant.” For Dicey, the most basic principle of the constitution 
was that of an “absolutely sovereign legislature” having the “right to make or unmake 
any law whatever.” This “unlimited legislative authority” operated in conjunction with 
institutional convention and the rule of law, but was otherwise unnuanced.32 
In summary, after about 1830, the discourse of ancient or common law 
constitutionalism was gradually displaced by the principle of strict legislative supremacy. 
This was due in large measure to methodological pressures associated with the rise of 
legal science. Again, methodological choices depend on the questions asked by a scholar, 
which are themselves embedded in intellectual and culture life. The epistemological 
concerns of the age with which Dicey is associated yielded particular methodological 
priorities, which in turn affected the substance of the law. Restricting itself to the 
systematization of objectively verifiable legal rules, the methodology of legal science 
could not account for – indeed, it sought not to account for – the unempirical claims of 
late-Georgian constitutionalism. To be sure, Parliamentary sovereignty was a principle 
which emerged slowly and cannot be comprehensively traced here.33 It is sufficient to 
note for the purposes of this analysis, that the mid-nineteenth century, methodological 
pressures yielded a principle of strict parliamentary sovereignty as a key postulate of 
constitutional order in the U.K.  
The “nature” of legislative supremacy in Canada was derived from traditions of 
Parliamentary sovereignty in Britain. In neither country was the absolute right of the 
legislature to make law a textually-entrenched premise, from which all other 
                                                          
31 Dicey, Law of the Constitution, supra note 10 at cxxvii. 
32 Ibid at 3-4.  
33 For a comprehensive account of the historical development of legislative supremacy in 
the United Kingdom, see Jeffrey Goldsworthy, Parliamentary Soveriegnty: 
Contemporary Debates (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010). 
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constitutional realities were necessarily deduced. To the contrary, as this section has 
made clear, legislative sovereignty was a postulate arrived at rather more inductively, 
through interpretation of the institutional realities of British constitutionalism in a given 
historical period. That interpretation was itself heavily influenced by changing norms as 
to what constitutes sound epistemology. As the rest of this chapter will indicate, the 
consequence of this particular historical development, is that legislative supremacy in 
Canada was comparatively easy to abridge through an expansion of the power of judicial 
review in the last-quarter of the twentieth century. Again, the legislature’s authority was 
long subjected to shifting institutional balances. Therefore, the “nature” of legislative 
supremacy in Canada, quite apart from its scope, was highly amenable to the 
incorporation of judicial review. 
 
iii) The Nature of Legislative Supremacy in France 
 
The nature of legislative sovereignty in France is textually-prescribed in Art. 3 of 
the 1789 Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen (the “DDHC”) and Art. 3 of the 
Constitution of 4 October 1958, both of which are in force (en vigeur) as constitutional 
instruments of the Fifth Republic.34 It is important to emphasize that the legal force of 
these articles derives not from their black letter as constitutional texts, but from the extent 
to which they reflect “republican principles” (principes républicains) of constitutional 
value. In French constitutionalism, the textual instrument is not the “source” for a given 
principle per se, but a locus of its transcription from centuries of republican literary, 
philosophical and aesthetic representation. The so-called “constitutional value” of such 
principles derive from their status as norms at the apex of a deductive system of truths in 
development since the French Enlightenment. Like all principles of constitutional value, 
those respecting legislative authority are to be regarded as innate or a priori truths, 
knowable by the light of human reason and irreproachable as a matter of natural law. 
                                                          
34 “La souveraineté nationale appartient au peuple; ses représentants et par la voie du 
référendum; “[a]ucune section du peuple ni aucun individu peut s’en attribuer l’exercise.” 
See Déclaration des Droits de l’Homme et du Citoyen de 1789 at Art 3 and Constitution 




Article 3 of the 1958 Constitution iterates verbatim Art. 3 of that of 1946 (now 
obsolete), stating that “National sovereignty vests in the people.” It proceeds to prescribe 
that the people will exercise its sovereignty through “their representatives and by means 
of referendum.” Finally, in both documents, the principle is supplemented by the proviso 
“no section of the people nor any individual may arrogate to itself, or to himself, the 
exercise thereof.”35 Thus, the effect of the 1946 and 1958 sovereignty clauses is to 
reinforce the principle of sovereignty set out in Art. 3 of the 1789 DDHC. That is, that 
“the principle of all sovereignty resides essentially in the Nation,” and that “[N]o 
norporate body, no individual may exercise any authority that does not emante expressly 
from it.” Thus, it is a principle of constitutional value in the Fifth Republic, quite apart 
from its formal constitutional texts, that sovereignty resides inalienably in the “nation,” 
and is to be exercised by its representatives to the exclusion of all other institutional 
actors.  
Given the extent to which republican principles are derived from literary, 
philosophical, and artistic disciplines, it should be unsurprising that the principle of 
national sovereignty enjoys a theoretical depth that belies the historical ephemerality of 
French constitutional instruments. Indeed, since the DDHC of 1789 was incorporated as 
the preamble of the constitution of 1791,36 the sovereignty principle has infrequently 
enjoyed a status which may be considered as legally operative.37 After 1791, the principle 
of sovereignty residing in the nation was in declining measures sustained by the 
                                                          
35 “Le principe de toute souveraineté réside essentiellement dans la Nation. Nul corps, nul 
individu peut exercer d’authorité qui n’en émane expressément.” Constitution du 4 
octobre 1958, ibid, and Préambule de la Constitution du 27 octobre 1946, online: 
Legifrance <http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr> 
36 The Acte constitutionnel de 30 septembre 1791 was France’s first written constitution 
after the collapse of absolute monarchy. The Déclaration des Droits de l’Homme et du 
Citoyen of 1789 was incorporated as its preamble. It fell out of disuse on 22 September 
1792 with the declaration of the first French Republic (1792 – 1804). 
37 It should be cautioned that what it means for a constitutional provision to be “legally 
operative” has changed much since the end of the eighteenth century. Modern notions of 
“judicial review,” while frequently traced to the decision of the Supreme Court of the 
United States in Marybury v Madison, 5 US 137 (1803), arguably did not take on 
anything like their present meaning until the mid to late-nineteenth century. Early French 
constitutional provisions were certainly intended to be hortatory and aspirational in their 
nature, rather than legally enforceable by an independent judiciary in the modern sense. 
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constitutions of 1793, 1795, and 179938 until being displaced by the adoption of the 1804 
constitution, which established the First French Empire. While the constitution of the 
Second French Republic (1848-1851) reinstituted sovereignty in the nation to the 
exclusion of individuals or factions, it too was rendered obsolete by the establishment of 
the Second French Empire in 1851. It was not until the 1946 constitutional that national 
sovereignty again had a textual basis in a constitutional document, given that the Third 
Republic (1870 – 1940) lacked a formal constitutional structure.39 
Indeed, as Martin Rogoff has suggested, national sovereignty is one of many 
republican principles which have found their true expression in a vast body of “literary, 
philosophical, and political works,”40 extending at least as far back as the Enlightenment. 
In Rogoff’s view, the French Revolutionary era (1789-1804) was in essence an 
“apotheosis of the Law [la Loi],” a development yielded by a century of intense literary 
criticism of Ancien Régime institutions by such luminaries as Montesquieu, Rousseau, 
Mably, and Diderot. To be sure, in French “la Loi,” refers to statutory law, and does not 
connote constitutional norms or general principles of justice (those may be implied by the 
                                                          
38 The Acte constitutionelle du 24 juin 1793, also known as the Constitution de l’An 1 or 
the Constitution Montagnard was in effect until suspended indefinitely on 10 October 
1793 when the a decree from the Committee for Public Safety declared that “The 
Provisional Government of France is revolutionary until there is peace.” See Micahel 
Kennedy, The Jacobin Clubs in the French Revolution: 1793-1795 (New York, Berghahn 
Books, 2000) at 53. The Constitution de août 1795 (Constitution de 5 fructidor an III) 
established France as a bicameral directorial republic. The constitution of the Directory 
was abolished in 1799 and replaced by the Constitution de 13 décembre 1799 (also called 
the Constitution de 22 frimaire an VII) which established the French Consulate (1799-
1804). The Consulate was a more conservative and authoritarian republic with a three-
person executive. The Constitution de 10 mai 1802 (Constitution de 15 thermidor an X) 
conferred near ditatorial power on Napoleon Bonaparte as First Consul for Life. Finally, 
the Constitution de 18 mai 1804 (Constitution de 28 floréal an XII) did away with 
republican notions of national sovereignty and inaugurated the First French Empire with 
Bonaparate as Emperor. 
39 The three principle laws which organized the Third Republic are: la loi du 24 février 
1875 which concerned the organization of the French senate, la loi du 25 fevrier 1875 
which dealt with the organization of the government, and la loi du 16 julliet 1875 which 
clarified aspects of the operation of the government. See Leslie Derfler, The Third 
French Republic, 1870-1840 (France: Van Nostrand, 1966). 
40 Martin A Rogoff, French Constitutional Law: Cases and Materials, 2nd ed, (Durham, 
North Carolina: Carolina Academic Press, 2014) at 8-9. 
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term “le droit.”)41 Therefore, by suggesting that the period of 1789-1804 represented an 
“apotheosis of the law,” Rogoff was referring to the revolutionary ascendency of strict 
legislative supremacy and the concomitant decline of Ancien Régime institutions.42 The 
implication of an “apotheosis” in this context is that legislative authority, at least in 
theory, attained primacy after a long process of becoming, akin to a deification. 
To be sure, in this thesis, any discussion of the literary, philosophical and 
aesthetic traditions from which the sovereignty principle emerged must be somewhat 
cursory. It may generally be said, however, is that the French Enlightenment was 
attended by a search for first principles and origins in all fields of human endeavour. 
Accordingly, for most forms of French architecture, art and philosophy developed during 
the eighteenth century, the effects of a “neo-classical” preoccupation with the “true style 
of the ancients” is intelligible.43 This is no less true of philosophy where an ideal of the 
“citizen” inspired by the Roman Republic became an objective of scholarly fixation. The 
public “citoyen” was stoic, austere, and dismissive of worldly vanities. Indeed, it may be 
said that literary and aesthetic trends in late-eighteenth century France reflected a 
sustained deliberation on the association between primitive simplicity and virtue. It is an 
association that remains at the heart of sovereignty in French republican thought. 
Arguably, the most influential writer on such matters was Jean-Jacques Rousseau 
(1712-1788). In his view, man, in a pre-social “state of nature,” had been happy and 
good, but had been corrupted by social institutions. The social institutions of mid-
eighteenth century France, he contended, were sustained by the conceit of “amour 
propre,” or an acute awareness of, and regard for, oneself in relation to others.44 The 
impulse to seek advantage relative to others had so corrupted man, Rousseau held, that 
man had become defined by relations of inequity. He was materially and psychologically 
dependent on other men, and as such, bound by laws to which he did not consent. 
                                                          
41 Martin A Rogoff, “The French Revolution of 1958-1998” as cited in Rogoff, ibid at 47. 
42 See Peter S Campbell, “Absolute Monarchy” in William Doyle, ed, The Oxford 
Handbook of the Ancien Régime (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012) at 16-17.  
43 Grafton, Most, and Settis, eds. The Classical Tradition (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard 
University Press, 2010) at 629. 
44 See for example Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Émile, or on Education, trans by Allan Bloom 
(Washington: Pegasus Books, 1979) at 67-8. 
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Rousseau thus began his 1762 treatise, On the Social Contract by declaring that “[m]an is 
born free, and everywhere is in chains.”45 To be sure, the manacles which he decried 
were of a kind forged in the mind. For Rousseau, it was the mental bondage of “amour 
propre” which gave rise to inequitable relations. Accordingly, he urged, he who “thinks 
he is the master of others” would find himself “more enslaved than they.” 
In order for man’s freedom to be “restored,” Rousseau wrote, man as an 
individual had to be governed by the general will (“volonté genérale”). Since it was 
volition that infused human action with moral content, he reasoned, in order to be 
legitimately bound by a law in moral terms, the individual had to be active in the law’s 
authorship. To be free in civil society, the individual was thus obliged to join with others, 
as a citizen, in the work of self-government.  Rousseau believed that if men gathered in a 
“single body,” a general will would be discernable to the extent that it referenced 
interests related to their “common preservation and general well-being.” The general will 
would be “so manifestly evident” that “only common sense [would be] needed to discern 
it.”46 As Judith Shklar has written, the notion of general will “conveys everything 
[Rousseau] most wanted to say,” because it is a “transposition of the most essential 
individual moral faculty [volition] to the realm of public experience” reconciling 
individual freedom with civil society.47  
It must be emphasized, however, that for Rousseau, “general will” was not 
coterminous with “majority rule.” He felt that the counter-egoistic influence of a 
classically-inspired form of “civic virtue” was necessary to prevent government 
according to the self-interest of a majority of individuals taken in aggregate. What was 
required for man to be free was a “healing education” that relieved him from the bondage 
of amour propre and returned him to himself.48 The education he contemplated was one 
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that enabled “natural man” to survive corrupt society. In Rousseau’s view, man needed to 
rediscover “amour de soi,” a natural impulse for self-preservation which, guided by 
reason and empathy (“pitié”) yielded virtue. It is for this reason that education figured so 
strongly in Rousseau’s thought. The formative influence of civic virtue was required to 
draw the individual out of himself, and re-orient him to the general or common good. By 
definition then, the virtuous citizen was “non-particularist,”49 and saw his good as co-
extensive with the common good. 
Rousseau’s On the Social Contract deeply influenced the drafters of the DDHC of 
1789.50 This was certainly true of the Abbé Emmanuel Joseph Sieyès (1748-1836),51 who 
authored the document’s sovereignty clause in Art. 3, and prescribed in Art. 6 that law 
must express the “general will.” In his highly influential pamphlet What is the Third 
Estate?, which was widely-circulated prior to the convening of the Estates General in 
1789,52 Sieyès urged that the standing of clergy and nobility as separate “estates” be 
nullified and that all legislative authority be vested in a unicameral “national assembly.” 
Such a legislative body would give expression to the “general will,” which was, he wrote, 
the “source of all legality” as a matter of natural law.53 He urged that within such a body, 
“private interests are bound to remain insulated” for self-government to be achieved.54 
Thus, Sieyès articulated a view of sovereignty that equated the pursuit of private interests 
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with the seeking of advantage relative to others, an impulse which on its face frustrated 
the emancipatory purposes of political association. 
In addition to the period’s most influential philosophical tracts, the republican 
ideal of sovereignty residing in the “nation” was exalted in the visual arts. In the years of 
the National Convention (1792-1795) and Directory governments (1795-1799) in 
particular, Rousseau’s sentiments were seized upon and reified by artists with a 
passionate imagination for antiquity, such as Jacques-Louis David, and his pupils, Jean-
Germaine Drouais, and Anne-Louis Girodet-Trioson. These artists set about re-
constructing through visual representation the entire spectrum of admirable human 
qualities, from displays of virtue to corporeal beauty, in classical terms.55 Calling upon 
the “noble simplicity and calm grandeur”56 of antiquity as stylistic points of reference 
these artists ensured that aesthetic representation in the last years of the eighteenth 
century both reinforced the association perceived between civic virtue and self-
government, and stressed the stylistic desirability of austerity and simplicity. In doing so, 
David and his disciples not only revolutionized French art, but embedded a particular 
vision of republican sovereignty in the national memory.  
The republican notion of national sovereignty would be richly and fulsomely 
developed in a vast body of political, literary and philosophical works throughout the 
nineteenth century. Importantly, it remained a relatively stable concept given the rigour 
with which it was developed during the Revolutionary years. Indeed, in republican 
discourse, national sovereignty was recognized as an a priori truth, as a principle of 
natural law not requiring empirical confirmation. So basic and self-evident was the 
principle that it was understood as a premise from which all other constitutional realities 
were to be deduced. It was not, in contrast, a postulate of constitutional order, arrived at 
inductively, from scholarly attempts to make sense of or to legitimate their institutions. 
Were that the case, the principle may have been more vulnerable to different 
methodological pressures associated with different temporal periods. The principle of 
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national sovereignty, while not operative as a constitutional provision after 1804, 
persisted in arts, philosophy, and literature, as an inheritance of the Revolution, and an 
ideal quite independent of institutional realities. 
A century later, in a lecture delivered on March 11, 1882, the philosopher Ernest 
Renan reflected on the meaning of the word “nation” as it had come to be used in 
republican discourse. After dismissing race, religion, language, and geography as 
“essential elements” of the nation, he declared the nation to be a no less than “a soul, 
[and] a spiritual principle.”57 He proceeded to delineate two constituent elements of that 
principle, which he said were “in truth but one.” The “nation,” he urged, was a kind of 
unity of both past and present. It was an historical concept, he held, which derived its 
meaning from “a rich legacy of memories” transcribed in philosophy, literature, and art. 
It was also very much a present concept, connoting “present-day consent, the desire to 
live together, [and] the will to perpetuate the value of the inheritance that one has 
received in an undivided form.”58 Renan’s formulation of the “nation” implicates the 
importance of the history of republican thought and the term’s inextricability from 
literary, artistic and other cultural expression since the Revolution. 
In summary, in the Fifth Republic, sovereignty is vested in the “nation” and is 
exercised by the nation’s elected representatives in a sort of trustee capacity. While it is 
twice articulated in the republic’s operative constitutional instruments, its real 
significance as a principle is to be found in centuries of republican philosophy, literary 
and artistic endeavour. The notion of sovereignty in France remains deeply embedded in 
a particular theory of republican government which emerged out of the French 
Revolution of the late-eighteenth century. Indeed, it is in the context of a revolutionary 
assertion of force that the principle must be understood. For instance, its peculiar stress 
on the essential unity of the people as a fraternal civic community is only intelligible in 
light of the social and institutional corporatism of the Anicen Régime.59 It is because of 
those inequities that Rousseau and his disciples came to stress the necessity of equality 
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for liberty and self-government. The natural result is a system of strict legislative 
supremacy that is prima facie ill-suited to the influence of other institutional actors. 
 
iv) The Origins of Judicial Review as a Substantive Exercise in Canada 
 
The historical development of legislative supremacy in Canada and the French 
Republic has powerfully shaped judicial reasoning in both jurisdictions. Again, in France, 
legislative supremacy was part of an assertion of national sovereignty as a principle or 
norm of constitutional value with which all other laws must comport. In Canada, in the 
tradition of British constitutionalism, the supremacy of legislative authority has tended to 
be seen as more of a postulate, arrived at inductively from the study of institutional 
realties in relation to custom and historical precedent. Arguably, the traditional view of 
the role of the legislature was in Canada, at least at a conceptual level, better able to 
tolerate an expanded role for judicial review when a constitutional rights instrument was 
adopted in 1982.60 As this section will reveal, in Canada, the development of a 
comparatively searching and fact-sensitive form of judicial review for rights violations 
was further assisted by a well-established practice of review for legislative competence 
with the division of powers between federal and provincial governments as required by 
the BNA Act, 1867.61  
Again, after Dicey published his Law of the Constitution in 1885, legislative 
supremacy was the norm in Canada. As William Robson noted, by 1939 there was 
“scarcely anyone who studied law, politics or constitutional history in England or the 
British Dominions” who had not been “brought up on Dicey.”62 To this Mark D. Walters 
added that Dicey’s celebrated treatise attained “canonical” status throughout the common 
law world.63 Indeed, in their recent accounts of the role of legislative supremacy in 
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Canadian constitutional law, both Peter Hogg and Patrick Monahan have cited the 
Diceyan concept of that principle as a starting point. But both have hastened to add that 
the federal character of Canadian legislative institutions precluded a strict application of a 
parliamentary right to “make or unmake any law whatever.” For Hogg, the federal 
division of powers set out in ss. 91 to 95 of the Constitution Act, 1982,64 “forced some 
fundamental departures” from the Diceyan standard.65 In Monahan’s view, a “moderate” 
form of legislative sovereignty has been applied to comport with the federal principle.66  
Thus, legislative supremacy in Canada has long referred to the notion that, within 
their respective jurisdictions, federal and provincial legislatures enjoy an absolute right to 
make law. That is, but for questions of vires, the “sovereign power to legislate” was an 
otherwise “absolute privilege”67 and could not be abridged if exercised pursuant to the 
authority conferred by ss. 91 to 95. The “Diceyan” notion of legislative sovereignty was 
repeatedly affirmed in early decisions of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, 
and formed the basis of the principle of exhaustive distribution of legislative authority. 
Per Attorny General for Ontario v. Attorney General for Canada, “whatever belongs to 
self-government in Canada belongs either to the Dominion or to the provinces, within the 
limits of the British North America Act.”68 While this dictum hints at the supremacy of 
imperial statutes, its real import is the extent to which it implicates the principle of 
parliamentary sovereignty as it came to be recognized in Canada. That is, an absolute 
right to make law, so long as such law was enacted intra vires. 
This division of powers is the basis upon which judicial review of legislation for 
constitutionality developed after 1982. The strictures imposed by ss. 91 to 95 obliged 
Canadian courts to invalidate laws enacted ultra vires, or outside of a legislature’s 
circumscribed jurisdiction. Courts have also developed rules they have said are entailed 
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by the federal principle, such as restriction on the drafting of excessively vague laws,69 
legislative inter-delegation,70 and the use of privative clauses to preclude judicial review 
of statutes.71 For the purposes of this chapter, however, the focus will be on the process 
by which legislation is “struck down” for violating the text of ss. 91 to 95. In certain key 
respects, the way in which courts have dealt with legislation engaging these provisions 
was carried over for review of alleged rights violations in constitutional rights 
adjudication. As will be revealed in the rest of this chapter, the jurisprudential techniques 
applied in Canada for review of statutes is highly inductive, involving a thorough-going 
inquiry into the substance of the challenged law. 
The normative bases for review on federal grounds are not entirely clear. In 
Hogg’s view, the overriding force of the limits imposed by ss. 91 to 95 of the BNA Act, 
1867 is derived from their status as imperial legislation protected from alteration by the 
Colonial Laws Validity Act of 1865 (the “CVLA”). Section 2 of the CVLA prescribed that 
any colonial law which was “in any respect repugnant” to legislation of the UK 
Parliament, would, “to the extent of such repugnancy but not otherwise, be and remain 
absolutely void and inoperative.”72 Thus, if either the federal or provincial legislature 
purported to make law beyond the jurisdiction granted by the BNA Act, such legislation 
would be voided as “repugnant” to imperial legislation. While doctrine of repugnancy 
was nullified by the Statute of Westminster, it persisted as a rationale for giving primacy 
to the BNA Act after 1931, due to an exception in s. 7 of that Act protecting the country’s 
constituent statute from domestic amendment.73  
For his part, Norman Siebrasse has argued that the doctrine of repugnancy was 
not the established means of justifying review for compliance with ss. 91 to 95. Indeed, in 
his work on the origins of Canadian judicial review, Siebrasse located only three cases 
making explicit reference to the CVLA or to conflict with imperial statutes in order to 
strike down a federal or provincial law. He urged that in fact established practice in the 
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country had been to relate such measures to “excess of jurisdiction.”74 That doctrine did 
not justify invalidity of a Canadian law based on its hierarchical relationship to an 
imperial statute, but upon the text of the BNA Act itself as the source for the legislature’s 
authority.75 While Sebrasse conceded that in practice the distinction between the two 
rationales may be “so fine as to be invisible,”76 the lack of clarity as to the theoretical 
basis for judicial review until 1982 again speaks to the comparatively ad hoc and half-
conscious development of Canadian constitutionalism. 
The best account of the normative bases of judicial review in Canada is one that is 
sufficiently capacious to take in both rationales. Seabrasse’s finding of scant reference to 
the CLVA or to the supremacy of imperial statues does not conclusively indicate that 
repugnancy played a negligible role. Indeed, it was not in keeping with the inductive 
culture of the common law for reviewing courts to elaborate on the rationale for the 
textual provision they cited in applying the law absent some material reason for doing so. 
Further, Seabrasse understated the extent to which the excess of jurisdiction doctrine 
emerged from repugnancy as an historical rationale for judicial review. Though 
conceptually distinct in the strict sense, both were sourced in the practice of English 
competition law of constraining corporate ordinances by requiring that they not be 
“repugnant” to the laws of the state.77 The authority of federal and provincial legislatures 
in Canada must be thought of in these terms; that is, as “grants” of power, determining 
the outer limits of which was an exercise in discerning the will of the UK Parliament. 
In any case, since 1867, British and Canadian courts have been tasked with 
arbitrating the division of powers set out in the BNA Act.78 The JCPC established early on 
that a law’s compatibility with the jurisdictional limits set by ss. 91 and 92 is determined 
                                                          
74 N Siebrasse, “The Doctrinal Origin of Judicial Review and the Colonial Laws Validity 
Act” (1993) 1 Rev of Const Stud 75 at 75. 
75 Ibid at 91. 
76 Ibid at 92. 
77 For a more comprehensive overview of the practices out of which judical review 
developed see Mary Sarah Bilder, “The Corporate Origins of Judicial Review” (2006) 
116 Yale LJ 502. 
78 Until 1949, the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in England was the final court 
of appeal for British North America. 
33 
 
by an inquiry into its “pith and substance,”79 and Canadian courts have proceeded as 
stare decisis. Application of the so-called “pith and substance doctrine” has generally 
involved two stages, the first of which obliges the court to ascertain the “matter” of the 
impugned legislation. The “matter” has been variously described as the law’s “true 
meaning,” its “true nature and character,” but most commonly, its “pith and substance.”80 
This determination is made by scrutinizing both the law’s purpose and its effects.81 Once 
a court has identified the law’s pith and substance, it proceeds to a second stage, at which 
it decides whether such a law fits within the jurisdiction conferred on the enacting 
legislature by the BNA Act.  
For the purposes of this chapter, it is sufficient to note that review for compliance 
with the federal principle has always been a deeply inductive exercise in which the “true” 
substance of a law is probed by the court. Indeed, given the potential for legislation to 
affect multiple and over-lapping “matters,” application of the pith and substance doctrine 
may more accurately be said to involve identifying the “dominant” or “most important” 
matter of an enacted law.82 Again, the court assesses the relevant “facts” of a statute, 
namely its purpose and effects, and reasons inductively from them to arrive at what may 
be said to be its “proper matter.” It is well-established that the inquiry is not a technical, 
formal exercise, narrowly focused on the strict legal operation of the law. Rather, 
consistent with inductive reasoning’s orientation to probability rather than absolute truth, 
courts have stressed that the inquiry must be thorough-going with respect to the facts and 
heavily reliant on the court’s independent judgment. 
It should be added that in division of powers jurisprudence, as elsewhere, the 
binding nature of precedent requires the court to reason in a highly fact-sensitive way. 
The application of a rule for which a given precedent stands is of course the end point of 
reasoning from precedent. That application can only take place after assiduous review of 
the facts in order to determine whether a given rule applies or whether it should be re-
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formulated by carving out an exception that better suits the case at hand (what in 
common law is referred to as “distinguishing”). That decision is generally arrived at in a 
way that is heavily reliant on analogy, a form of reasoning which, again, only makes 
sense if previous judicial decisions constitute a binding source of law. It may therefore be 
said that the facts of the case are not merely the object of review, but a “tool” of review, 
leveraged in such a way that would not be possible in civilian systems where the 
judiciary is assigned a more passive role. 
To conclude, by the time the Charter was incorporated on 17 April 1982, 
Canadian courts were well-practiced in probing the substance of legislation, and delving 
into the purposes for which it was enacted. In so-called “division of powers” 
jurisprudence, before the “matter” of the legislation is assigned to a proper head of 
power, the reviewing court engages in a thorough and often highly discretionary 
assessment of the substance of the challenged law. This form of review was 
complimented by the inductive nature of common law reasoning,  which required 
working from the facts and rendering inferences about probability. In this sense, between 
the polarities of facts and principles, both of which would be engaged by a 
proportionality inquiry, Canadian courts were historically oriented to facts. With the 
incorporation of a supra-national tool of rights adjudication, well-established methods of 
legal reasoning were brought to bear and yielded a comparatively searching form of that 
test. 
 
v) The Origins of Judicial Review as a Deductive Exercise in France 
 
In France, judicial review of legislation for constitutionality was incorporated in a 
series of steps beginning in 1958 with the establishment of the Constitutional Council. It 
is generally agreed that the competence to review promulgated statutes for conformity 
with constitutional rights instruments was not contemplated by that body’s founders.83 To 
the contrary, the council was set up with the general objective of ensuring the proper 
functioning of French governmental institutions, with particular emphasis on protecting 
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the executive from encroachment by the legislative branch.84 Notably, the Constitutional 
Council did not exercise a judicial function in the strict sense, and there remains no 
formal requirement that appointees have legal qualifications.85 Thus, while the 1958 
constitution initiated the beginning of a form of judicial review for constitutionality, the 
Constitutional Council was an essentially passive body set up in such a way as not to 
compromise legislative supremacy. The first sign of a potential for real intrusion of the 
council into the substantive work of the legislature would not arise until 1971. 
In that year, the Constitutional Council affected an establishment of an a priori 
form of judicial review in its landmark decision in Dec. No 71-33 DC (“Liberté 
d’association “). Seized on 1 July 1971 of draft legislation allowing the state to withhold 
recognition of an association perceived to have an “illicit purpose,”86 the proposed law 
was held to offend the 1946 constitution’s preambular reference to the “fundamental 
principles recognized by the laws of the Republic” (the “PFRLR”), which surely included 
freedom of association.87 Thus, in what has been referred to as a “coup d’état 
constitutionnel,”88 the Constitutional Council rendered legally operative a set of rights 
thereafter referred to as the “bloc de constitutionalité.”89 After Liberté d’association, all 
sub-constitutional laws were required to comply not only with the provisions of the 1958 
constitution, but with the rights set out in the 1789 DDHC and the preamble of the 1946 
Constitution, including its preambular reference to any number of unspecified PFRLR.90 
It should be emphasized that until 1 March 2010, judicial review by the 
Constitutional Council was only available in a narrow window after the passage of a 
statute but before its promulgation,91 and only if a sufficient number of legislators 
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assented to its review.92 This form of a priori judicial review effectively preserved 
legislative supremacy. However, judicial review of promulgated statutes became possible 
with the 2008 enactment of the Loi constitutionnelle de modernisation des institutions de 
la Ve République.93 As of March 1, 2010, the date on which that reform took effect, a 
party may file a petition in the course of litigation (a QPC or “une question prioritaire 
constitutionnel”) to have a law reviewed for its constitutionality by the Constitutional 
Council.94 The council thus engaged in full a postiori review of promulgated legislation 
for conformity with the texts and principes of the bloc de constitutionalité. In doing so, it 
has preserved the French practice of reasoning by deduction, which developed to give the 
appearance of judicial restraint. 
Indeed, the French aversion to judicial authority is deeply-rooted. Given the 
extent to which the French republican tradition emphasized volition and consent for laws 
to be legitimate, it is unsurprising that it was stipulated in Art. 3 of the 1789 DDHC that 
no individual or body could exercise authority unless such authority emanated expressly 
(émane expressément) from the people. That document’s exclusion of non-representative 
institutional actors was reinforced by the constitutions of 1946 and 1958. Indeed, this 
long-standing antipathy to the emergence of non-representative institutional actors, or 
what Pierre Levy has called “other legitimacies,” has had a profound effect on the 
development of the judiciary in France.95 Indeed, the country’s distinctive form of 
judicial reasoning (which will be explored in greater depth as this analysis proceeds), was 
developed to comport with a comparatively passive role that has been ascribed to the 
French judiciary. The republican principle of sovereignty residing in the nation has long 
been ill-suited to recognition of other sources of authority outside the legislative branch. 
It should be noted this distrust of judicial authority also has a specific historical 
cause. While republican resistance to the influence of “other legitimacies” is informed by 
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a wide array of institutional inequities attributed to the Ancien Régime, the 
unrepresentative nature of its court structure left an enduring distrust of the judicial role. 
Prior to their abolition in 1789, the highest courts of appeal in France were provincial 
appellate courts or “parlements,” made up of members of the nobility referred to as the 
“noblesse de robe.”96 Membership in the parlements was in the vast majority of cases 
based on inherited title and the influence wielded by them was widely perceived to be 
inequitable.97 Accordingly, as Jean Louis Goutal has noted, since 1790 French judges 
have practiced “deduction and nothing but deduction”98 in an effort to avoid the 
application of judicial discretion in applying the law as developed by the legislature. 
Indeed, the appearance of judicial discretion is ably avoided through strict 
deduction. Heeding Rousseau’s instruction in On the Social Contract that “the scope (la 
portée) of legislation is always general,”99 legal rules, including rights, most often take 
the form of statements of general principle, radically compressed into broad language and 
short sentences, expressing essential content but no more, through a drafting technique  
known as “concision.”100 The role of the judge is to apply that law mechanically, as 
though the legislature at issue “has already judged.”101 In doing so, the reviewing court 
refers to the legislation using the language of “assertion, not of argument;” and renders a 
decision that is “existential and descriptive, not formative and prescriptive.”102 Not 
admitting of dissenting opinions and disallowing the use of verbs suggesting the exercise 
of judgment by the judge,103 the court’s opinion is presented as a strict exercise in 
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deduction. Through the deductive technique of syllogisme judiciare, the facts of a case 
are subsumed under a general legal rule as the “end point” in chain of stringently logical 
steps. 
As the next chapter will show, the Constitutional Council has been able to review 
legislation for compliance with the three requirements of proportionality through 
essentially deductive reasoning. Prevailing methods of rights adjudication therefore 
reflect both the institutional development of the Constitutional Council, which long 
resisted probing the merits or “substance” of legislation, and long-established practices in 
French legal reasoning more generally. Accordingly, in the context of the proportionality 
inquiry, which again is a hybrid exercise, the reasoning of the Constitutional Council is 
more principle-oriented, with the facts of the case taking a secondary role. To be sure, the 
facts of the case are probed and evaluated in some measure but only to the extent 
necessary to determine the principle under which they are to be subsumed. The facts are 
not leveraged to formulate principles through induction, and the council does not, at least 
in the strict sense, set precedent and craft jurisprudence as a formal source of law. 
Still, the Constitutional Council does review promulgated legislation for 
conformity with the constitution and its authority to do so remains un-reconciled with the 
practice of legislative supremacy and the principle of national sovereignty from which it 
is derived. Both Art. 3. of the 1789 DDHC and Art. 3 of the 1958 constitution expressly 
deny the legitimacy of all authority that does not emanate expressly from the people (“qui 
n’en émane expressément”). The text of Art 6. of the 2008 amendment, dealing with 
constitutional review (“contrôle de constitutionnalité,”) does not address the upset to 
institutional norms affected by an expansion of judicial review.  No attempt is made to 
reconcile facially discordant constitutional requirements. The amendment merely makes 
provision for judicial review of enacted statutes and specifies the procedures by which it 
may be sought by a complainant. The justificatory basis of judicial review therefore 
remains ambiguous and subject to much scholarly debate. 
The most widely accepted explanation for reconciling judicial review with 
legislative supremacy and national sovereignty was developed at least as early as 1982 by 
                                                          
“Approaches to Statutory Interpretation and Legislative History in France” (2003) 13 
Duke J Comp & Int’l L 195. 
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the French constitutional scholar Louis Favoreu. He developed a theory of judicial review 
based on the analogy of the “pointsman” (“la théorie de l’aiguilleur”). In Favoreu’s view, 
any finding of unconstitutionality would be analysed as a lack of institutional competence 
by the ordinary legislator  (as “le pouvoir constitué”) to make a decision solely within the 
jurisdiction of the authority that made the constitution (“le pouvoir constituant”).  Not 
expressing a view on the substance or merits of the law, the role of the reviewing body is 
merely to indicate which way ought to be taken at an unclear juncture between legislative 
and constitutional procedure. The exercise is a purely procedural and highly compatible 
with syllogistic reasoning. The Constitutional Council serves as a sort of “pointsman,” 
directing trains down one track or another.104 According to Favoreu, so long as the 
pouvoirs constitués are aligned with the will of the pouvoir constituant, the general will is 
undisturbed. 
While Favoreu’s “pointsman” theory forms the basis of a considerable amount of 
literature on the justificatory bases of French judicial review, it has been criticized for 
conflating constitutional rights instruments with the general will. It effectively forsees 
two sources of general will, that to which current representatives give expression and that 
of the constituent authority. In terms of the practical result of this line of reasoning, it is 
difficult to argue that the idea of general will ever contemplated the authority of 
unelected judges prevailing over representative assemblies in constitutional matters. It is 
for this reason that Georges Vedel posited that Favoreu’s approach could be legitimated 
by the potential for affected a constitutional amendment (“une révision”).105 Simply put, 
in Videl’s view, the availability of constitutional revision or amendment allowed the 
nation to re-assert its will over the Constitutional Council if it was so determined. 
National sovereignty was therefore preserved because the elected representatives of the 
nation retained final say, notwithstanding the difficulty involved in securing a 
constitutional amendment.106  
                                                          
104 Louis Favoreu, “Le Conseil constitutionnel et la cohabitation” as cited in Marie-Claire 
Ponthoreau, University of Bordeaux (France, unpublished paper) at 3-4. 




It is noteable that the justifications provided by both Favoreau and Vedel 
disoblige the Constitutional Council from reviewing the substance of the legislation in 
question. Again, consistent with deductive modes of legal reasoning, between the 
polarities of facts and principles, French jurists find themselves oriented to principles. 
Again, this is not to say that they are inattentive to facts, but rather to acknowledge that 
civilian legal reasoning has a different relationship to the facts than does the common 
law. What is ultimately being attempted is to preserve this distinction while yielding 
identical benefits through the use of proportionality principles. Whether or not such a 
system can be reconciled with a deeply-entrenched principle of national sovereignty 
remains contentious. 
 
vi) Approaches to Proportionality in Both Legal Systems are Converging 
 
The proportionality standard has been called “the most successful legal transplant 
of the twentieth century.”107 Indeed, as this chapter has suggested, the incorporation of 
proportionality into Canada and the Fifth French Republic has affected a remarkably fast 
and far-reaching synchronization of the machinery of rights ajudication in both countries, 
despite legacies of sharply different conceptions of the judicial function and modes of 
legal reasoning. Both jurisdictions now provide for judicial review of enacted legislation 
where its effects may infringe a constitutionally-protected right. Again, proportionality 
involves elements of inductive, fact-sensitive reasoning and deduction from general 
principles. The practical effect of the adoption of that hybrid standard in common law 
Canada and civilian France has been the application of a standard that is more factually-
driven in the former and more principle-oriented in the latter. In both cases, however, the 
same methodological pressures are exerted, affecting a narrowing of the legislature’s 
discretion in limiting constitutional rights. 
It cannot be definitively said whether one approach to review of legislation is 
necessarily more rigorous or searching than the other.  What can be said is that if there is 
                                                          
107 Mattias Kumm, “Constitutional Rights as Principles: On the Structure and Domain of 
Constitutional Justice” (2003) 2 International Journal of Constitutional Law 574, 595 as 
cited in Michel Rosenfeld and András Sajó, eds, The Oxford Handbook of Comparative 
Constitutional Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013) at 1315. 
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a difference between the degree of deference afforded to the legislature between the two 
applications of proportionality that is related to their relative fact-sensitivity, that 
differene is gradual diminishing. Both countries seem to be increasingly attentive to 
foreign methodological practices when applying proportionality.108 Indeed, there is 
evidence that the Supreme Court of Canada is moving toward a more principle-focused 
formulation of the test. It is also clear that in its constitutional interpretation, the 
Constitutional Council has elevated the influence of jurisprudence in French 
constitutional law. Reference to case law, and by neccessary implication a tendency to 
give greater scrutiny to facts, is pushing French constitutional review in a more inductive 
direction. These developments may well suggest continued synchronization in the 
methodology of proportionality in both countries. 
It is the Supreme Court of Canada’s 2009 decision in Hutterian Brethren that 
gives reason to believe that the application of proportionality in Canada is becoming 
more principle-oriented. In that case, a majority of the court called for analytical clarity in 
the application of each step of the proportionality inquiry, referring to Israeli and 
European Union practice. Specifically, the majority instructed that reviewing courts 
should not engage in evaluating the government’s legislative objective at the stage of 
minimal impairment. Advising that minimal impairment was a strictly empirical concept, 
they held that any value-laden concerns about the government’s objective should be 
concluded at the final stage of proportionate effects of proportionality stricto sensu.109 
For their part, the dissenting judges urged against treating the steps of proportionality as 
“water tight compartments” and called for an “holistic” application of the test.110 The 
effect of reinforcing the structured-nature of the test by the majority was, arguably, to 
reduce judicial discretion and refocus attention on the distinct requirements of 
proportionality as constitutional principles. This would make the application of 
proportionality less inductive. 
While it may be early to assess what the full implications of Hutterian Brethren 
may be, it is clear that the application of proportionality has advanced the inductive use 
                                                          
108 Alberta v Hutterian Brethren of Wilson Colony, 2009 SCC 37. 
109 Ibid at para 51. 
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of case law in French constitutional review. To be sure, in French civil law, jurisprudence 
developed by courts (“la jurisprudence”) has traditionally been regarded as an influence 
but not legally binding.111 In early constitutional review as well, judicial decisions were 
not treated as a source of law since, strictly speaking, they never created legal rules. 
Again, consistent with the tradition of a passive judiciary, the role of the judge was 
always understood to be restricted to appling pre-existing statutes or customs. But as 
René David has documented, since 1971 the Constitutional Council has developed an 
extensive body of case law for interpreting the Fifth Republic’s newly operative 
constitutional rights instruments and for determining which principles belong in the bloc 
de constitutionalité.112 However, given the need for guidance in determining what does 
and does not meet the requirements of proportionality, judicial review has given new 
significance to case law.  
Again, while it is clear that case law has become a increasingly important 
reference point for the development of the constitutional instruments of the French Fifth 
Republic, it is still too early to predict whether the increasing importance of jurisprudence 
in constitutional law will result in a formal change in its status. As David has 
acknowledged, the increasing influence ascribed to constitutional case law still does not 
make it a formal source of law. But reference to past decisions does by necessity import 
reasoning by analogy and distinguishing, both of which are highly fact-sensitive 
exercises. Accordingly, in some measure, the Constitutional Council is moving toward 
reasoning processes which may be more inductive than is typical in other areas of French 
law. Arguably, these signs of convergence suggest that differences in application are 




This chapter has established that legislative supremacy in Canada and the French 
Republic emerged out of two very different histories. In Canada, the exclusive right of 
the federal and provincial legislatures to make law within the constitutionally-prescribed 
                                                          
111 Bell, supra note 83 at 25-27. 
112 René David, French Law (Baton Rouge: Louisana State University Press, 1972) at 
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jurisdictional limits reflected norms of parliamentary sovereignty as developed in British 
constitutionalism. The legislature was deemed to be sovereign in its own right, strictly in 
terms of institutional independence. But the legislature’s sovereignty was arrived at 
gradually, through a slow and unsystematic historical development. In other words, its 
rights were postulated from an essentially inductive assessment of its competence in 
relation to other institutions. The role of the legislature in France, however, is established 
by the revolutionary assertion of sovereignty as a principle from which all other 
constitutional realities are deduced. That principle is a particular concept of republican 
sovereignty giving the legislature the exclusive right to express the will of the nation as 
trustees of their volition. It may fairly be said, therefore, that in France, legislative 
supremacy was a premise of the constitutional framework, whereas in Canada it was a 
postulate. 
While the incorporation of judicial review into prevailing modes of legal 
reasoning was easier in Canada than in the French Republic, both jurisdictions now 
provide review for suspected violations of freedom of religion on what is substantively a 
three-step proportionality standard. The analysis undertaken in this chapter has had two 
objectives. It has sought to shed light on how proportionality as a “hybrid” analysis 
involving reference to both facts and principles is able to be incorporated with relative 
ease into both common law and civilian legal jurisdictions. Mainly, however, it has tried 
to account for sylistic differenes in the application of proportionality in the case law that 
will be referenced in this thesis. Those differences have to do with the relative fact-
sensitivity of each application of the proportionality test and are due to the historical 
development of judicial review against different conceptions of legislative supremacy in 
Canada and France. As the final section of this chapter has indicated, convergence may 




Chapter 3: A Comparative Analysis of the Application of Proportionality to 




This chapter takes the form of a comparative analysis of constitutional rights 
adjudication in Canada and the French Republic. It examines the methods by which the 
constitutionality of legislative limitations on freedom of religion are determined in each 
jurisdiction, using France’s Law no. 2010-1192 of 11 October 2010 as a paradigmatic 
example. That statute introduced a criminal prohibition on the concealment of the face in 
public. The government of the French Republic held that such a legislation was necessary 
to deter the wearing of Islamic veils or niqābs, urging that such face-coverings had a 
deleterious effect on gender equality, public security, and democratic life. On 7 October 
2010, the French Constitutional Council determined that the ban introduced by Law no. 
2010-1192 was a justifiable limitation on freedom of religion,1 as did the European Court 
of Human Rights (the “ECHR”) in its 1 July 2014 decision in SAS v France.2 While a 
statute like Law no. 2010-1192, has never been judicially reviewed in Canada, the 
country’s freedom of religion jurisprudence is sufficiently thorough-going to speculate as 
to how a reviewing court would respond to a similar constitutional challenge.  
While this analysis does explain how an infringement of freedom of religion is 
established in each jurisdiction, it is primarily concerned with the application of 
proportionality as an adjudicative tool. As explained in the previous chapter, review on a 
proportionality standard is as a sort of “hybrid” exercise, combining inductive, fact-
sensitive reasoning with deduction from general principles. It is for this reason that the 
migration of proportionality is widely perceived as affecting a degree of constitutional 
norm convergence across common law and civilian jurisdictions.3 This chapter is 
intended to explore points of convergence in the way in which proportionality is applied 
                                                          
1 Cons const, 7 October 2010, Loi interdisant la dissimulation du visage dans l’espace 
public, (2010) JO 18345, 2010-613 DC. 
2 SAS v France [GC], no 43835/11, ECHR 2014. 
3 See for example Eric Engel, “The History of the General Principle of Proportionality” 
(2012) 10 Dartmouth LJ 1 and Moshe Cohen-Eliya and Iddo Porat, Proportionality and 
Constitutional Culture (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013) at 150-152.  
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in jurisdictions with divergent modes of judicial reasoning. Indeed, while review of 
enacted legislation on a proportionality standard is now available in Canada and the 
French Republic, in each country it is applied in such a way as to comport with domestic 
modes of judicial reasoning. Thus, this analysis seeks to probe the extent of 
harmonization in adjudicative methods while shedding light on the broader viability of 
statutes like Law no. 2010-1192. 
This chapter proceeds in six sections. In the first and second sections, the means 
by which proportionality was incorporated from the law of the European Union into 
Canadian and French law are reviewed. The third and fourth sections assess whether 
legislative bans of the kind imposed by Law no. 2010-1192 violate the scope or content 
of freedom of religion as it is entrenched in Canadian and French constitutional rights 
instruments. Sections five and six examine the use of proportionality in determining 
whether such an infringement would be constitutionally justifiable, with reference to the 
Constitutional Council’s decision respecting Law no. 2010-1192 and to relevant 
Canadian case law. At all times, this analysis is undertaken with a view to both the 
methods by which proportionality is applied in each jurisdiction and its likely substantive 
outcomes. 
It is concluded that while a statutory ban on concealment of the face in public 
may be a proportionate infringement of freedom of religion in the French Republic, it 
would almost certainly be held to be unconstitutional in Canada. Substantive differences 
yielded by divergent modes of judicial reasoning in each jurisdiction are negligible. The 
constitutionality of such legislation would turn on the inquiry into whether it has 
proportionate effect. It is the evaluative nature of the final step of the proportionality 
standard, and the extent to which it requires consideration of the normative dimension of 
rights that makes it decisive. Whether a deleterious effect on a right is thought to be 
tolerable in a free and democratic society turns on often unarticulated notions of what it 
means to be free and democratic. This is often made starkly clear in freedom of religion 
jurisprudence. 
 




The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (“the Charter”) was entrenched as 
Canada’s principal constitutional rights text on 17 April 1982. It established a two-stage 
procedure of judicial review for potential rights violations. At the first stage, the claimant 
must satisfy the reviewing court that a guaranteed right or freedom has been infringed. 
This involves the court in a purposive inquiry into the “scope” or “content” of the right. If 
an infringement of the right is established, it falls to the state to show on a balance of 
probabilities that the infringement is constitutionally justifiable. The justificatory 
standard which the state must meet is prescribed by s. 1, the Charter’s general limitations 
clause: 
 
The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms guarantees the rights and 
freedoms set out in it subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed 
by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society.4 
 
In other words, provided that an infringement of a constitutional right or freedom is 
“prescribed by law” (generally a statute or a regulation),5 it is subject to s. 1 justification.6 
In its 1986 decision in R. v. Oakes, the Supreme Court of Canada construed s. 1 of 
the Charter as imposing “a form of proportionality test.”7 Writing for the court, Dickson 
J. (as he then was) held that if a Charter right is found to be infringed, the reviewing 
court must then ascertain whether there are constitutional justifications for limiting the 
                                                          
4 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, s 1, Part 1 of the Constitution Act, 1982, 
being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11. 
5 The constitutionality of administrative decisions or other state actions is no longer 
determined by s. 1 justification. The words “prescribed by law” indicate that s. 1 
justification is available only to legal norms that are “authorized by statute, …binding 
rules of general application [that are] sufficiently accessible and precise.” See Greater 
Vancouver Transportation Authority v Canadian Federation of Students, 2009 SCC 31 at 
para 53; Doré v Barreau du Québec, 2012 SCC 12 at para 37. 
6 Section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982, which affirms Aboriginal and treaty rights, is 
technically not part of the Charter and therefore not subject to s 1. Still, per R. v. 
Sparrow, the Supreme Court of Canada developed a test for determining permissible 
limitations on s. 35 rights comparable to a proportionality standard. See Constitution Act, 
1982, s 35, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c. 11 and R v Sparrow 
[1990] 1 SCR 10 75. 
7 Justice Dickson first made reference to s. 1 requing a “form of proportionality test” in R 
v Big M Drug Mart Ltd [1985] 1 SCR 295 at para 139. 
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exercise of the right by the sub-constitutional law.8 The state must first show that the 
impugned law was adopted for a proper purpose. If that threshold is met, it must then 
satisfy a three-part proportionality test. It must show that the measures it adopted are 
“rationally connected” to its legislative objective (that is, the law’s proper purpose), that 
those measures impair the right “as little as possible,” and that there is a proportionate 
relation between the deleterious effects on the right and benefits accrued.9 With few 
modifications, the “Oakes test” remains the standard for determining the legitimacy of 
sub-constitutional limits on constitutional rights in Canada.10  
In developing the Oakes test, Dickson J. seems to have drawn from the ECHR’s 
case law interpreting limitations clauses in the European Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (the “Convention”).11 As noted in the 
previous chapter, from its origins in nineteenth century Prussian administrative law, 
proportionality as a legal construct migrated to German Basic Law, and from there to the 
law of the European Union. By the late-1970s, the formal three-step structure now 
associated with proportionality was more or less fully developed by the ECHR. Indeed, in 
its 1979 decision in Sunday Times, that court articulated a test that was quite similar to 
Oakes. It held that “interference” with the right to freedom of expression under Art. 10 of 
the Convention must be “prescribed by law,” have “legitimate aims,” be “necessary” to 
                                                          
8 Although government action is generally dependent upon statutory authority, it may 
rely on the common law as in the case of a prerogative. The Charter applies to the 
common law where the common law is the basis for some governmental action which is 
alleged to have infringed a guaranteed right or freedom. See RWDSU v Dolphin Delivery 
[1986] 2 SCR 573 at para 34. 
9 In Oakes, the Court held that to be minimally impairing, the legislation means must 
infringe the constitutional right “as little as possible” to achieve its objective. In R v 
Edwards Books, while superficially applying Oakes, the Court broadened the legislature’s 
margin of appreciation by stating that the legislative means must infringe the right “as 
little as reasonably possible.” See R v Oakes, [1986] 1 SCR 103 at paras 69-71 and R v 
Edwards Books, [1986]  2 SCR 713 at para 131. 
10 It should be noted that while the formal structure of the Oakes test is to be applied for 
all potential rights violations, Canadian courts have advised that it be applied in a manner 
that is “realistic” and sensitive to context. See Edwards Books, ibid, at para 176. 
11 The European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms has number of specific limitations clauses. That is, a right carries with it in the 
form of a sub-section its own limitations clause. 
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achieve those aims, and be commensurate with the values of a democratic society.12 
Thus, when it wrote Oakes, the Supreme Court of Canada seems to have drawn directly 
from case law on constitutional limitations clauses in the EU. 
 
iii) The Textual Bases for a Proportionality Standard in France 
 
It must be recalled that review of legislation for conformity with constitutional 
rights instruments first became available in the French Republic with the Constitutional 
Council’s 1971 decision in Dec. No 71-33 DC  (“Liberté d’association”).13 In that 
decision, the council affected an establishment of a form of a priori judicial review for 
the constitutionality of legislation prior to its promulgation. In doing so, it rendered 
legally operative (“en vigeur”) two constitutional rights texts.14 The so-called 
constitutional bloc (“le bloc de constitutionalité”) established in Liberté d’association 
included the Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen of 1789 (“the DDHC”) and the 
preamble of the Constitution of 13 October 1946. That document, among other things, 
makes reference to “the fundamental principles recognized by the laws of the Republic” 
(the “PFRLR”). The council relied on the 1946 preamble to justify a broad and open-
ended authority to identify principles of constitutional value not transcribed in either 
constitutional text. In 2004, the Charter of the Environment was added as the third 
operative rights document of the French Fifth Republic. 
The Constitutional Council’s decision in Liberté d’association was an important 
step on the way to full a postiori review, which was finally made available with the 
constitutional reform law of 2008.15 As explained in the first chapter, the Constitutional 
Council had been established by Title VII of the Constitution of 4 October 1958 as a 
                                                          
12 The Sunday Times v The United Kingdom, no 6538/74, § 46, 54, 58, ECHR 1979-I. 
13 Cons const, 16 July 1971, Liberté d’association, (1971) JO 7114, 71-44 DC. 
14 The authority to identify certain laws as recognizing “fundamental” values was 
necessary in order for the Constitutional Council to be able to elevate certain statutes 
enacted in the French Third Republic (1870-1940) to constitutional status. Certain 
enduring constitutional principles were developed during the Third Republic (such as 
freedom of association) even though that regime lacked a formal constitution. See Cons 
const, 20 July 1988, Loi portant amnistie, (1988), JO 9448, 88-244 DC.  
15 Loi constitutionnelle n° 2008-724 du 23 julliet 2008 de modernisation des institutions 
de la Ve République, JO, 23 July 2008, 11890. 
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weak and deferential institution, tasked with a range of rather technical responsibilities, 
most notably, arbitrating the division between the competence of the legislature (over 
statute law) and the executive (over regulations).16 The drafters of the constitution of the 
Fifth Republic did not contemplate judicial review of legislation. To the contrary, as the 
Travaux préparatoires of that document reveal, they recognized French constitutional 
culture as “extraordinarily hostile to judicial review.”17 Thus, when the Constitutional 
Council was instituted, the supremacy of the legislature to the judiciary was still well-
entrenched. Its 1971 decision in Liberté d’association marked a departure from that 
order, initiating the gradual incorporation of review of promulgated statutes. 
The introduction of a priori review in 1971 both perpetuated the traditional 
French conception of the organic unity of legislation and law, and exacerbated its 
attendant confusion of legislative and constituent authority. While the council’s new role 
did not upset legislative supremacy in a technical sense, it did effect the legislative 
process to the extent that Parliament began to act with a view to the council’s institutional 
competence. For instance, the mere prospect of a petition for constitutional review 
(generally brought by opposition parties) and possible censure deeply influenced policy-
making.18 This phenomenon, which accelerated throughout the 1980s, has been referred 
to as the “juridicization” of French legislative institutions.19 During that time, the 
council’s willingness to obstruct the legislative process increased and its case law gained 
increasing pedagogical authority. Part of this process involved the incorporation of ever-
more searching standards of review, to bring France into alignment with rights norms and 
practices of other EU member states. 
Not long after the Constitutional Council assumed the power to review legislation 
prior to its promulgation, it provided reassurance that its role was in no way legislative, 
but strictly limited to assessing acts of the legislature for conformity with constitutional 
                                                          
16 John Bell et al, Principles of French Law, 2nd ed (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2008) at 156. 
17 Alec Stone, The Birth of Judicial Politics in France: The Constitutional Council in 
Comparative Perspective (Oxford: Oxford Universtiy Press, 1992) at 5. See also Travaux 
préparatoires de la Constitution du 4 octobre 1958, Avis et débats du Comité consultatif 
constitutionnel (Paris: La Documentation française, 1960) at 75-79. 
18 Stone, ibid at 4. 
19 Ibid at 8-9. 
50 
 
texts and principles. In Decision 74-54 DC of 15 January 1975 (also known as the 
“Abortion I” decision)20 the council held: “[T]he Constitution does not confer on the 
Constitutional Council a general or particular discretion (un pouvoir général 
d’appréciation ou de décision) identical to that of Parliament, but simply, empowers it to 
rule on the constitutionality of statutes referred to it.”21 In other words, the Constitutional 
Council established that did not have the competence to “second guess” Parliament on 
questions of policy.22 Accordingly, it developed a single standard of review for 
constitutional review which it termed “manifest error” (erreur manifeste).23 On that 
standard, absent an error so egregious that it could not “escape a man of good sense,”24 
the council could not interfere. 
After about 1982, the standard of manifest error gradually evolved into a more 
rigorous means-end rational review. While certain rights retained the highly deferential 
standard of manifest error, others became subject to review for rational connection and 
necessity of the means adopted by the legislature in light of its objectives. In Decision 
2002-461, for instance, (also referred to as “Juvenile Justice”), the council declared 
certain “educative sanctions” imposed on young offenders to be constitutional by 
acknowledging the importance of education to prevent breaches of the public order and 
noting that the sanctions “naturally take into account the familial and educational 
obligations of the interested parties.”25 Described as a “proportionality” standard by 
French jurists and academics, this standard of review was far less evaluative than its 
three-part counterpart in European law, evincing an on-going unease in questioning 
legislative policy choices, which the Constitutional Council saw as falling within the 
legislatures “domaine de non-contrôle.” 
                                                          
20 Cons const, 15 January 1975, Loi relative à l’interruption volontaire de la grossesse, 
(1975) Rec 19, 74-54 DC. 
21 Ibid at para 1. 
22 Ibid. 
23 For the first explicit reference to the manifest error standard see Cons const, 16 January 
1982, Loi de nationalisation, (1982) Rec 18, 81-132 DC at para 20. 
24 Stone, supra note 15 at 160. 
25 Cons const, 29 August 2002, Loi d’orientation et de programmation pour la justice, 
(2002) JO 14953, 2002-461 DC at 32. 
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It was not until 2007, not long before the constitutional revision which established 
a procedure for a postiori review, that the Constitutional Council supplemented its 
“proportionality” standard with consideration of the legislation’s “possible consequences 
(conséquences possibles). In Dec. 2007-255 (“Loi en faveur du travail”), for instance, the 
council upheld certain targeted tax benefits aimed at rewarding work and stimulating the 
acquisition of a principal residence by the taxpayer. In deciding that the impugned 
legislation did not, inter alia, violate the principle of equality before public burdens in 
Art. 3 of the DDHC, the council engaged in a brief discussion of the merits of the 
legislation and its potential harms to constitutional rights.26 This was substantially an 
inquiry into proportionate effect or proportionality stricto sensu. It should be 
remembered, however, that review for proportional effect remains the exception. The 
standard applied by the council is more or less deferential depending on the text of the 
rights provisions engaged. The following sections will explore this rather abstract notion 
in more concrete terms. 
 
iv) Establishing an Infringement of Freedom of Religion in Canada 
 
It must be recalled that the Canadian Charter’s general limitations clause, s 1, 
contemplates a two-stage procedure of judicial review for a potential rights violation. At 
the first stage, the reviewing court has to determine whether the challenged law has the 
effect of limiting a guaranteed right. Ascertaining the scope of the right, in terms of its 
content and outer contours, involves a purposive interpretation of its text.27 The Charter’s 
guarantee of freedom of religion is prescribed in s. 2(a): 
 
2. Everyone has the following fundamental freedoms: 
(a) freedom of conscience and religion28 
 
                                                          
26 Cons const, 16 August 2007, Loi en faveur du travail, de l’emploi et du pouvoir 
d’achat, (2007) Rec 310, 2007-555 DC. 
27 R v Big M Drug Mart Ltd, [1985] 1 SCR 295 at para 116. 
28 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, s 2(a), being Schedule B to the Canada Act 
1982 (UK), 1982, c 11. 
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The Supreme Court of Canada has formulated a test for determining when the right to 
freedom of religion has been abridged, which the clamant must satisfy on a civil standard. 
In the case of a legislative ban on concealment of the face in public, it is the first hurdle 
which anyone making a freedom of religion claim under s. 2(a) would have to surmount. 
 In terms of the methods of judicial reasoning to be applied, it is fair to say that 
constitutional review in Canada is comparatively inductive and fact-sensitive. Reflecting 
the culture of a common law jurisdiction, reviewing courts arrive at legal probabilities 
based on the facts with reference to binding precedent. In the constitutional context, the 
relative rigour with which a reviewing court can probe the facts at hand has been 
reinforced by the fact that constitutional review for rights violations has only ever been 
available ex post; that is, through the application of constitutional law to a specific case. 
In other words, review does not take place in the abstract but with regard to actual legal 
cases that raise constitutional questions in the context of litigation. Determining whether 
the scope of freedom of religion under s. 2(a) is infringed would therefore involve a 
comparatively probing and thorough-going inquiry into the facts being litigated at a very 
low level of abstraction. 
In its 2004 decision in Syndicat Northcrest v Amselem,29 the Supreme Court 
defined the scope of “freedom of religion” with reference to three criteria distilled from 
its s. 2(a) jurisprudence. The Court held, and has since repeatedly affirmed, that freedom 
of religion consists of the right to “undertake practices or harbour beliefs having a nexus 
with religion,” which an individual “sincerely believes or is sincerely undertaking in 
order to connect with the divine or as function of his or her spiritual faith.” It is not 
necessary, the court added, for such practices or beliefs to be objectively required by a 
recognized religion.30  Accordingly, the court in Amselem had to develop a definition of 
“religion” that was sufficiently capacious to account for what it called a “personal or 
subjective” conception of the right, but that was still serviceable given the text of the 
right and the requirement that the expression at issue have a “nexus with religion.” In 
                                                          
29 Syndicat Northcrest v Amselem, 2004 SCC 47. 
30 See for example Ameslem, ibid at para 43; SL v Commission Scholaire des Chênes, 
2012 SCC 7 at para 24, Multani v Commission scolaire Marguerite-Bourgeoys, 2006 
SCC 6 at para 35, Saskatchewan (Human Rights Commission) v Whatcott, 2013 SCC 11 
at para 156. 
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other words, it had to give “some outer definition” to a concept that it conceded could not 
be defined with precision.31 
Justice Iacobucci, writing for the majority in Amselem, gave “religion” a broad 
and “purposive” definition, consistent with the canons of Charter interpretation.32 He 
held that,“[d]efined broadly, religion typically involves a particular and comprehensive 
system of faith and worship,” and “tends to involve belief in a divine, supernatural, or 
controlling power.”33 More importantly, however, he held that the “essence” of religion 
for the purpose of s. 2(a), had to do with “freely and deeply held personal convictions or 
beliefs connected to an individual’s spiritual faith.” That is, religion as it is used in 
Canadian constitutional (and indeed quasi-constitutional)34 texts is not coextensive with 
recognized religious institutions or doctrines, but denotes beliefs “intrinsically linked to 
one’s self-definition and spiritual fulfillment” and practices which “allow individuals to 
foster a connection with the divine or with the subject or object of [their] spiritual 
faith.”35 Thus, to establish an infringement of “religious” expression under s. 2(a), a 
reviewing court will focus on the factual indicia of the inward nature of the belief and the 
depth of feeling with which it is held. 
In arriving at this definition of “religion” for the purpose of s. 2(a), the court in 
Amselem expounded upon its earlier case law, including its first s. 2(a) decision in the 
1986 case of R. v. Big M Drug Mart Ltd.36 In that seminal decision, Dickson J. did not 
define “religion” per se, but construed the text of s. 2(a) in such a way as to give primacy 
to “personal choice” and “individual autonomy.”37 Reflecting at some length on the 
history of the Protestant Reformation in England, he reasoned that freedom of religion in 
                                                          
31 Amselem, supra note 27 at para 39. 
32 See Quebec v Boisbriand 2000 SCC 27. 
33 Amselem, supra note 27 at 39. 
34 It should be noted that, while the Supreme Court’s reasons in Amselem were held to be 
applicable to s. 2(a) of the Canadian Charter, the case at bar had to do with the right to 
freedom of religion under s. 3 of the Quebec Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms, 
RSQ, c C-12. Provincial human rights legislation have been said to be of a “quasi-
constitutional” nature.” See Cadillac Fairview Corp v Saskatchewan (Human Rights 
Commission), [1999] SJ No 217 at para 29. 
35 Amselem, supra note at 27 para 39. 
36 R v Big M, supra note 24. 
37 Amselem, supra note 27 at para 40. 
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Canada was rooted in an historical recognition by the state that “belief was not amenable 
to compulsion” and that there existed a “reality of individual conscience.”38 Accordingly, 
he held, the rights to both freedom of religion and to freedom of conscience under s. 2(a) 
were in fact a “single integrated concept,” which was meant to confer protection on 
beliefs of a kind recognized as integral to individual autonomy and personhood.  
The Amselem decision both clarified the scope of freedom of religion and 
reinforced the centrality of “personal choice” to a s. 2(a) claim.  It did so in two key 
respects. First, in overturning the conclusions of the Quebec Court of Appeal, Iacobucci 
J. held that reviewing courts may not inquire into whether or not the belief or practice at 
issue is objectively required by a religion. It is not the “mandatory or perceived as 
mandatory nature” of the religious expression that attracts protection under s. 2(a), he 
reasoned, but its “religious or spiritual essence.”39 Thus, to fall within the scope of s. 2(a), 
the claimant need only establish on the facts that she subjectively believes that her 
conduct is required by her religion. The belief or practice need not be legitimated by 
established doctrine in any objective sense. To require an objective basis for religious 
expression, Iacobucci J. held, would both improperly engage a reviewing court in the 
arbitration of religious doctrine40 and undermine the importance of autonomy and 
individual choice to freedom of religion, as settled by earlier case law. 
Secondly, while the majority precluded speculation as to a religious practice’s 
“validity” in light of recognized doctrine, custom, or ritual, it did give reviewing courts a 
measure of latitude to probe the sincerity with which the belief is held. It hastened to add, 
however, that inquiries to that end must be “as limited as possible,”41 so as not to offend 
the deeply personal nature of the right. Therefore, the Court advised, the need to establish 
the claimant’s “sincerity” or “honesty of belief”42 is a question of fact that goes no further 
than what is necessary to establish her “good faith,” and that her putative belief is 
“neither fictitious nor capricious, and that it is not an artifice.”43 To meet this low 
                                                          
38 Ibid at para 45. 
39 Ibid at para 47. 
40 Ibid at para 45. 
41 Ibid at para 52. 
42 Ibid at para 51. 
43 Ibid at para 52. 
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threshold, the claimant may adduce evidence to show that the practice at issue is 
consistent with her “other religious practices at the time of the alleged interference”44 
Again, Iacobucci J. stressed that this test must be alive to both the “intensely personal” 
nature of the right, and the need to avoid the “invidious interference” of the state.  
It should be also be noted that, in its early s. 2(a) jurisprudence, the Supreme 
Court of Canada indicated that freedom of religion under s. 2(a) may be subject to 
“internal limits.” Quite apart from s. 1 of the Charter, which does not affect the “scope” 
of a right, “internal” limits are inferred from the text of the right itself and speak to its 
content or outer contours. For instance, some of the earliest s. 2(a) case law shows a 
willingness to deny protection to the religious expression of parents whose conduct poses 
a risk of harm to their child. It was in such a context that in the 1993 case of P(D) v S(C), 
L’Heureux-Dubé J., writing for a majority, held that freedom of religion is “inherently 
limited by the rights and freedoms of others.”45 Similarly, in Young v Young, McLachlin 
J. (as she then was) affirmed that where a parent’s religious expression jeopardizes the 
best interests of a child, “it is clear that the guarantee of religious freedom can offer no 
protection,” and recourse to a proportionality analysis under s. 1 is not appropriate.46 
While in recent years Canadian courts have shown a preference for denying such 
claims under s. 1 rather than under s. 2(a), they continue to recognize internal limits 
where the interference with the right would be “trivial or insubstantial.” That is, as 
Dickson J. put it in R. v. Edwards Books and Art Ltd., religious beliefs and practices are 
protected by s. 2(a) to the extent that they might “reasonably or actually be threatened.” 
For a state-imposed burden to be proscribed, he added, it must be “capable of interfering 
with religious beliefs or practices.”47 This somewhat abstractly formulated rule serves as 
a tool for dispensing with challenges to legislative or administrative action which on its 
face has come to be recognized as constitutionally permissible. In other words, an 
internal limit to the right exists where the application of a thorough-going proportionality 
                                                          
44 Ibid at para 53. 
45 P(D) v S(C), [1993] 4 SCR 141 at 107. 
46 Young v Young, [1993] 4 SCR 3 at 218. 
47 R v Edwards Books and Art Ltd, [1986] 2 SCR 713 at 97. 
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analysis would be patently unnecessary.  It is with “a view to the underlying context” of a 
rights claim, it has been held, that the ultimate standard of protection will be measured.48 
If a Canadian court were to review a legislative ban on the wearing of the full 
face-veil or niqāb in public places, it is all but certain that it would find a violation of s. 
2(a). In its 2012 decision in R. v NS, the Supreme Court had to determine whether a 
Muslim woman was required to remove her niqāb when testifying in order to afford the 
accused the full measure of his s. 11(d) rights to make full answer and defence to the 
charges against him, given the centrality of face-to-face communication historically 
ascribed to that right. In spite of a three-way split in their reasoning, every member of the 
court agreed that to oblige a Muslim woman to remove her veil constituted an 
infringement of her right to freedom of religion under s. 2(a). The claimant NS professed 
that she wore the veil as an expression of her faith as a Muslim. Accordingly, that the 
practice of veiling had a “nexus” with religion as defined in Amselem was not contested. 
Writing for the majority, McLachlin C.J. found that the lower court in N.S. had 
erred in finding that the claimant evinced a lack of sincerity. The preliminary inquiry 
judge had inferred a lack of sincere belief from the claimant’s inconsistent use of the veil. 
McLachlin C.J. held that in doing so, he had confused the strength of N.S.’s belief with 
the sincerity with which it was held. Inconsistent adherence to a religious practice, she 
held, “may suggest lack of sincere belief, but it does not necessarily do so”49 given that 
religious belief may vacillate over time without being an “artifice,” or a claim made 
capriciously or in bad faith per Amselem. Thus, the threshold for establishing the 
sincerity of a religious belief is very low.50 More generally, in light of the low bar for a s 
2(a) violation set by Amselem, it is incontrovertible that a law of general application 
requiring the removal of face-veils would be found to violate freedom of religion. Again, 
this would trigger s. 1 of the Charter, shifting the burden to the state to provide that such 
a law is justifiable. 
                                                          
48 Ibid at para 76; Commission Scholaire des Chênes, supra note 28 at para 25. 
49 R v NS, 2012 SCC 72 at para 13. 
50 While it is very rare for a reviewing court to find a lack of sincerity, such was the case 
in R v Kharaghani. In that case, an Ontario court conducted a limited factual inquiry to 
that end and refused to accept possession of cannabis as the exercise of a “sincerely held 




v) Establishing an Infringement of Freedom of Religion in France 
 
Modes of constitutional adjudication in the French Republic do not lend 
themselves to questions pertaining to the “scope” or “content” of freedom of religion. 
French legal reasoning proceeds deductively, largely by way of what is called judicial 
syllogism (syllogisme judiciare), a deductive technique developed to preserve legislative 
supremacy and to give an air of judicial passivity. As this analysis will show, it is applied 
by taking two contending general principles, and subsuming the facts at hand under one 
or the other as a sort of “end point” in a chain of logical inferences from those principles. 
Thus, the facts take a secondary role to principles when contrasted with common law 
reasoning. To speculate as to the “scope” of a right is an inherently inductive exercise, 
more aligned with common law practice, aimed at preemptively clarifying when a given 
set of facts will trigger a legal principle. In other words, questions of “scope” by their 
nature direct the mind to facts, when French rights adjudication is far more oriented to the 
general legal principles engaged by a case. 
Accordingly, this section aims not so much to delineate the content of freedom of 
religion per se, but to establish the principles that support a rights claim and to reflect on 
their interplay. It must be recalled that in the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Council, 
it is not so much the black letter of the right which is being litigated, but the principles 
which are recognized as transcribed by that text. In other words, textual provisions cited 
in constitutional texts are to be thought of less as discrete and more or less insular 
provisions, than as principles of “constitutional” or the highest value in a hierarchical 
system of norms. As was the case in the Constitutional Council’s 2010 decision 
respecting the prohibition on the veil, multiple constitutional principles are often 
implicated by a given set of facts, and in concert shape the deductive process by which a 
result is reached, as section four of this analysis will reveal.  
It is critical to establish from the outset that the Constitutional Council’s decision 
on the veil was not the result of a specific constitutional challenge brought by a private 
individual or group with standing. Rather, Law 2010-1192 had been referred to council 
on 14 Sept. 2010 by the Presidents of the National Assembly and of the Senate, for a 
priori review as provided for in the second paragraph of Art 61 paragraph 2 of the 
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Constitution.51 Thus, the council did not have to decide whether a particular provision 
was engaged by the law in the strict sense.52 Review by the council was undertaken with 
a more general view to whether the legislation conformed with a range of principles of 
constitutional value (the so-called bloc de constitutionalité). The council’s decision, 
released a month later on 7 October 2010, dealt with four constitutional provisions which 
it determined were potentially engaged by the referred legislation. It arrived at that 
determination by way of a reasoning process not indicated in the text of its decision, but 
which necessarily precedes any deductive analysis. 
Indeed, as a rule, French judges and members of the Constitutional Council do not 
account for the process by which the general principles adjudicated are determined. 
Certainly, the established practice of the Conseil d’État and the Cour de Cassation is to 
focus on logical deductions from pre-determined premises. Neither court elaborates on 
how these premises are identified at the outset. But as Eva Steiner has put it, the essential 
task of the judge is in fact to find “‘correct’ premises,” and that cannot be done by way of 
deduction alone. To the contrary, it involves reliance on induction, analogy, and judicial 
discretion.53 It is for this reason that the text of judicial decisions tends not to 
acknowledge the search for appropriate premises. In the context of the Constitutional 
Council’s review of Law 2010-1192, it is clear that the four constitutional provisions 
cited had to be arrived at by some process of judicial reasoning given that no provisions 
                                                          
51 Prior to 1973, Art 61 of the prevailing constitution of the Fifth Republic allowed only 
four officials to refer acts of Parliament to the Constitutional Council after their adoption 
but before their pomulgation by the President of the Republic and their entry into force: 
the President of the Republic, the Prime Minister, the President of the National Assembly 
and the President of the Senate. In 1974, Art 61 was amended to allow 60 Deputies 
(members of the National Assembly) or 60 Senators to refer a legislative act to the 
council. The constitutional reform law of 23 July 2008 amended Art 61 to allow for the 
the Cour de Cassation or the Counseil d’État to refer a statue already in force to the 
council for consideration of its constitutionality during the corse of a proceeding, subjet 
to certain conditions. 
52 It should be noted that while ex post review of enacted legislation is now available, 
modes of judicial reasoning remain essentially deductive, as they had developed under 
the practice of a priori review. 
53 Steiner, supra note 48 at 151 
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were specifically cited by the Presidents of the National Assembly or Senate upon 
referral of the legislation for a priori review.54 
In her study of French legal reasoning, Steiner asserts that French judges do not in 
actual practice begin by stating premises or applying general principles. Rather, she 
observes, they begin with “some complicated and confusing case” out of which premises 
gradually emerge from “analysis of the total situation.”55 Again, the text of the judicial 
opinion does not account for this process, but merely states its results in formal and 
laconic language. Choosing the premise or general principle from which a result will be 
deduced is a necessary first step requiring a certain engagement with the facts. The judge 
must then make interpretive choices, as well as engage in the weighing of conflicting 
interests and policy considerations.56 The necessary search for “correct” premises or 
applicable principles, in Steiner’s view, is thus one of the main “limits of syllogistic 
reasoning”57 The search for appropriate principles is accordingly left un-articulated in the 
text of the decision so not to give the appearance of judicial discretion in the application 
of the law. 
Thus, the Constitutional Council’s review of Law 2010-1192 was based not 
merely on the provisions cited in its decision, but on the entire constitutional bloc. That 
is, the draft legislation was referred to the council to be assessed for conformity with four 
documents and a larger body of constitutional principles developed in constitutional case 
law. It may be recalled that the bloc de constitutionalité includes the text of the 
Constitution of 1958, the individual rights set out in the DDHC of 1789, the “political, 
economic, and social principles” enumerated in the preamble to the Constitution of 4 
October 1946, the Charter of the Environment of 2004, and a body of non-textual 
PFRLR. The four provisions cited by the Constitutional Council in its reasons as general 
principles governing the case are the only principles within that potentially vast body of 
law which the council determined to be implicated by the legislation under review As 
                                                          
54 The first paragraph of the council’s decision says of the referee legislators: “They have 
not raised any particular contention regarding this statute.” See Loi interdisant la 
dissimulation du visage, supra note 1 at para 1. 
55 Steiner, supra note 48 at 150-1. 
56 Ibid at 151. 
57 Ibid at 150. 
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Steiner put it, those provisions were identified as the “correct premises" of the decision 
by a preliminary analysis of the facts referred for a priori review. 
The council held that four constitutional provisions were engaged by the 
government’s proposed legislative ban on concealment of the face in public, three of 
which are contained in the DDHC of 1789 (Arts. 4, 5, 10), while the fourth is in in the 
preamble of the Constitution of 1946 (Art 3). The relevant provisions are: 
 
Art. 4. La liberté consiste à pouvoir faire tout ce qui ne nuit pas à autrui 
: ainsi, l'exercice des droits naturels de chaque homme n'a de bornes que 
celles qui assurent aux autres Membres de la Société la jouissance de ces 
mêmes droits. Ces bornes ne peuvent être déterminées que par la Loi.58 
 
Art. 5. La Loi n'a le droit de défendre que les actions nuisibles à la 
Société. Tout ce qui n'est pas défendu par la Loi ne peut être empêché, et 
nul ne peut être contraint à faire ce qu'elle n'ordonne pas.59   
 
Art 10. Nul ne doit être inquiété pour ses opinions, même religieuses, 
pourvu que leur manifestation ne trouble pas l'ordre public établi par la 
Loi.60 
 
Art 3. La loi garantit à la femme, dans tous les domaines, des droits égaux 
à ceux de l'homme.61 
 
It is may be noted that the council’s reasons in Dec. 2010-613 rely only on textually-
prescribed principles and not on PFRLR or other non-textual principles. While both enjoy 
equal weight as principles of constitutional value, for comparative purposes, this analysis 
deals only with textual provisions in both jurisdictions. 
                                                          
58 Art 4. Liberty consists of the freedom to do everything which injures no one else; 
hence the exercise of the natural rights of each man has no limits except those which 
assure other members of the society the enjoyment of the same rights. These limits can 
only be determined by law. 
59 Art. 5. The law can only prohibit such actions as are hurtful to society. Nothing may be 
prevented which is not forbidden by law, and no one be forced to do anything not 
provided for by law 
60 Art. 10. No one shall be disturbed on account of his opinions, including his religious 
views, provided their manifestation does not disturb the public order as determined by 
law 
61 Art. 3 The law guarantees women equal rights to men in all spheres. 
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Finally, before proceeding to discuss the application of proportionality to the ban 
on the veil as a sub-constitutional limit on a constitutional right to freedom of religion, it 
is critical to note that the four provisions cited in Dec. 2010-613 were not litigated 
individually or in their own right. Rather, the provisions are to be read somewhat in 
aggregate, and thought of as a more or less singular articulation of freedom of religion for 
the purpose of the law being reviewed. From the perspective of a common law tradition 
in which the discrete provisions of a constitutional text have controlling force, the French 
approach is quite different. But it must be recalled that in common and civil law 
traditions, there are often different ways of conceptualizing problems and of articulating 
solutions. The French Cartesian tradition places a particular emphasis on abstract 
thinking and evinces a corresponding lack of interest in empirical detail. Accordingly, it 
is not appropriate to strictly adhere to the black letter of each textual provision during the 
adjudicative process, but to think abstractly, with a view to the general principles at play. 
 
vi) The Application of the Proportionality Test in Canada 
 
a) Proper purpose 
 
Under the Canadian Charter, the first step of s. 1 justification requires the state to 
establish that it enacted the impugned legislation for a “proper purpose.” That is, it must 
have legislated with a view to a sufficiently important objective. The determination of 
whether a legislative objective is “sufficiently important” involves three rather value-
laden considerations. As Dickson J. held in Oakes, a legislative objective will be accepted 
as sufficiently important where it is “pressing and substantial” as opposed to merely 
trivial, and directed to the “realization of collective goals of fundamental importance.” 
Further, from a normative standpoint, the legislative objective must not be discordant 
with the values of a “free and democratic society.”62 As legal concept, these requirements 
are remarkably under-developed given that they have been held to be met in all but a few 
cases to have reached the Supreme Court of Canada. Indeed, the Court has only struck 
down a law for having an improper purpose once, in R. v. Big M Drug Mart. 
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Accordingly, Big M remains the Court’s most authoritative pronouncement on 
improper or inadmissible objectives under the first stage of a s. 1 analysis. In that case, it 
invalidated federal Sunday-closing legislation for having been enacted with a religious 
purpose. Specifically, the Court determined that the objective of the impugned legislation 
was to coerce observance of the Christian Sabbath and not, as the government had 
argued, to provide a non-sectarian “common day of rest.”63 According to the majority, 
not only did the legislative history indicate a religious purpose, but the legislation could 
not have been enacted by the federal government as valid criminal law without one.64 In 
contrast, in Edwards Books, the Court was able to ascribe to provincial Sunday-closing 
legislation an objective of providing a common day of rest.65 While both laws had the 
effect of privileging observance of the Sunday Sabbath, only the legislation at issue in 
Big M was determined to be intolerable in a free and democratic society. 
In distinguishing the facts of Edwards Books from those of Big M, the Court 
reflected at some length on what constitutes an inadmissible legislative objective under 
the first stage of Oakes. Again, the effect of the legislation was similar in both cases. The 
purpose for which the Sunday-closing law in Big M was enacted, however, was 
determined to be a “purely religious” one, evincing an intention to “bind all to a sectarian 
Christian Ideal” through positive law. As such, the Court held, the law represented “a 
form of coercion inimical to the spirit of the Charter,” given that document’s multi-
cultural ethos and its broad guarantee of freedom of conscience and religion.66 In 
contrast, the element of coercion in constitutionally-protected matters was not present in 
Edwards Books, where the legislative purpose was found to be the provision of a 
common day of rest for retail workers, and not a “surreptitious attempt to encourage 
                                                          
63 Ibid at 135. 
64 Criminal law is a matter of federal jurisdiction under s 91(27) of the Constitution Act, 
1982. Appropriate subjects for the criminal law have been held to be “public peace, 
order, security, health, morality” per Reference re Dairy Industry Act, s 5(a), [1941] SCR 
1. A legislative purpose that can not be construed along these lines cannot be persued 
under s 91(27). 
65 Edwards Books, supra note 8 at para 62. 
66 Big M, supra note 24 at para 97. 
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religious worship.”67 Accordingly, the purpose was held to not to offend Charter values 
as envisioned by the text of s. 1. 
The Court’s reasons in Big M and Edwards Books suggest that a law will not 
satisfy the “proper purpose” inquiry where its objective is intended to discourage the 
exercise or enjoyment of constitutional rights. This is not to say that a statute or common 
law rule cannot in their effect limit a s. 2(a) right; to the contrary, they routinely do.68 The 
first stage of s. 1 justification does not consider the means chosen by the legislature to 
realize its objective, or their potential deleterious effect on constitutional rights. Rather, 
the proper purpose inquiry reflects an evaluative and valued-laden component of s. 1 
justification that is focused narrowly on the propriety of a given legislative objective in 
light of the standard implied by the words “free and democratic society.” The extent to 
which the legislator’s concerns are “pressing” or of “fundamental importance” has come 
to be definitively tied-up with this normative inquiry and have rarely brought about the 
invalidation of a law in their own right. 
Determining whether a legislative ban on the concealment of the face in public 
would pass the first stage of s. 1 justification is difficult in the absence of actual 
legislation or a legislative record. It is from such sources that Canadian courts ascertain 
the legislative objective, and that task is often wrought with practical and theoretical 
difficulties. In other constitutional courts, judicial review of legislative restrictions on 
face-coverings have acknowledged the existence of three legislative objectives, namely, 
public safety, gender equality, and maintaining the minimum requirements for democratic 
life.69 While prevailing modes of legal reasoning in those jurisdictions may be able to 
                                                          
67 Edwards Books, supra note 8 at para 62. 
68 It is well established that no Charter right is absolute and that “the ultimate protection 
of any particular Charter right must be measured in relation to other rights and with a 
view to the underlying context in which the apparent context arises.” See Amselem, supra 
note 27 at para 62. 
69 These were the three legislative objectives accepted by the French Constitutional 
Council in Déc n°. 2010-613, supra note 1 at para 4. The same three objectives were 
accepted by the Belgian Constitutional Court when reviewing that country’s legislative 
ban on concealment of the face in public in Cour Constitutionnelle, Arrêt n° 145/2012 du 
6 décembre 2012, B 20 40. 
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deal with multiple legislative objectives,70 the tendency of Canadian courts is to ascertain 
a singular objective, given the relative intensity with which they focus on the factual 
matrix at hand. Where a single legislative objective is illusory, they strive to narrow their 
focus to “the characterization that most directly relates to the reason for violation the 
constitutional right.”71  
In practice, this may be avoided given the tendency of Canadian legislatures to 
draft laws with a relatively searching form of judicial review in mind. Indeed, like all s. 1 
requirements, the need for a legislative objective to be “pressing and substantial” 
presupposes a fairly inductive form of judicial review. Accordingly, courts have 
interpreted it as imposing an evidentiary burden which must be met. It is for this reason 
that a ban on concealment of the face would likely be framed in narrower, and more 
negative terms. For instance, rather than draft the law with a view to advancing gender 
equality, a Canadian legislature would be more likely to be found to be acting to address 
the “harm” to gender inequality associated with the practice of veiling. Likewise, a ban 
legislated in the name of security or democratic life, would be enacted and justified with 
an emphasis on the harms perceived to be associated with concealment of the face in 
public. To be sure, the evidentiary threshold is low, and the government need only proffer 
evidence to support “a reasoned apprehension of harm”72 to discharge its burden. 
While there is every indication that public security and gender equality are 
appropriate bases for limiting s. 2 rights,73  it is far from clear that the objective of 
maintaining the necessary standards for democratic life would be admissible at the first 
                                                          
70 Belgium adopted the Code civil des Français (the Napoleonic Code) under French 
occupation (1794-1814). It retained the French model and has developed a civil law 
system that is very similar to that of France. Like French constitutional law Belgian 
constitutional law continues to be modified to conform with norms mandated by the 
European Union. 
71 Peter W Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, 2011 Student ed (Toronto: Thomas 
Reuters Canada Ltd, 2011) at 38.9(a). 
72 Ontario (Community Safety and Correctional Services) v Ontario (Information and 
Privacy Commissioner), 2014 SCC 31 at para 58. See also Reference re Section 293 of 
the Criminal Code of Canada, 2011 BCSC 1588. 
73 Providing for public security was recognized as a pressing and substantial objective in 
Devito v Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 2013 SCC 57 at para 72, 
while ensuring gender equality was accepted as a such in Reference re Section 293, ibid.  
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stage of s. 1. The Supreme Court’s decision in Sauvé v Canada is instructive on this 
point. In that case, the Court struck down a legislative provision that denied to persons 
imprisoned for two years or more their right to vote as guaranteed by s. 3 of the Charter. 
In so, doing the Court split five to four on the admissibility of “philosophically-based or 
symbolic” legislative objectives. Writing for a majority, McLachlin C.J. held that “vague 
and symbolic objectives make the justification analysis more difficult” because they do 
not speak to the necessity of the limit on the right “in concrete terms.” For this reason, 
she held, “demonstrable justification requires that the objective clearly reveal the harm 
that the government hopes to remedy.”74 Further, she held, ““broad, symbolic objectives” 
such as “enhancing civic responsibility" and “good citizenship” have been held to be 
“problematic.”75 Accordingly, it is clear that on whatever basis the government sought to 
justify its legislation, it would have to do so with reference to a reasoned apprehension of 
concrete harm. 
 
b) Rational Connection 
 
If the reviewing court is satisfied that the impugned legislation has been enacted 
for a proper purpose, it then falls to the government to prove that the means it has 
adopted are rationally connected to that purpose. In other words, at the second stage of 
Oakes (and the first stage of proportionality), the government must establish “a causal 
connection between the infringement and the benefit sought on the basis of reason and 
logic.”76 The Supreme Court has explained the role of the rational connection inquiry as 
ensuring that limitations on rights should not be “arbitrary, unfair, or based on irrational 
considerations.” While this conception, first articulated in Oakes, has not been formally 
re-visited by the Court, there is some evidence that it is moving away from the language 
of “fairness” at the rational connection stage. Indeed, as Aharon Barak has noted, that 
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language is problematic to the extent that it suggests an evaluative role for the Court in 
what is essentially an empirical inquiry.77 
Indeed, in its decision in Alberta v. Hutterian Brethren of Wilson Colony, the 
Court urged against conflating the search for a rational connection with more value-laden 
considerations better left to the final “balancing” step of proportionality. It stressed that 
“[t]he issue at the stage of rational connection is simply whether there is a rational link 
between the infringing measure and the government’s goal.”78 Beyond the search for 
such a link, the reviewing court should refrain from questioning the wisdom of means 
chosen by the legislature. It is well-established, for instance, that the state is not required 
to prove that the measures it has adopted will optimally realize its legislative objective. It 
need only show that it is reasonable to suppose that the limit may further its objective. 
Furthermore, the measures may advance the legislative purpose partially or inefficiently 
and still pass the rational connection test. Simply put, the rational connection inquiry is a 
second threshold test, which will be met where the legislature can point to the “reason” or 
“logic” of the measures it has adopted.79 
A legislative prohibition on the concealment of the face in public might well pass 
the rational connection branch of s. 1 justification. To be sure, a more definitive 
conclusion in this regard would require actual legislation with an identifiable purpose and 
means. It is unclear whether it could be established that the three legislative objectives 
already considered (security, gender equality, and maintaining the minimum standards of 
democratic life) are in fact compromised by public veiling. If it can be so established, the 
evidentiary record for each potential harm will likely be different. For example, while 
there may be significant evidence that the veil undermines gender equality,80 evidence 
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80 In Reference re Section 293 of the Criminal Code of Canada, 2011 BCSC 1588 the 
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suggesting its harm to public security or democratic participation may be scant. It must 
be recalled, however, that to establish a rational connection all that is required is enough 
evidence to disoblige the court of any notion that the means adopted by the legislature are 
arbitrary or illogical. 
Indeed, the requirement of a rational connection is widely recognized in both 
Canadian case law and legal scholarship as being a burden which may be easily 
discharged. Again, evidentiary support for harm or the potential for harm can be slight. 
The Supreme Court has established that in most cases the evidentiary basis for means 
adopted by the legislature may be “admittedly inconclusive,”81 and has indicated that the 
inquiry is really about finding a “common sense connection.”82 Again, this suggests that 
the evidence needed to show the logic of the legislative scheme may be minimal. With 
respect to the three legislative objectives already discussed, if the state had adduced 
evidence at the first stage of Oakes to show that a ban on the veil was meant to respond to 
harm associated with veiling, the same evidence may be serviceable to show a rational 
connection between the prohibition on concealment of the face and the prevention of that 
harm. 
 
c) Minimal Impairment  
 
As the preceding two sections have noted, very few laws reviewed under s. 1 have 
been struck down during the preliminary “proper purpose” inquiry or at the so-called 
“rational connection” stage. Furthermore, the requirement of proportionate effect at the 
fourth and final step of Oakes has also played a marginal role in constitutional rights 
adjudication.83 The vast majority of laws that have failed s. 1 review, have done so at the 
“minimal impairment” or “least drastic means" branch of Oakes. In fact, the second stage 
of Oakes has been so consequential that one constitutional law scholar has called it “the 
“heart and soul of s. 1 justification.”84 However, in Hutterian Brethren, the Supreme 
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Court signaled a more structured and formal approach to minimal impairment which may 
give new importance to the final branch of Oakes. The final two steps of s. 1 justification 
are analysed here with the Court’s reasons in Hutterian Brethren firmly in mind. 
The second stage of Oakes requires the state to establish that the legislation under 
review impairs the constitutional right or freedom it engages “no more than is reasonably 
necessary” to achieve the law’s objective. The word “reasonable” is important because it 
indicates that while the legislature is obliged to use the least restrictive means available to 
it to realize its objective, it enjoys a degree of deference or “room to maneuver” in 
determining what those means are. This so-called “margin of appreciation” doctrine 
recognizes that that legislature is better-suited to making policy, particularly where 
complex social and economic issues are involved. Accordingly, the Court has held that 
review for minimal impairment does not require that the limitation on a right be 
“perfectly calibrated,” only that it is “reasonably and demonstrably justified.”85 Thus, a 
law will be “minimally impairing” of a constitutional right where it falls within a range of 
reasonable alternatives available to the legislature.  
The effect of the court’s decision in Hutterian Brethren was to re-fortify the 
legislature’s margin of appreciation in determining the most effective means of achieving 
its objective. In that case, a small, insular religious community called the Hutterites 
challenged a regulation introduced by the Alberta government requiring all driver’s 
licenses in the province to include a photograph of the license-holder. They objective 
based upon their religious belief that the Second Commandment prohibited them from 
willingly being photographed, and insisted on an exemption to the photo requirement. In 
rejecting the Hutterites’ claim, the majority held that an exemption would defeat the 
government’s objective, which was to reduce identity fraud associated with the licensing 
system by ensuring one-to-one correspondence between each license and a photo of the 
license-holder in a digital “photo bank.” For her part, Abella J., writing in dissent, 
resisted the notion that the absolute integrity of the photo-bank was necessary to 
substantially satisfy the government’s objective. 
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The majority in Hutterian Brethren held that a reviewing court is not competent 
to re-configure or modify the policy determination made by the legislature as the most 
effective means of realizing its objective. As McLachlin C.J. put it, in the case of the 
photo bank, the demand for an exemption, “instead of asking what is minimally required 
to realize the legislative goal, asks the government to significantly compromise it.”86 If 
the legislature determines that a one-to-one correspondence was necessary for the system 
to be effective, the court must not engage in speculation as to “how effective” the system 
needs to be. The rational connection and minimal impairment tests are not evaluative but 
empirical, in the sense that they are “essentially determined against the background of the 
proper objective, and are derived from the need to realize it.” In this way the legislative 
goal, which has been found to be pressing and substantial, “grounds the minimal 
impairment analysis.”87 
Provided that the reviewing court does not readjust the legislative objective at 
minimal impairment, a statutory ban on concealment of the face in public might well be 
accepted. Again, this has a great deal to do with the relative breadth with which the 
legislature defines its purpose. If allowing for exemptions to the prohibition on veiling 
would substantially defeat the government’s purpose then the court may well accept a full 
ban as minimally impairing. As McLachlin C.J. noted in Hutterian Brethren, freedom of 
religion cases often involve this sort of “all or nothing dilemma.”88 Where providing a 
religiously-based exemption, for example, would defeat the purpose of the ban, as it 
would seem to here, then the ban may well be found to be minimally impairing. 
 
d) Proportionate Effect   
 
The final step of s. 1 justification engages the court in a balancing exercise to 
determine whether the legislation being reviewed is proportionate in effect or 
proportionate stricto sensu. Citing the work of former Israeli Supreme Court President 
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Aharon Barak,89 the majority in Hutterian Brethren, held this step involves a court 
“placing colliding values side by side and balancing them according to their weight.” 
Canadian courts have typically referred to this exercise as balancing the salutary effects 
of the legislation with its deleterious effects on the constitutional right. President Barak 
has written elsewhere that, on his methodology the inquiry into proportionate effect is in 
fact “the most important of proportionality’s tests.”90 While it has historically played a 
quite marginal role in the application of Oakes, there is good reason to believe that the 
more empirical and less evaluative approach to minimal impairment developed by 
President Barak has gained influence in Canadian constitutional law, and may make the 
final step of Oakes more consequential. 
Indeed, in Hutterian Brethren, McLachlin C.J. stressed the importance of 
differentiating the rational connection and minimal impairment analyses from the inquiry 
into proportionate effect. In her view, while the latter invites the court to engage in value 
judgments, the first two steps of proportionality are far more empirical, and do not invite 
the court to “read down the government’s objective.”91 This distinction, she held, drawn 
by President Barak, is “a salutary one,” although one “not always strictly followed by 
Canadian courts.”92 The government’s objective, and the means adopted by the 
legislature to realize it, are not to be altered, but determined to be constitutional or 
unconstitutional as they are at the final step of Oakes. This approach re-affirms the 
legislature’s constitutionally authority to make policy-decisions, while at the same time 
vesting in the reviewing court a highly discretionary authority to strike down laws which 
are perceived to be insufficiently beneficial to justify the infringement of constitutional 
rights. 
This sort of balancing or weighing of values engages the normative dimension of 
constitutional rights. To assess whether an infringement on a right is tolerable in a “free 
and democratic society” requires the reviewing judge to have some notion of what is 
implied by the words “free” and “democratic.” At this step in s. 1 justification, the court 
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imports, whether consciously or unconsciously, historical and cultural pre-notions of 
what makes for a good society. As far back as Big M, the Supreme Court has articulated a 
strongly individualistic theory of religious freedom under s. 2(a) as part of a more general 
s. 2 ethos which regards rights as essentially negative, to be exercised against the state. 
While the Court has tended to articulate this particular rights paradigm as though it were 
axiomatically the only meaning that could be ascribed to the words “free and 
democratic,” it does reflect an ideological orientation derived from Canada’s intellectual 
and cultural history.  
Consistent with this individualistic rights ethos, legislation tends to be struck 
down at the final step of s. 1 justification where its salutary effects on society are 
perceived to be too abstract or speculative. In Trinity Western, for example, the court 
found that a risk was overly speculative, citing insufficient evidence that potentially 
discriminatory beliefs were actually result in discriminatory conduct. What was required, 
the court held, was “concrete evidence” of the harm apprehended.93 Similarly in 
Amselem, “security” concerns posed by the construction of Succot on balconies in an 
apartment complex were also held to be “speculative” in the absence of evidence of a 
“tangible impact.”94 It should also be recalled that in Sauvé the Court refused to reconcile 
a highly abstract legislative objective as being sufficiently important to over-ride a 
Charter right. Under this model, then, the state has relatively little room for passing laws 
of general application with predominantly abstract or symbolic dimensions.  
Furthermore, deleterious effects on rights, including freedom of religion, are 
considered by a reviewing court in light of broader Charter values, specifically, “liberty, 
human dignity, equality, autonomy, and the enhancement of democracy.” As the majority 
held in Hutterian Brethren, “liberty” is the “most fundamental” of such values, and in the 
case of s. 2(a), the “right of choice in matters of religion.”95 This emphasis on individual 
choice and the right to be left undisturbed by the state can be traced back to Dickson CJ’s 
seminal s. 2(a) decision in Big M. Subsequent case law has held that a negation of 
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individual choice in matters protected under s. 2 is highly deleterious, and the more the 
right is negated, the more intolerable the harm is considered to be. This was surely the 
case in NS, where veiling was held to be an expression of individual choice and the 
degree of interference with that choice was total.96  
Thus, while a legislative ban on concealment of the face in public may well pass 
the first three steps of a s. 1 analysis, it is all but certain that it would fail on the final 
inquiry into proportionate effect. Again, this has to do mainly with the speculative and 
somewhat abstract nature of such legislation’s salutary effects on gender equality, public 
security or democratic participation. Balanced against this is a very concrete and far-
reaching deleterious effect on a s. 2(a) right. It is important to understand that this 
particular weighing of the different values engaged reflects a particular individualistic 
approach to constitutional rights. While this normative dimension of rights adjudication 
has often found expression at the minimal impairment branch of s.1 justification, post-
Hutterian Brethren, it will likely be considered at the stage of proportionality stricto 
sensu. That stage of s. 1 justification is poised to take on new significance, for as the next 
chapter of this thesis will suggest, the historical and cultural dimension of rights remains 
critical, in spite of increased synchronization in the methodology of rights adjudication 
across legal systems. 
 
vii) The Application of the Proportionality Test in France 
 
a) Proportionality is Applied Syllogistically 
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In reaching its result in Dec. 2010-61, the Constitutional Council subsumed the 
facts relating to Law 2010-1192 under one of two contending principles after a process of 
strict deduction, during which it justified its deductive inferences with reference to the 
requirements of proportionality. Again, Dec. 2010-61 takes the form of a laconic six-
paragraph statement of the law, admitting of no references to precedent and no reliance 
on analogy or other inductive techniques which typify the common law. Its language is 
therefore “existential and descriptive,” rather than “formative and prescriptive.”97 It is a 
short decision, even by the standards of the Constitutional Council. Before delving into 
the council’s reasons with respect to Law 2010-1192, it is critical to recall why French 
rights adjudication is so distinctively terse. While the first chapter of this thesis examined 
French legal reasoning from an historical perspective, in this section it is worth briefly 
considering how French deduction takes place from a doctrinal standpoint. 
As Constitutional Council member Jacqueline de Guillenschmidt has stated, the 
Constitutional Council strives to apply the law in a non-discretionary manner, with “With 
the common sense that since Descartes has been equally shared among all men.”98 For his part, 
Descartes opined that by way of “quite simple and easy” reasoning, not unlike “analytical 
or co-ordinate geometry,” even the “most distant” truth may be arrived at.99 The starting 
point, he reasoned, must be a broad and general principle ascertained by the “indubitable 
conception of a clear and attentive mind which proceeds solely based on the light of 
reason.”100 From a basic principle, he advised, which is often the “simplest object and 
[therefore] easiest to know,” other less apparent truths might be discerned through strict 
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deduction.101 In other words, from a principle known with certainty, other correct 
propositions can be inferred as following necessarily. Descartes’ deductive methodology 
deeply imbued French legal theory, legislative drafting and juristic form. As suggested 
earlier, the Cartesian premise that truth is logically antecedent to experience powerfully 
reinforces a posture of judicial restraint. 
The French Cartesian tradition, in stark contrast to the common law, places a 
premium on abstract thinking and gives a corresponding lack of attention to empirical 
detail. The Constitutional Council thus presents the results of constitutional litigation as 
logical deductions from more fundamental principles. Deductive inferences are justified 
by the fact that constitutional rights are conceived of as norms from which sub-ordinate 
norms derive their force of law. As Hans Kelsen put it, a norm, whatever its formal legal 
status, is only binding if the entity commanding it is “authorized” or “empowered.” to 
issue that command. This presumes a normative order in which all law is situated.102 
Drawing deductive inferences involves identifying more specific norms as following 
logically from general norms, in light of the need for the higher norm to “empower” it. 
Through the deductive technique of syllogisme judiciare, the facts of a case are subsumed 
under a more specific norm as the “end point” in chain of stringently logical inferences. 
Accordingly, the role of the judge is represented as “applying” the law somewhat 
mechanically, as though the law being discussed “has already judged.”103 However, as a 
standard of judicial review, proportionality invariably involves the reviewing court in 
some degree of evaluation and “balancing,” which would seem antithetical to traditional 
Cartesian methods. While French jurists commonly state that proportionality has always 
been the essence of deduction, it is undeniable that French adjudicative techniques have 
evolved to adapt to the incorporation of a standard of review that is necessarily somewhat 
inductive. It is clear that considerations of proportionality now inform how the 
Constitutional Council thinks about how legal norms are to be reconciled. This is evident 
from its use of the language of proportionality to justify its deductive inferences As this 
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section will show, in the case of Dec. 2010-61, this equated to a terse and syllogistic 
reasoning process which incorporates consideration of proper purpose, rational 
connection, and minimal impairment to establish a proportionate infringement of a rights 
norm. 
It serves to recall that none of the constitutional texts of the Fifth French Republic 
contain a general limitations clause from which a requirement of proportionality for 
rights limitation can be inferred. Still, Jacqueline de Guillenschmidt has referred to 
proportionality as “la pierre angulaire du contrôle de constitutionalité.”104 In her view, 
while the requirement of that legislative abridgments of constitutional rights be 
proportionate does not emanate from the black letter of a single, discrete textual 
provision, it is an adjudicative norm which has long pervaded the republic’s 
constitutional rights instruments. Accordingly, in French constitutional interpretation, 
proportionality has traditionally been treated as “un principle mouvant, impossible à 
définir dans l’absolu et nécessairement contigent.”105 This approach has had the effect of 
forestalling the development of the sort of structured, formal approach to judicial review 
for proportionality which has taken hold in other jurisdictions, and of ensuring that 
proportionality requirements would be inferred from the text of the rights being 
adjudicated. 
Nevertheless, the term “proportionality” does have a meaning in a norm sense, 
even if the stringency of its application as a legal standard varies depending on the 
language of the rights norms at issue. For any sub-constitutional limit on a constitutional 
right to be “proportionate,” it must, in general terms, be “équilibré, mesuré, [et] 
raisonable.”106 While this triadic standard always “underwrites” interpretation of rights 
and their limits in France, as de Guillenschmidt has noted, it is rarely clearly expressed in 
the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Council.107 Those three normative criteria are used 
by the council to measure the adequacy of the statutory standard to the legislative 
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objective and to ensure a balance between the infringement of a right and the public 
interest.108 Depending on the rights norms at issue, this may mean a standard of manifest 
error, a “soft” form of proportionality focussed on necessity or minimal impairment, or a 
rigorous three-step test that includes a weighing of the law’s “possible consequences.” 
For instance, the Constitutional Council has generally used a far less exacting 
standard of review for environmental or social rights (“droits de créance”) than for 
legislation affecting liberty rights.109 While the former often retain a standard of manifest 
error, most of the latter now demand application of a full three-step proportionality test, 
or what French jurists refer to as the “triptych allemand.”110 The three-part means-end 
rational review with scrutiny for minimal impairment and proportionality stricto sensu 
has been applied, for example, to ensure that a deprivation of the right to liberty is 
“strictly and obviously necessary’ per Art. 9 of the 1789 DDHC. In contrast, Art. 5 of the 
2004 Charter of the Environment, which ensures the imposition of precautionary 
measures by public authorities to prevent environmental damage, has been found to 
attract a standard of review akin to manifest error.111 Again, this variability has to do with 
the relative breadth of legislative maneuverability conferred by the right as suggested by 
its text. 
It must be recalled, however, that what is being reviewed is the competence of the 
legislature to make law given the constitutional principles engaged. In French 
constitutional rights adjudication, those principles are conceived of less as discrete textual 
provisions than as norms of the apex of a hierarchical order which both limit and 
empower all sub-constitutional laws. In other words, constitutional principles or norms 
dictate at the highest level of abstraction how all legislation and subordinate legislation is 
to be interpreted or applied. In most cases dealt with by the Constitutional Council, 
including Dec. 2010-61 respecting concealment of the face in public, a number of textual 
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provisions in several constitutional texts are implicated. The constitutional principles 
implicated by those provisions are read as informing and complimenting one another. 
Thus, the council is not adjudicating the black letter of individual textual provisions in 
relation to the facts, but setting out the constitutional norms engaged by a particular set of 
facts in the most abstract of terms. 
Accordingly, the rights provisions engaged in Dec. 2010-61, (that is, Articles 4, 5 
and 10 of the DDHC and Article 3 of the Preamble of the Constitution of 1946), must be 
read as a priori truths which inform each other. Article 4 of the DDHC is a general 
liberty right, prescribing that the exercise of an individual’s “natural rights” may only be 
limited to ensure the enjoyment of these same rights by others. It further prescribes that 
such limits “shall be determined solely by the law.” Article 5 circumscribes the 
legislature’s authority to set such limits by stating that it may only limit rights where their 
exercise is harmful to society. Article 10 suggested that freedom of religion is a natural 
right within the meaning of Article 4, and may only be limited in the interest of “public 
order,” which to be consistent with Article 4 must involve the prevention of some harm. 
Finally, Article 3 of the 1946 preamble, obliges the legislature to legislate with a view to 
ensuring gender equality. 
From these provisions, the Constitutional Council postulated two general contending 
principles: the broad liberty right of the individual to freedom of religion and the right of 
the legislature to limit that right to prevent societal harm, including harm of a gendered 
nature. With the single deductive inference that places of public worship (lieux de culte 
overtes au public) were not part of the “public order” for which the legislature could 
make law, the council proceeded to subsume Law no. 2010-1192 under the principle of 
legislative authority to make law for the public order. Again, this is an very short 
decision, and generally broad constitutional principles such as those involved in this case 
yield a chain of inferences to get to propositions sufficiently narrow to take in the facts at 
hand. Still, in arriving at its decision, the Constitutional Council made full use of the 
requirement of proportionality to justify its inferences. The proportionality criteria which 
the council felt were engaged by the principles it cited were proper purpose, rational 





a) Deductive Inferences are Justified With Reference to Proportionality’s 
Requirements 
 
First, the Constitutional Council acknowledged that Law no. 2010-1192 
prohibiting the concealment of the face in public had a proper purpose. Again, it should 
be recalled that the proportionality standard in France grew out of the stand of manifest 
error, and the council retains the ability to invalidate legislation with “arbitrary or 
abusive” purposes, the error of which “could not escape a man of good sense.” In general 
terms, the standard of manifest error equates to the proper purpose inquiry in Canadian or 
EU law. On this point the council reviewed the legislation and held that Law no. 2010-
1192 was “intended to respond to practices which until recently were of an exceptional 
nature, consisting of concealment the face in public.” It proceeds to note that the 
legislature had felt that such practices were at odds with public safety, gender equality 
and the minimum requirements of life in society, and more general the constitutional 
principles of liberty and equality.112 Implicit in these reflections on the legislative 
purpose, is an subtle acknowledgement that there is nothing manifestly inappropriate 
about it. 
Secondly, the Constitutional Council acknowledged (again, in rather existential 
and descriptive terms) the proportionality of the means adopted by the legislature in Law 
no. 2010-1192. Immediately preceding its discussion of legislative purpose, the council 
noted that “when enacting the provisions referred for review, Parliament has completed 
and generalized rules which previously were reserved for ad hoc situations for the 
purpose of providing public order.”113 This statement of legislative means suggest their 
innate rationality, as a logical extension of measures already existing to meet the needs of 
a developing situation. Given that a rational connection is generally considered to be a 
non-arbitrary or non-capricious one, a “completion and generalization” of existing rules 
cannot fail to meet that standard. Further, the reference to “public order” has a particular 
constitutional meaning. The legislature is empowered to make law for the “public order,” 
a term which draws its normative dimensions from other constitutional provisions setting 
                                                          




out the democratic character of French institutions. The implication is that if the 
provision developed for ad hoc situations were “rational,” then their adaptation to a more 
general phenomenon will be as well.  
In the fifth paragraph of its six-paragraph decision, the council held that Law no. 
2010-1192 minimally impaired on the right to freedom of religion. Again, the legislative 
objective is not a shifting standard but must ground the minimal impairment analysis. 
Accordingly, the council noted that “in view of the purpose which it sought to achieve,” 
the legislature had achieved a conciliation which was not disproportionate (une 
conciliation qui n’est pas manifistement disproportionné) between safeguarding the 
public order and guaranteeing constitutionally protected rights.114 It proceeded to note, 
however, that the legislation could not apply to places of worship frequented by the 
public without constituting an excessive burden on the exercise of freedom of religion.115 
Thus, for the council it followed logically there was no less intrusive way to realize the 
legislative objective of preventing the harm associated with the niqāb than by prohibiting 
it in public places that do not have a specific religious purpose. In other words, veiling 
could be permitted in places of worship without undermining the legislature’s goals with 
respect to public order. 
Importantly, the Constitutional Council did not conduct a balancing of the 
legislation’s salutary and deleterious effects. Again, this would have required the 
reviewing court to weigh contending values against the framework of what is required by 
a democratic society consecrated to the realization of “liberty” and “natural rights.” The 
fact that this inquiry was not conducted in Dec. 2010-61 suggests that it was not inferred 
by the council as required by the text of the rights provision they were applying. More 
accurately, it may be said that the rights paradigm the council felt was implied in 
determining proportionate effect was sufficiently well expressed by a more limited 
inquiry into whether the legislature had acted in manifest error, had used irrational 
means, and unduly impaired the rights of the individual. In a normative sense, the balance 
that French constitutionalism seeks to achieve between the rights of the individual and 
the needs of the whole of which he is a part is sufficiently accounted for in the softer 
                                                          









This chapter has analysed the application of proportionality in Canada and the 
French Republic to legislative limits on the constitutional right to freedom of religion. It 
has used France’s recent legislative ban on the wearing of full face veils in public as an 
example which has implications for other freedom of religion cases in each jurisdiction. 
To be sure, each country undertakes the proportionality analysis using starkly different 
forms of legal reasoning. While Canadian rights adjudication is imbued with the 
empiricism and fact-sensitivity of the common law, French jurists place a premium on 
abstract and conceptual thinking.  For the French Constitutional Council, proportional 
limitations on rights are knowable by the virtues of logic, and not as a by-product of 
litigation. Nevertheless, in recent decades both jurisdictions have incorporated the 
principles of proportionality into their approach to constitutional review, affecting an 
impressive synchronization in methods of rights adjudication.  
As this analysis has shown, both systems are able to bring the same principles to 
bear through their respective methods of judicial reasoning (ie. whether fact-oriented or 
principle-oriented). Differences in substantive outcomes resulting from differences in 
reasoning methods appear to be negligible. In other words, neither Canadian nor French 
legal reasoning necessitates a more rigorous application of the proportionality standard. 
Both constitutional authorities are likely to assess for a proper purpose (or the absence of 
a manifest error), a rational connection, and minimal impairment and arrive at more or 
less the same result, irrespective of the method of judicial reasoning used. Both forms of 
judicial reasoning strive to reconcile the right with its potential to be limited, and in doing 
so arrive at a window within which it must decide whether or not to defer to the 
legislature.  
In the case of a prohibition on the veil, the matter turns on the final step of the 
analysis; that is, the inquiry into proportionate effect. The Canadian approach invites a 
reviewing court to assess the harm occasioned by the ban against a normative backdrop 
that sees liberty as a negative right of the individual to be left unmolested by the state. 
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The individual and the state are conceived of as existing in fairly rigid dichotomy, with 
the interests of the collective being represented by the legislature and the interests of the 
individual being represented by the courts. For its part, the French Constitutional Council 
did not conduct a proportionate effects inquiry, which in effect allowed it to assess the 
limitation against a backdrop which does not percieve of the state and the individual 
existing in as rigid a binary.  Indeed, as the next chapter will explain, even where the 
Constitutional Council conducts a proportionate effects inquiry it is done in such a way as 
to comport with this more legislature-centric normative backdrop. 
The normative dimension of rights, understood as the extent to which they are 
historically and culturally contingent, remains critical to determining justifiable 
limitations on rights. As with other constitutional rights, the normativity of “freedom of 
religion” is most evident when the reviewing authority considers whether the effects of a 
legislative limitation on that right is proportionate in the strict sense. Accordingly, the 
next chapter takes the form of a deeper and more concentrated analysis of the 
proportionate effects or balancing stage of proportionality. By analysing the way in 
which balancing takes place from the perspective of each jurisdiction’s intellectual and 
cultural development, the normative dimensions of democratic life and religious liberty in 





Chapter 4: How the Proportionate Effects Test Acts as the Main Vector for the 




This chapter attempts to shed light on the role of constitutional culture in the 
application of the proportionality test as tool of rights adjudication. It suggests that the 
“proportionate effects” or “balancing” stage of that test is the main vector for the 
expression of the cultural dimension of rights because it engages a reviewing court in 
appraisals of what is good or acceptable in a given jurisdiction. In the first two chapters 
of this thesis, it was suggested that courts in Canada and the French Republic have 
adapted proportionality to comport with their domestic modes of legal reasoning. This 
chapter explores how rules for applying the proportionate effects test have been 
judicially-developed so that balancing reflects prevailing rights norms in each country. It 
concludes that while the migration of proportionality has brought about a degree of 
harmonization in the methodology of rights adjudication, the constitutionality of 
limitations on rights such as freedom of religion still turns largely on both articulated and 
unarticulated normative considerations distinctive to different jurisdictions. 
The legal rules developed by courts for application of the proportionate effects 
test are used to anchor a discussion about the cultural nature of constitutional balancing. 
That discussion is based upon the observation that while the proportionate effects test is 
part of a legal standard developed at a supra-national level, fundamental value-
considerations of order and purpose are ascribed to it in the jurisdiction applying it. In 
other words, an instrumental “steering function” is expected of the proportionate effects 
test when it is applied in a particular legal system.1 This chapter suggests that the nature 
of those value-considerations are best understood with reference to the constitutional 
culture in which the standard is being applied. The term “constitutional culture” is used to 
suggest basic, historically-developed “shared meanings” and interpretive perspectives in 
                                                          
1 Hans Vorländer, “What is a ‘Constitutional Culture?’” in Silke Hensel et al, eds, 
Constitutional Cultures: On the Concept and Representation of Constitutions in the 
Atlantic World (Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2012) at 28 
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a jurisdiction’s constitutional law.2 This chapter aims to move beyond a narrow or 
positivistic comparative analysis by exploring how the legal rules of balancing in each 
jurisdiction reflect their respective constitutional cultures.3 
An historicist approach is used as the most effective means of exploring the 
“shared meanings" that inform balancing in each jurisdiction. This chapter does not seek 
to ascribe historical causes to contemporary legal issues. Nor does its use of history 
reflect an attempt to give a comprehensive review of the development of legal norms or 
institutions in Canada or France. The aim of this chapter is in fact far less ambitious. An 
historicist methodology is used to isolate a narrow distinction in legal reasoning in each 
legal system in the context of the balancing stage of proportionality. By relating that 
distinction to historical patterns, this chapter suggests a far greater degree of organicism 
in the law relating to constitutional rights than is generally acknowledged in legal 
scholarship. The recognition or non-recognition of particular substantive rights, it is 
suggested, is related to but not co-extensive with these underlying patterns in thinking 
about rights. 
Accordingly, differences respecting the constitutionality of legislative restrictions 
on religious expression, such as prohibitions on concealment of the face in public, can be 
explained by a divergence in the way rights are conceptualized. That divergence finds its 
expression mainly in the proportionate effects stage of proportionality. It is argued that 
the Canadian approach to balancing reflects the empiricism of the common law, while the 
French approach is distinctly rationalistic. While the common law tradition tends to see 
liberty in a negative sense, as an individual right to be left unmolested by the state, the 
latter sees the state as having an important role in advancing liberty through a formative 
project of fraternal and egalitarian citizenship. The legal rules of balancing have been 
                                                          
2 Ibid at 25. 
3 Legal positivism suggests, in the words of Hans Kelsen, that “the content of the law can 
be anything whatsoever.” The only basis upon which to judge the legitimacy of a law 
whether it is issued authoritatively and has social efficacy. No moral elements are 
included in the analysis. The tradition tends to restrict its focus to the black letter of the 
law and its functional operation as the principle means of assessing its validity. See Hans 
Kelsen, Pure Theory of Law, 2nd ed, trans by Erine Rechtslehre (1960) by Marx Knight 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967) at 198 and Robert Alexy, The Argument 
from Injustice: A Reply to Legal Positivism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002). 
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developed to reflect these ends. Thus, it is the legal rules of balancing, and not specific 
doctrines of secularism per se, which are responsible for the constitutionality or 
unconstitutionality of restrictions on religious expression in the public sphere. 
 
ii) The Proportionate Effects Inquiry: General Observations 
 
In most jurisdictions, constitutional review on a proportionality standard requires 
a preliminary inquiry into whether the law under review has a “sufficiently important 
objective,” followed by a three-part “proportionality test.” That test involves assessing 
the impugned legislation for: a “rational connection” between its objective and the means 
adopted to realize it, minimal impairment of the constitutional right, and a proportionate 
relation between the salutary effects of the law and its deleterious effects on the right. It 
is critical to appreciate that the final step of proportionate effects (known in the law of the 
EU as “proportionality stricto sensu”) is conceptually distinct from those that precede it. 
Taken together, the first three requirements represent a “means-end analysis,” focused 
narrowly on the relation between the legislative objective and the legislative means. In 
contrast, the test for proportionate effects assesses the relation between the legislative 
objective and the constitutional right. While the first three inquiries are primarily 
empirical, the fourth is evaluative in the sense that it involves a rather more subjective 
“balancing” of values.4 
To be sure, the preliminary question of whether the law has a sufficiently 
important objective can be described as evaluative to the extent that it involves a court in 
determining whether a legislative objective is “good” or “acceptable” in a constitutional 
democracy. That inquiry, however, is focused narrowly on the admissibility of the law’s 
purpose, and the bases upon which a purpose can be rejected as improper are generally 
few and well-defined. Improper purposes are particularly clear and accessible to 
reviewing courts because they tend to be articulated in the constitutional text itself or in 
relevant case law,5 and do not involve the same level of speculation as questions dealing 
                                                          
4 Aharon Barak, Proportionality: Constitutional Rights and their Limitations 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012) at 344. 
5 Under the European Convention on Human Rights, statutory purposes which are 
considered acceptable from the standpoint of limitations on rights are set out in the text of 
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with the potential effects of a law. In other words, the legislative intent involved tends to 
be either patently unacceptable or not. Thus, the proper purpose inquiry is conceptually 
like the rational connection and minimal impairment tests both in the sense that it is 
focuses on the relation between the law’s limiting purpose and the means selected to 
achieve it, and because of the primarily empirical nature of its application.  
The requirements of a rational connection and minimal impairment are not 
evaluative and do not engage the court in value judgements. The test for a rational 
connection between the means used by the legislation and the purpose it was designed to 
fulfill is empirical. It involves verifying as a matter of fact some sort of connection, 
however slight, between legislative means and ends. Again, such means may advance the 
legislative objective badly or inefficiently and still be rational.6 Similarly, the minimal 
impairment or necessity test does not invite a reviewing court to evaluate the legislative 
purpose or the need to realize it.7 The legislative objective remains fixed and grounds the 
inquiry. The aim of minimal impairment is to filter out cases in which the same level of 
realization of a legitimate legislative objective can be achieved at less cost to 
constitutional rights.8 While some level of judicial discretion is invariably applied,9 at 
minimal impairment the court is charged only with ruling out gratuitous limitations on 
rights.  
The final step of the three-part proportionality test is different. It departs from 
consideration of the legislative ends and means, and focuses on the effects of the law. The 
                                                          
the specific limitations clauses themselves. See for example Council of Europe, 
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 
as amended by Protocols Nos. 11 and 14, 4 November 1950, ETS 5 at Art. 9(2). 
6 Barak, supra note 4 at 305. 
7 Ibid at 321. 
8 Julian Rivers, “Proportionality and Variable Intensity of Review,” (2006) 65 Cambridge 
LJ 174 at 200. 
9 When applying the minimal impairment of necessity stage of proportionality, for 
example, the European Court of Human Rights developed the notion of a “margin of 
appreciation.” According to that doctrine, a court will grant to a legislature a measure of 
“latitude… in evaluating factual situations and in applying the provisions enumerated in 
international human rights treaties.” The margin of appreciation is now a well-recognized 
part of the proportionality test in every jurisdiction where that standard of review is used. 
See Y. Arai-Takahashi, The Margin of Appreciation Doctrine and the Principle of 
Proportionality in the Jurisprudence of the ECHR (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2002) at 2. 
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court evaluates those effects through a balancing of its potential benefits and the harm it 
might cause to the rights of affected individuals or groups. It involves the reviewing court 
in determining, not whether a given level of rights-enjoyment combined with the 
realization of other interests meets a particular legal test, but whether it is good or 
acceptable in a given context.10 While scholars have advanced a range of methodological 
proposals to lend greater structure and formalism to the exercise and to prevent it from 
becoming “a playground of subjectivity”11 the balancing process remains 
“methodologically obscure” in most jurisdictions. It is generally recognized that the 
balancing stage of proportionality involves an “insurmountable” element of subjectivity12 
given the extent to which it engages value judgments. 
The inherent subjectivity or “crudeness”13 of the proportionate effects test stems 
from the fact that, in order to measure whether there is in fact an an adequate congruence 
between the benefits gained by a law and the harm it may cause to constitutional rights, 
the reviewing court must be able to “quantify” the net gain and loss of a particular 
legislative initiative. That is, the values in conflict must, at their precise point of conflict, 
be infused with a certain weight, a weight which ultimately derives from context. The 
interaction of the value with particular factual circumstances inevitably engages judicial 
discretion and subjectivity. The proportionate effects test, therefore, cannot avoid a high 
level of subjectivity. The most that can be done is for judges to develop legal rules to 
guide balancing. The legal rules of balancing signal certain principles to which courts 
must refer when applying that stage of the proportionality standard. 
As this chapter will show, when developing such rules courts are working from 
the text of the limitations clause of the constitutional document. Starting from the 
language used to justify limitations on rights, they bring to bear, both consciously and 
unconsciously, a particular way of thinking about rights that is organic to the legal system 
of which they are a part. They both read in particular political and philosophical 
                                                          
10 Rivers, supra note 8 at 200. 
11 Bernard Schlink, “Proportionality” in Michael Rosenfeld and András Sajó, eds, The 
Oxford Handbook of Comparative Constitutional Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2012) at 724. 
12 Ibid at 725. 
13 Rivers, supra note 8 at 201. 
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ideologies, historical and cultural realities, including general notions of the structure of 
the political system,14 and import particular modes of reasoning which affect rights 
balancing in less explicit ways. In a sense, during balancing, judges are at once conscious 
articulators of certain aspects of the constitutional culture, and unconscious transmitters 
of other aspects. It is for both of these reasons that the final step of the proportionality 
analysis gives expression to the extent to which constitutional rights are historically and 
culturally contingent. 
 
iii) Canadian Constitutional Culture Reflects a Common Law Heritage  
 
The most important aspect of Canadian constitutional culture for the purpose of 
this analysis are those which engage very basic questions about traditional forms of legal 
reasoning. Those reasoning practices pre-existed the incorporation of the Canadian 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms (“the Charter”), and were subsequently leveraged in its 
interpretation. From a comparative perspective, the most distinctive feature of Canadian 
constitutional reasoning is its empiricism and non-speculative character. As this section 
will suggest, this fact-dependence and aversion to abstract reasoning is an inheritance of 
common law practices which developed in Britain in the eighteenth-century. Indeed, it is 
a key contention of this thesis that, even after the incorporation of a constitutional rights 
instrument and a robust system of judicial review, Canada may still be justifiably referred 
to as a common law constitutional culture. This is in large measure due to the extent to 
which the country’s common law heritage continues to make itself felt in constitutional 
review. 
In the first chapter of this thesis, it was suggested that the late-Georgian period, 
extending roughly from the years 1760 to 1830, exerted an enduring influence on the 
development of “ancient” or “common law constitutionalism.” It was argued that 
common law constitutionalism is not so much a discrete theory of legislative competence, 
as it is a theoretical orientation, situated opposite of the principle of strict parliamentary 
supremacy. Simply put, common law constitutionalism suggests that authoritative legal 
texts – whatever their formal status – are to be interpreted as elements of a larger, 
                                                          
14 Barak, supra note 4 at 349. 
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historically-contingent constitutional design, admitting of both written and unwritten 
sources.15 A consequence of that sort of arrangement is that courts are obliged to interpret 
general or ambiguous texts with reference to custom and precedent, rather than original 
understanding.16 Such an interpretation is based on a recognition that a legislative text is 
embedded in a particular constitutional context, from which it derives both its meaning 
and its legitimacy as a source of law. 
To be sure, the distinction between the two ways of conceiving of parliament’s 
role tended to be more theoretical than practical. Throughout the nineteenth century, 
Parliament exercised its authority within a context established by custom and past 
practice, but was effectively unfettered by other institutions. The importance of studying 
the discourses relating to parliament’s role lies in the extent to which they shed light on 
the organic development of British constitutional culture. The historical period during 
which common law constitutionalism last crested is important to that task because it 
reinforced certain aspects of that culture, as influential actors endeavoured to define what 
they regarded as a cumulative and coherent tradition from the influence of the French 
Revolution. Jurists and legal scholars of the period represented British constitutional 
culture as inherently ill-suited to the sort of abstract rights discourses taking place in 
revolutionary France. The constitutional culture of Britain, it was argued, was essentially 
empirical and unspeculative, having developed incrementally in a relationship of co-
dependence with the common law. 
Indeed, among the most important influences on late-eighteenth century jurists 
was British “empiricism,” a philosophical tradition exemplified by the writings of such 
figures as John Locke, George Berkeley, and David Hume. In the most general terms, 
that tradition could be distinguished from the “rationalism” of continental Europe based 
upon the question of whether the human mind is possessed of any “innate” ideas.17 While 
                                                          
15 TRS Allan, “Text, Context, and Constitution: The Common Law as Public Reason” in 
Douglas E Edlin, ed, Common Law Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2007) at 185. 
16Adrian Vermeule, “Common Law Constitutionalism and the Limits of Reason” (2007) 
107 Colum L Rev 1482 at 1482. 
17 Anthony Kenny, A New History of Western Philosophy In Four Parts (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 2010) at 599. 
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the answers given in both traditions are variegated and deeply nuanced, it may be said 
that for the eighteenth century British empiricists, human knowledge derived only or 
primarily from sensory experience and not, as continental rationalists would have it, from 
abstract or a priori reasoning. Thus, for empiricists, knowledge could not be gained 
absent some level of engagement with concrete facts. To speculate or develop theories 
that did not engage such facts was an error at best, and not likely to yield any real 
knowledge for any practical use.  
Neither philosophy nor the common law was a “self-contained science” in the 
eighteenth century; each influenced the development of the other.18  It is for this reason 
that traditional forms of common law reasoning, which leveraged judicial precedent as a 
tool for argument by analogy, reflected the empirical values of eighteenth-century 
Britain. For example, while for continental rationalists knowledge was something to be 
acquired through the mind’s recognition of certain pre-existing truths, the British 
empiricists urged that knowledge of a given object was only a “perception” of the mind, 
based upon the accordance or discordance of that object with other perceptions acquired 
by past experience.19 As the writer John Locke put it, for empiricists, the “capacity for 
distinguishing one thing from another is the source of the obvious and certain truth of the 
proposition.” It was the “mind’s ability to discern or distinguish” and to “to perceive two 
ideas to be the same or different” that lead to human understanding.20 
The culture of empiricism which had developed in Britain throughout the 
eighteenth century, helped to elevate the importance of precedent in judicial decision-
making in the early 1800s. Prior to that, the common law was defined mostly by its 
“sanctity and unchangeability,” as a “fixed body of doctrine based on natural law and 
inflexible rules.21 Reference to precedent was an important but not exclusive nor 
                                                          
18 Michael Lobban, The Common Law and English Jurisprudence (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1991) at 80. 
19 Kenny, supra note 17 at 600. 
20 John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding II, ed by Jonathan Bennett, 
Online: Some Texts from Early Modern Philosophy <http://www.earlymoderntexts.com>   
21 Achieving fairness was not generally thought to be the function of the common law. 
Where application of the common law was thought to be unjust, relief was to be found in 
equity. See PS Atiyah, The Rise and Fall of Freedom of Contract (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1979) as cited in Lobban, supra note 19 at 1. 
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obligatory tool used by judges in reaching just solutions. In other words, judges might be 
guided by precedent but they were not bound by it, as no official doctrine of stare decisis 
existed. 22 By the late eighteenth-century, however, the application of the common law 
became increasingly empirical and the ability to apply or distinguish past precedent based 
upon the facts of a given case became central to the judicial function. Informed by 
empiricism, the common law increasingly accepted the importance of cautious, fact-
contingent reasoning and incremental change in the law.  
By the end of the eighteenth century, reference to the inflexibility and 
immemorality of the common law were yielding to discussions of how the common law 
“grew.” Indeed, in his survey of the common law during the years 1760 to 1860, the legal 
historian Michael Lobban associated the legal culture of the period with the writings of 
Edmund Burke, who stressed the importance of slow, half-conscious change in the law. If 
the common law did indeed “grow” and develop, Lobban observed, “it was in a Burkean 
way, adding on to a sturdy and solid ancient structure” while avoiding the abstract and 
the speculative.23 Indeed, the writings of Burke provide helpful insight into the culture of 
the eighteenth-century common law, with a particular focus on the ways in which it was 
different from that of the First French Republic (1792-1804). As such, they are a 
convenient point of reference for an analysis of common law constitutional culture in a 
comparative perspective. 
Indeed, in recent years, a number of Canadian legal scholars have identified the 
writings of Burke with the formative years of a Canadian constitutional culture in the 
nineteenth century. For instance, David Schneiderman and Peter H. Russell have urged 
that the “moral foundations” of Canadian constitutionalism are imbued with a distinctly 
Burkean hue.24  For his part, the historian G. Blaine Baker has suggested that the 
influential actors in mid-nineteenth century Upper Canada subscribed to an exaggerated 
                                                          
22 An official doctrine of stare decisis did not develop until the early nineteenth century. 
See Lobban, supra note 18 at 87. 
23 Ibid. at 1-2. 
24 David Schneiderman, “Edmund Burke, John Whyte, and Themes in Canadian 
Constitutional Culture” (2005) 31 Queen’s LJ 578 at 578 and Peter H Russell, 
Constitutional Odyssey: Can Canadians Become a Sovereign People? (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 2004) at 10. 
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form of Burke’s ideology. “By-passed by the American, French, and Industrial 
Revolutions,” he wrote, the “legal-administrative elite" of Upper Canada became “radical 
in its romantic and stubbornly Georgian posture” and self-concept.25 While it is not 
within the limited scope of this analysis to delve further into such claims, it is sufficient 
to note that the writings of the Whig parliamentarian are increasingly used by Canadian 
scholars as a short hand reference for the early common law culture of the country. 
In his writings, Burke argued that the distinctive characteristic of the British 
constitution was that it was non-speculative. In his 1790 letter to the French député 
Charles Jean François Depont he urged that French rights discourses were abstract and 
insufficiently tethered to reality. Affirming his ardour for a “manly, moral, regulated 
liberty,”26  he proceeded to rail against the reign of “naked reason” in France,27 which he 
held to be “vulgar in the conception [and] perilous in the execution.”28 For him, the 
French view of liberty as an object of design by “geometrical distribution and 
arithmetical management”29  denied the reality of human nature: 
 
The nature of man is intricate; the objects of society are of the greatest 
possible complexity; and therefore no simple disposition or direction of 
power can be suitable either to man’s nature or to the quality of his 
affairs. When I hear the simplicity of contrivance aimed at and boasted 
of in any new political constitutions, I am at no loss to decide that the 
artificers are grossly ignorant of their trade, or totally negligent of their 
duty.30 
 
In a similar vein, in his Observations on the Present State of the Nation, penned in 1769, 
he wrote that “politics ought to be adjusted, not to human reason, but to human nature of 
                                                          
25 G Blaine Baker, “The Reconstruction of Upper Canadian Legal Thought in the Late-
Victorian Empire” (1985) 3 Law & Hist Rev 259 at 259. 
26 Edmund Burke, Reflections on the Revolution in France and on the Proceedings in 
Certain Societies in London Relative to that Event, by Conor Cruise O’Brien (London: 
Penguin Books, 2004) at 89. 
27 Ibid at 183. 
28 Ibid at 267. 
29 Ibid at 144. 
30 Ibid at 153. 
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which reason is but a part and by no means greatest part.”31 To engage the state in a self-
conscious ethical project was by necessity to invite the use of its arbitrary power, for the 
complex reality of both the person and his society was simply not amenable to a design 
arrived at through discursive reason, even if said design was emancipatory in its 
objective. 
For Burke, the British constitution was based upon the principle of inherited right 
and empirical growth. It was for this reason that he tended to comingle the language of 
constitutional “rights” with proprietary “title.” In his letter to Depont, he observed that 
the British saw their liberty not as an object of design, but as a “patrimony derived from 
their forefathers.”32 It was for “reasons of practical wisdom which superseded their 
theoretical science,” he advised, that they favoured a “positive, recorded, hereditary title” 
for all that which was worthy of being inherited, to a “vague, speculative right.”33 He 
proceeded to reference a series of initiatives from the Magna Carta to the Petition Of 
Right (1628), as support for the proposition that it had been the “uniform policy” of the 
British constitution to conceptualize liberty as an “entitled inheritance” and an “estate” 
belonging to the British people, “without an reference whatever to any other more general 
or prior right,” of the kind on which French rights discourses were being conducted. 
It is important to observe that the rights to which the British lay claim were 
essentially negative rights to be exercised by the individual against the state. Certainly, 
the obligation to act affirmatively to facilitate the enjoyment of certain “positive” rights 
was not in contemplation in pre-industrial Britain. But what is more important for the 
purposes of this analysis, is that conception of rights articulated by Burke did not involve 
the state in any kind of formative project aimed at emancipation or the self-conscious 
generation of a particular type of society. The state was presumed to be liberty’s natural 
antagonist. To look for liberty in the state was to look for it where it could never be 
found. The state, Burke argued, is not “made in virtue of natural rights,” for such rights 
                                                          
31 Edmund Burke, “Observations on a Late Publication Entitled The Present State of the 
Nation” in Isaac Kramnick, ed, The Portable Edmund Burke (New York: Penguin Books, 
1999) at 154. 
32 Burke, Reflections at 119. 
33 Ibid at 118. 
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existed outside of it.34 The continental philosophy he criticized was be definition 
“abstract” because it was oriented to a reality that did not yet exist. The authority of the 
state would be a needed to bring about that reality, much to Burke’s consternation. 
Finally, it is important to note the essentially empirical way in which Burke 
construed constitutional development in Britain. He equated the culture of the British 
constitution with the common law, and suggested the importance of adhering to particular 
sets of facts in making decisions concerning the rights of the individuals. Echoing the 
writings of the empiricists on epistemology, he suggested that it was “circumstances that 
“[gave] in reality to every political principle its distinguishing colour and discriminating 
effect.”35 It was therefore inadvisable to speculate about rights and their limitations 
beyond a concrete set of facts in which a particular decision had to be made. By taking an 
essentially empirical approach to the constitution then, it may be said that the constitution 
did not “change” per se, but was “meliorated and adapted” to circumstances arising over 
time.36 In this way, as the legal historian David Lieberman has suggested, the late-
Georgian British constitution may be best thought of as a “living organism of complex 
structure and historical continuity,”37 that had in many ways grown up in 
contradistinction to the rationalism of the continent. 
 
iv) At Common Law, Freedom of Religion Developed as a Negative Right 
 
The development of freedom of religion in Britain was related to other cultural 
developments in that country, including trends in law and philosophy. The free exercise 
of religion in Britain came about by way of a slow process of religious de-regulation in 
the centuries after the Reformation. That process involved a series of legislative 
initiatives (often called “relief acts”) which repealed laws burdening particular religious 
factions. As this section will suggest, the effect of extending relief to particular religious 
sects legitimated their long-standing resistance to a majority with which they refused to 
                                                          
34 Ibid at 150. 
35 Ibid at 90. 
36 Ibid at 123. 
37 Davd Lieberman, The Province of Legislation Determined: Legal Theory in 
Eighteenth-Century Britain (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989) at 5. 
94 
 
conform. Emancipation of so-called “non-conforming” Protestants and later Roman 
Catholics took the form of a negative right against the state to be unburdened in the 
public sphere because of private confessional differences. In this way, freedom of 
religion is prototypical of other rights in British constitutional culture. Thus, rights in 
Canada can only be adequately understood with reference to the heterodox nature of 
religious practice in post-Reformation England. 
The Protestant heritage of Britain affected the way in which rights were 
conceptualized in two important ways. First, the rise of Protestantism was a critical 
influence in the emergence of the “individual” as the principal currency for most 
discussions on the human condition in the modern era. As H. Richard Niebuhr has put it, 
between the polarities of “order and movement [and] of structure and process,” the 
Protestant is arguably oriented to the more dynamic end relative to the Roman Catholic.38 
His experience is – again, in the most general of terms – less about being part of an 
enduring order and more about internal process.39 The free decision of the individual will 
was central. It is in this sense that Marx observed that the effect of the Reformation was 
to displace “bondage out of devotion by replacing it with bondage out of conviction.”40 
While the distinction is subtle, it is real, and exerted a powerful and still discernable 
influence on the development of British constitutional culture. 
The second way in which the Reformation affected the development of rights 
discourse in Britain was by impressing a distrust of the state on British culture. The 
essentially negative nature of “liberty” in the common law tradition can only be 
understood in light of the Reformation. Quite apart from the anti-statism of Protestant 
“non-conformists,” the Anglican majority were long gripped by fear of the re-emergence 
of a Roman Catholic state. Indeed, railings against “arbitrary government’ and “popery,” 
ran like a leitmotif throughout most aspects of British culture for over two centuries. 
While it may be said that the result was an essentially “negative” conception of liberty as 
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the right to be free from the state’s coercive power, there existed a positive aspect to the 
constitution as well. That is, in the Anglo-Protestant mind, the freedom of the individual 
included his or her right to move toward a goal of action dictated by his or her 
conscience. 
Until the early nineteenth century, restrictions on matters of conscience were 
justified as necessary to protect the inherited rights of Britons, who were axiomatically 
assumed to be Protestant. As the Prince Regent put it in 1819,“devine favour and 
protection,’ had secured in Britain ‘the principle of religion under a just submission to 
lawful authority.41  For centuries after the Reformation, prejudice against Roman 
Catholics in Britain was endemic. Adherents of that faith were distrusted as inherently 
“un-English” and “fundamentally alien,” associated with continental tyranny.42 It was in 
this way that restrictions on religious practice were reconciled with notions of “ancient” 
and “inherited” rights. In a manner not atypical of the eighteenth century, “universal” 
rights claims were made by and in the interest of a particular and restricted male 
demographic. The means by which the British constitution adapted to protect those rights, 
and the means by which enjoyment of those rights was extended are worth studying as 
indicative of constitutional culture. 
 
v) The Legal Rules Developed for the Application of the Proportionate Effects 
Inquiry Reflect a Common Law Constitutional Culture. 
 
It may be recalled that the Supreme Court of Canada has interpreted  s. 1 of the 
Charter as contemplating a proportionality test as the justificatory standard for all 
limitations on constitutional rights. The standard of review that it articulated in its 
decision in R. v. Oakes in 1986 closely followed the approach taken by the ECHR in 
interpreting the specific limitations clauses of the European Convention on Human 
Rights (the “Convention”). Under the so-called “Oakes test,” the Court held, the state has 
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to establish on a a balance of probabilities that the legislation under review has been 
enacted for a proper purpose and that it meets the three requirements of proportionality: 
rational connection, minimal impairment, and proportionality in its effects. With respect 
to the final step of the test, it signaled that “the values of a free and democratic society” 
would be brought to bear to determine whether the balance between the salutary effects 
of the impugned legislation and its deleterious effects on the right is constitutionally 
permissible.43 
The Supreme Court stated in Oakes that the values of a “free and democratic 
society” are both the basis for the rights and freedoms entrenched in the Charter and “the 
ultimate standard against which a limitation on a right or freedom must be shown to be 
reasonable and demonstrably justifiable.”44 In other words, the Court  held that the test 
for whether a limit on a right is proportionate and justifiable must be informed by both 
the s. 1 reference to a “free and democratic society,” and the normative structure of the 
Charter as a whole. While a thorough-going review of the Court’s reflections on that 
normative structure is not feasible here, for comparative purposes, two general 
observations may be made. First, the court has interpreted s. 1 as being informed by a 
“negative rights” ethos guaranteeing non-interference by the state. Secondly, it has 
developed legal rules and modes of reasoning for the application of proportionality which 
reflect an essentially empirical approach to construing legal rights. 
As a preliminary point, however, it should be noted that the Supreme Court has 
said that the negative rights ethos informing s. 1 pervades the Charter as a whole. It is 
therefore appropriate to refer to the interpretation of other Charter provisions when 
construing. s. 1. As the Court held in R. v. Lyons, the “amplification of the content of 
each enunciated right or freedom imbues and informs our understanding of the value 
structure sought to be protected by the Charter as a whole, and in particular, the content 
of the other specific rights and freedoms it embodies.”45 Thus, in the cases of Godbout v 
Longueil and R.B. v Children’s Aid Society, the Court began by citing Lyons as the 
correct approach to interpreting the content of “liberty” under s. 7. It then proceeded to 
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refer specifically to its decisions in Oakes and Big M Drug Mart, dealing with the words 
“free” and “freedom” in ss. 1 and 2(a) respectively.46 All three provisions, it reasoned, 
should be interpreted as being informed by the same negative rights ethos.  
It may be said that the ethos informing the Charter is one of  “negative liberty,” 
emphasizing individual or group autonomy and a general right to non-intervention by the 
state. It is a philosophical orientation well-explained by Dickson J. (as he then was) in 
Big M, in which he pronounced that  “freedom can primarily be characterized by the 
absence of coercion or restraint,”47 through forms of control that limit “volition” and 
autonomous choice.48 He went on to suggest that a society is only “truly free” where it 
can “accommodate a wide variety of beliefs, diversity of tastes and pursuits, customs and 
codes of conduct.”49 He then characterized the Charter in classically liberal terms as a 
safeguard against a “tyranny of the majority.”50 These remarks were subsequently 
affirmed in case law on a range of other provisions, including s. 7 where “liberty” was 
equated with a right “to make fundamentally personal choices, free from state 
interference”51 and s. 2(b), where freedom of expression was interpreted as advancing 
“self-fulfillment and autonomy.”52 
With respect to freedom of religion under s. 2(a), Dickson J. opined that religious 
beliefs were “historically prototypical” of other constitutional guarantees in their focus on 
the importance of individual choice and volition. The centrality of conscience and the 
free, inward decision of the individual will, Dickson J. suggested, was a cultural 
derivative of the English. Reformation. During the English Civil Wars and Interregnum 
in particular, he suggested, the idea that “belief was not amenable to compulsion,” gained 
ascendency. An essentially English fixation on the “reality of the individual conscience,” 
he concluded, further assisted the development of institutional norms of a “free and 
democratic society.” He concluded that rigorous protection of individual conscience was 
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not only central to s. 2(a), but indicative of the broader “values that underlie [Canadian] 
political and philosophical tradition,” and as such, represented the sine qua non of 
constitutional rights protection under the Charter.53   
To be sure, in Big M Dickson J. noted that negative rights claims against the state, 
while essentially individual in nature, can have a collective or group dimension. As 
support for this proposition, he interpreted freedom of religion under s. 2(a) by citing s. 
27., which prescribes that that document must be interpreted with a view to the 
“preservation and enhancement of the multicultural heritage of Canadians.”54 Section 27 
has been used as support for the proposition that s. 2(a) of the Charter protects both 
individual and group aspects of freedom of religion.55 However, as McLachlin C.J. made 
clear in Alberta v Hutterian Brethren of Wilson Colony, the multiculturalism provision 
does not transform an individual right against the state into a collective one. Rather, its 
effect is often felt at the final stage of the proportionality test. A deleterious effect on the 
rights-holder may be considered more serious where it has a broader impact on a group or 
community of which he or she is a part. 
 
vi) In Canada, Justifiable Limitations on Rights are to be Determined Empirically 
 
In light of these normative commitments, it is perhaps unsurprising that the 
legitimacy of limitations on rights at the proportionate effects stage of s. 1 justification 
has come to focus on the extent to which such limits adversely affect autonomy and 
choice. Again, courts have developed legal rules to assist in “quantifying” the salutary 
and deleterious effects of the legislation under review from an evaluative standpoint. One 
such rule is that the degree of harm which the violation of a right will incur must be 
assessed with a view to the values of a free and democratic society; namely, “liberty, 
human dignity, equality, autonomy, and the enhancement of democracy”56 The Supreme 
Court has stated that, in all cases, “liberty” is “the most fundamental of these values,” and 
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it has interpreted the other values in light of it.57 Importantly, it has construed each of 
these terms as involving a rigid binary between the rights-holder on the one hand, and the 
legislature as representative of the collective interest on the other. 
The Supreme Court has used an empiricist and non-speculative approach to 
determining whether a limit on a right is proportionate in its effect. A second judicially-
developed legal rule is that the gravity of a deleterious effect on a right will depend on 
the extent to which it deprives the claimant of his or her freedom of choice. Per Hutterian 
Brethren, the question [at the proportionate effects stage] is whether the limit leaves the 
adherent with a meaningful choice to follow his or her religious belief or practice.”58 An 
effect may range from being “trivial,” in which case it is more likely to be permissible, to 
total abrogation of autonomous choice, in which case it is less likely so.  At all times 
gravity is measured in terms of what the individual is or is not able to do in a given case 
or what can clearly be inferred from concrete evidence. Thus, the seriousness of the harm 
greatly depends on the engagement of the particular claimant in a particular set of facts. 
Conversely, the salutary effects of a limitation on a right will be deemed suspect 
where they are unduly speculative or symbolic. There must be some concrete benefit that 
is likely to materialize if the rights of an individual or group are to be abridged. Of 
course, the salutary effects of legislation are inherently connected to the legislative 
objective, and the Court has held that with respect to the proportionate effects inquiry 
“the highly symbolic or abstract nature of [an] objective detracts from its importance as a 
justification for the violation of a constitutionally protected right.”59 Indeed, as Abella J. 
noted in Hutterian Brethren, the proportionate effects inquiry often turns on the question 
of whether the benefits gained from a rights-limitation would be “real” or “perceived.”60 
Thus, to justify a limitation on a right, the state’s burden is to prove a harm or a real risk  
of harm and to demonstrate that the benefits of the limitation are concrete and not 
speculative. 
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Thus, the legal rules developed for the proportionate effects inquiry are applied to 
the factual matrix at hand according to modes of reasoning reflecting a common law legal 
culture. The judicial reasoning process used is comparatively inductive and fact-
dependent, leaving little room for the state to legislate in the pursuit of unempirical social 
or philosophical objectives. That culture is also one in which liberty tends to be 
understood negatively, in terms of the absence of state interference in the enjoyment of 
rights. The legal rules of balancing are a matter of judge-made law, and are derived from 
judicial interpretation of the constitution’s general limitations clause, s. 1, and their 
understanding of the constitutional order as a whole. While they are represented as 
flowing naturally from the words “free and democratic,” they in fact reflect local and 
particular pre-notions and prejudices of what constitutes a free and democratic society. 
 
vii) French Constitutional Culture is Based in an Emancipatory Project which 
Favours Rationalism 
 
If the culture of the common law is empirical, it may be said that French 
constitutional culture is rationalist. That is, it is premised on reasoning that accepts that 
there are objective truths pre-existing recognition by the human mind. One such truth is 
the natural liberty of the individual. It is a basic postulate of French republicanism that 
social institutions must be structured in such a way as to preserve liberty from the 
deleterious effects of inequitable social relations. French constitutional culture 
accordingly involves the state in a kind of emancipatory project aimed at legislating 
conditions deemed necessary for liberty. To a certain extent, French republicanism 
contemplates freedom through the state as opposed to freedom from the state.61 Liberty 
may exist in a state of nature, but it is not a natural or historic given; rather it must be 
secured by the republic.62 This requires the state to be able to legislative prescriptively, 
and to exert a rationalizing, emancipatory influence on a broadly-construed public sphere. 
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A critical part of the state’s role, then, is to impose its “social authority” in the 
interest of “promoting the autonomy of persons.”63 The revolutionary heritage of the 
French Republic is discernable in the presumption that the state should have a role in 
“culturing” society to modernity. As this section will reveal, perhaps the most important 
aspect of that acculturation is the republic’s function in wrenching the individual out of 
his archaic, sectarian identities and engaging him in a shared project of being free. In 
comparative perspective, it may be noticed that French republicans are confident in the 
universality of their values, and in the corrosive effect of illiberal, sectarian traditions on 
democratic life.64 As a result, the distinction between the liberty of the individual and the 
interests of the collective is not as clear as in other constitutional traditions. The 
remainder of this chapter will explain how the incorporation of judicial review has taken 
account of this difference. 
In order to account for the comparative inseverability of individual interests from 
public ones in French constitutional culture, it is necessary to examine certain precepts of 
French republicanism. This requires a degree of engagement with an extensive body of 
philosophical, literary, and aesthetic representations of the republican ideal as it has 
developed in France since the late-eighteenth century. Indeed, the French revolutionary 
period initiated both a tradition of ephemeral constitutional instruments and of republican 
expression in a range of intellectual and cultural mediums. It is for this reason that, as the 
French cultural historian Pierre Nora put it,  “republicanism” in France has long been 
characterized by “a powerful political culture” and an “empty political form.” In other 
words, Nora added, it has long had “strong emotional [but] weak institutional 
substance.”65 French republican thought, while itself a multiform and complex tradition, 
continued to be the real source of norms of constitutional value in France. The 
“legicentic” nature of French constitutional culture can only be explained with reference 
to certain peculiar features of that discursive tradition. 
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viii) The Writings of Rousseau Exerted a Formative Influence on French 
Republicanism 
 
The inclination to conceive of individual rights as involving a strong collective 
dimension is derived from a distrust of “factional” interests which extends at least as far 
back as the mid-eighteenth century. While a distinct culture of republicanism would not 
emerge in France until at least as early as the First Republic (1792-1804), the deeply anti-
sectarian nature of French republican discourse is traceable to the writings of Rousseau. 
He introduced to early French republicanism at once a Romantic preoccupation with 
“nature” and an attachment to the cultural norms of classical antiquity. He proposed that 
in an (allegorical) “state of nature,” man had been noble and free, but had been corrupted 
in society by his “amour propre,” or his impulse to covet the esteem of others.66 
Rousseau repined, “[d]ependence on men engenders all the vices, and by it, master and 
slave are mutually corrupted.”67 If man were to retain his freedom in society, he wrote, he 
required a sort of healing education. 
He prescribed a neo-classical conception of the “citizen” not merely as a bearer of 
legal privileges and immunities, but as an active participant in the sovereign authority. To 
remain free, the individual had to engage in public-decision making. Further, he had to 
engage in such a way as to produce laws which would not define his society by relations 
of inequity. He did so by subordinating his private or “particular interests,” and orienting 
himself to the “general will.”68 Again, for Rousseau, the “general will” was not the 
additive total of a majority of private wills. Rather, it was the “highest common factor of 
agreement,”69 or the “rational” interest in general terms of the society as an organic 
whole. In order to participate in self-government and in the shaping of the “general will,” 
he advised, the individual needed to be cultured in an ethic of “civic virtue,” as inspired 
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by the stoic, austere and egalitarian habits he attributed to the city-state cultures of Greek 
and Roman antiquity.  
To be sure, Rousseau recognized that by entering into this “civil state,” the 
individual relinquished some of the freedom he enjoyed in a “state of nature.” He could 
no longer pursue his private interests without regard for the general will. However, 
Rousseau proposed that  passage into a civil state would produce a “remarkable change" 
in man. By “substituting justice for instinct in his conduct,” the actions of the citizen 
acquired a “moral” quality they had formerly lacked: 
 
Then only, when the voice of duty takes the place of physical impulses 
and right of appetite, does man, who so far had considered only himself, 
find that he is forced to act on different principles, and to consult his 
reason before listening to his inclinations. 
 
By entering the social contract, he concluded, man’s faculties would be “so stimulated 
and developed” and his feelings “so ennobled” that he would “bless continually the 
happy moment” that it delivered him from being “a stupid and unimaginative animal” 
and made of him “an intelligent being and a man.”70 
Rousseau’s prescription of a high-level of engagement in public decision-making 
complimented by an egalitarian culture of “civic virtue” deeply influenced French 
republican culture in its formative stages. A “literary cult of Rousseau” which had 
prevailed in intellectual circles during the final years of the Bourbon monarchy, gradually 
transformed during the First Republic into a “political cult of Rousseau.”71 Veneration of 
his writings not only reinforced the period’s neo-classical preoccupations in literature and 
the arts, but found powerful expression in revolutionary festivals, hymns, iconography, 
and even modes of dress. During the dictatorship of the Committee of Public Safety 
(1793-94) in particular,72 the extolling of “virture and regeneration of morals” pervaded 
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most aspects of public life, as the revolution extended its ambitions to a reformation of 
human nature.73 The revolutionary heritage of France was profoundly influenced by 
Rousseau’s association of liberty with virtue, and it is from that heritage that French 
republican culture derived much of its emotional energies. 
The origins of French secularism or laïcité can be traced to the First Republic and, 
in some measure, to the intellectual contributions of Rousseau.74 Born in the Republic of 
Geneva, Rousseau was of Calvinist extraction, but identified in his writings as a deist 
who perceived divinity in nature.75 He distinguished between “inward devotion to the 
supreme God,” and sectarian religion, or what he referred to as “the religion of the 
priest.”76 The latter, he wrote, had produced in France “a kind of mixed and anti-social 
system of law,” by dividing society and inculcating intolerance. He urged that sectarian 
religion was antithetical to the social contract, for it “detached” men from civic life and 
the general welfare, “as from all earthy things.” It indulged man’s impulse to amour 
propre by enticing him to turn inward, and to perceive his fellow citizens as “others” with 
interests antagonistic to his own. He accordingly equated “religion and civil intolerance.77 
 
ix) Religious Sectarianism Contributed to the Development of Rousseau’s Notion 
of the “General Will” 
 
The importance of his writings can only be understood in light of the role of the 
Roman Catholic Church in mid-eighteenth century France. The late-Bourbon monarchy 
was a régime of an ineradicably Catholic character. The church legitimated the régime by 
inculcating belief in the divine right of kings and teaching the necessity of sacerdotal 
power and mediatory access to grace and Christian salvation. As the cultural historian 
Adam Zamoyski has put it, Roman Catholicism was no less than the “central organizing 
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principle” of French politics, education, art and even language.78 The church sanctified 
the French monarchy, and was in turn privileged by it. As the so-called “first estate” of 
the realm, its clergy were subject to a range of political privileges and immunities. The 
church coveted such advantages while resisting efforts to extend toleration to French 
Protestants and Jews. It also retained a right to petition the state to censor offensive or 
sacrilegious material, which it successfully exercised to induce publication bans on the 
Social Contract and Émile.79 
It was for these reasons that Rousseau’s anti-sectarianism and his emphasis on the 
general will was influential for a range of actors in the First Republic. To be sure, it is not 
possible here to comprehensively review state policies toward religion during the First 
Republic. The difficulties which inhere in such an undertaking is due to the fact that the 
First Republic remained an ill-defined concept. It was neither officially inaugurated nor 
abolished,80 and never represented a coherent system of government. It was, rather, a 
process of historical development involving at least three distinct republican régimes: a 
parliamentary dictatorship under the National Convention (1792-95), a limited suffrage 
republic known as the Directory (1795-99), and the plebiscitary régime termed the 
Convention (1799-1804).81 During that period, treatment of religion in the public sphere 
was in a state of constant change, responsive to both the ideological aspirations of private 
decision-makers and the political realities to which they felt obliged to respond. 
It is important to begin, however, by noting the role of the Roman Catholic 
Church in precipitating the emergence of republicanism as a viable system of government 
in the years leading up to 1791. As late as 1789, when most of its members presumed the 
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continued viability of the Bourbon monarchy, the National Assembly initiated a far-
reaching process of constitutional re-structuring. With respect to the church, it pursued a 
“dual policy” of extending legal rights to non-Catholics,82 while subordinating the Roman 
Catholic Church to the authority of the state through such measures as the abolition of 
ecclesiastical taxing power and the confiscation of church lands. Most importantly, 
however, in 1790 the French government adopted the Civil Constitution of the Clergy, 
which divested clerics of their legal privileges and required them to take an oath of 
fidelity to the new constitution. When both the French monarchy and the Papacy resisted 
the Civil Constitution, the collapse of the ancien régime was accelerated and anti-clerical 
sentiment was intensified. 
The first two republican régimes to follow the abolition of the monarchy in 1792 
contributed significantly to the French republican distrust of “factional interests,” 
particularly religious ones. The papacy’s repudiation of the Civil Constitution of the 
Clergy intensified republican hostility to the church, and initiated a divide between so-
called “juring” priests who took the oath and “non-juring” or “refractory” priests who 
refused. Thereafter, the National Convention and Directory governments were engaged in 
sustained but unsuccessful efforts to stabilize the country, which found itself menaced by 
foreign armies from without, and by Catholic and royal reactionaries from within. The 
most sanguinary example of such reaction was the war in the Vendée region between the 
republic and an insurgency called the Catholic and Royal Army.83 Taking at least one 
hundred and seventy thousand lives, the Vendée war epitomized what François Furet has 
termed “the depth of the conflict between religious tradition and the revolutionary 
foundations of democracy” in France.84 
Indeed, it was largely the religious instability of the First Republic which lead to 
the conferral of dictatorial power to the so-called Committee for Public Safety under 
Robespierre in 1793. During that period, the Committee advanced ever more radical 
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policies aimed at “de-Christianisation” or the total extirpation of the Catholic religion 
from France. This involved both efforts to develop new forms of civil religion, and to 
discourage “superstitious and hypocritical faiths.”85 The Committee introduced severe 
restrictions on public worship and on the public display of religious iconography, and 
enacted laws prohibiting ecclesiastics from wearing religious garb in public places.86 
Incited by the executive government of the country, Jacobin clubs took up the task of 
destroying “crucifixes, virgins, images of saints” and other “ridiculous” objects that could 
be construed as vestiges of “royalism, feudalism, and superstition.”87 The period 
reinforced in France a cultural association between religious expression and a lack of 
concern for the general welfare. 
Finally, it is important to note that the Committee supplemented restrictions on 
religious expression with affirmative measures aimed at the regeneration of French 
society in light of a pre-Christian ideal. This included the repeal of the Gregorian 
calendar for its historical association with the papacy, and the establishment of state-
sanctioned forms of deistic worship, complete with rituals such as “civic baptism” and 
ceremonial garb reminiscent of the Roman Republic.88 Robespierre in particular exerted 
himself in developing “a religion of the republic and a national morality,” deeply imbued 
with ideas derived from Rousseau. For instance, prayers of the period implored the 
“Supreme Being” to, among other things, “restore man to his primitive perfection.”89 
Atheism was discouraged and poorly subscribed. The real tension from which the  First 
Republic was never able to deliver itself was rather between traditional modes of Roman 
Catholic belief and a contrived form of deism which was austere, anti-sectarian and 
oriented to the general welfare. 
From its formative stages, French republican culture distrusted attachment to 
“factional interests” as inimical to the egalitarian ideal. Forged in resistance to feudal 
structures sustained by social privilege and private advantage, the “people” were exalted 
by republicans as a basically unitary, fraternal civic body in which minorities were not 
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recognized.90 The interests of the First Republic did much to shape a view of the “people” 
as perpetually menaced by what Pierre Lévy has called the emergence of “other 
legitimacies.”91 The emancipation of French Jews in 1791 was a paradigmatic example of 
the way in which republican equality applied. In the words of the député Clermont-
Tonnere, Jews were to be “refused everything qua nation, and granted everything qua 
individuals.” They would not be a “political body or order within the state” but would 
“acquire citizenship individually.”92 The only way to secure liberty was though an 
assertion of the equality of citizens by abolishing a litany of “mass anomalies” and 
entrenched privileges associated with feudal hierarchy.93 
A related aspect of this anti-sectarianism was the broad construal that the First 
Republic gave to the public sphere relative to the private. This is particularly evident in 
the emphasis that it placed on civic virtue and on engagement in civic institutions. As 
Marx observed, the political project initiated by the First Republic exalted the individual 
as a discrete being, but always into a sort of general but abstract communal existence.94 
This was in many ways due to the intellectual influence of Rousseau, who stressed the 
importance of civic commitment over self-interest. While the nature of public 
engagement and of in civic institutions has varied greatly, a comparatively rigid 
distinction the between the private and public sphere has remained. In short, in French 
republicanism, the ideals of liberty and equality have never been thought of distinct of a 
fraternal “community of citizens,” bound together by an ethical project and a shared civic 
loyalty.  
The religious tensions of the First Republic would only subside after Bonaparte’s 
accession to power and his implementation of a Concordat with the Vatican in 1801. But 
the period preceding the Concordat had given rise to a distinctive republican culture, that 
would continue to develop and mature throughout the nineteenth-century. Importantly, it 
remained ill-at-ease with factional identities and attached to the notion that strong civic 
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institutions might transcend private differences. Again, the French republic has always 
been predicated on the notion that the right to be left undisturbed by the state is not 
sufficient to secure liberty and self-government. Rather, it sees public life as involving an 
emancipatory project which obliges the citizen to be free in a particular way. This was the 
enduring legacy of the First Republic, when only a unitary, fraternal civic bond was 
thought to be sufficiently strong to break the hold of feudal inequity. That legacy was 
leveraged in the early years of the Third Republic (1870-1940) to form the basis of laïcité 
as coherent doctrine of secularism with a basis in law. 
 
x)  Laïcité Began to be Incorporated as an Official Doctrine of the French 
Republic in the Late-Nineteenth Century 
 
The contemporary état laïque was introduced in France beginning the early 1870s 
in response to new incursions of the Roman Catholic Church in French public life. In 
1864, the Vatican released a document called The Syllabus of Errors, which condemned 
substantially the entire panoply of Enlightenment political ideas, including liberty, 
separation of church and state, and the presumption of equality with other Christian 
faiths, or what it called “indifferentialism.”95According to the historian Robert Gildea, the 
Syllabus was so far-reaching as to effectively preclude reconciliation between the church 
and liberal or democratic ideas in France.96 The church also condemned the Paris 
Commune of 1871, which had revived persecution of clerics, as the culmination of an 
anti-religious revival that had beset France with instability since 1789.97 Finally, they 
argued that the country’s defeat by a Protestant state in the Franco-Prussian War (1870-
1871) had been God’s punishment for the sins of the Enlightenment and the French 
Revolution.98  
The church accordingly pursued a program of “Moral Order,” putatively aimed at 
expiation of the country’s sins. French church officials argued for the restoration of both 
the monarchy and the Pope’s temporal power, which had been ceded as a result of the 
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Concordat. Its most successful initiative, however, was its effort to extend the church’s 
grip on national education, as a means of inculcating Catholic thought and prejudice at 
both the primary and secondary school levels.99 The church’s control of girls’ education 
by nuns reached its highest point in 1878, when the number of those in female 
congregations, which had been 66,000 in 1850, more than doubled to 135,000.100 The 
church also successfully agitated for legislation allowing for Catholic universities for the 
first time since the revolution, ending a state monopoly on education at the secondary and 
post-secondary levels established by Bonaparte so that all future military and civil 
officers would have to pass through the same education system. 
The French government responded by legislating for free education in 1881 and 
for compulsory secular or lay education the following year. It justified a prohibition on 
religious schools by insisting that the republican doctrine of laïcité required the state 
school to be a neutral space in which liberty of conscience prevailed. Delivering 
education through the filter of religious doctrine was deemed to be antithetical to that 
objective.101 In the place of Christian morality a civic or “independent” morality was to 
be taught, based on such secular notions as fraternity and solidarity.102 The new moral 
instruction was to be supplemented with civic education aimed at training the future 
citizen in democratic participation and self-government. The introduction of a secular 
education system was roundly justified with reference to republican principles and the 
Revolution of 1789.103 As in the First Republic, the imposition of a neutral public sphere 
was an assertion of power; and an attempt to sustain an egalitarian and fraternal 
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democracy, in which every citizen felt a sense of obligation for the liberty of his fellow 
citizen. 
The most important legislative initiative taken during the was the 1905 law on the 
Separation of Church and State. That law finally abolished the 1802 Concordat and 
remains the de jure basis of laïcité in France. Iterating Art. 10 of the 1789 Declaration of 
the Rights of Man and Citizen (the “DDHC”) Art. 1 of the 1905 law guaranteed the “free 
exercise of faiths under no other restrictions than those set out in the interests of  public 
order.” In Article 2 it was declared that “the republic does not recognize, remunerate or 
subsidize any faith.” Art. 28 prohibits any display of religious symbols or iconography in 
any public place, excepting religious edifices, cemeteries, museums or exhibitions. The 
1905 law has been supplemented by a number of ministerial “circulars” including a 1936 
ban on the wearing of religious insignia, a 1937 ban on religious proselytising in schools, 
and an affirmation in 1944 of school neutrality.104  
In the Fifth Republic, the 1905 law of separation is recognized as a constitutional 
law by virtue of having been recognized by the Constitutional Council as reflecting 
principles which are fundamental to republican France. The council’s authority to so 
designate a law stems from the preamble of the 1946 constitution, which affirms the 
constitutionality of a range of unspecified “fundamental principles recognized by the 
laws of the Republic.”105 Accordingly, the principle of laïcité is a norm with which all 
sub-constitutional laws must conform. French constitutional law guarantees at once a 
wide range of individual rights, and a constitutional structure that is prima facie ill-suited 
to recognizing religious distinctions in the public sphere.106 The remainder of this thesis 
will explain how an equilibrium between the two is reached from the standpoint of legal 
doctrine. It will be argued that the degree of protection afforded to religious rights has 
less to do with the doctrine of laïcité per se than with France’s legicentric constitutional 
culture. 
 
                                                          
104 Bronwyn Winter, Hijab and the Republic: Uncovering the French Headscarf Debate 
(Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 2008) at 54-55. 
105 Constitution du 4 octobre 1958, Version consolidée au 21 juin 2015, Pmbl. Online: 
Legifrance <http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr>  
106 Laborde, supra note 60 at 4. 
112 
 
xi) French “Légiscentisme” Presumes a Role for Civic Virtue and Laïcité  
 
As a matter of constitutional law, the legality of the ban on the public wearing of 
full-face veils was based not on laïcité per se but on the level of deference afforded to the 
legislature by the Constitutional Council. The requirement of proportionate effects and 
the legal rules affecting their operation were determined with a view to legislative 
competence. But the doctrine of laïcité does inform how that competence is construed, 
and it is important to understand the way in which it does. For non-French observers 
trying to understand the role of laïcité in determining deference in French constitutional 
rights adjudication, it helps to begin by remembering that, historically, legislative 
supremacy was the norm in France and that the judge was accordingly assigned an 
essentially passive role. There is, however, an important third element which has long 
supplemented what would otherwise be a system of parliamentary majoritarianism. That 
third element is foreign to common law conceptions of constitutional rights protection but 
integral to those of the French Republic. 
At a theoretical level, majority rule in France has always been tempered (or even 
directed) by an ethic of civic virtue, and laïcité is merely an example of that ethic 
transcribed into law. The link between laïcité and republicanism was well-stated by the 
historian Claude Nicolet, who observed that “[l]egal and territorial integrity also require 
unity of another kind: moral or spiritual: this is the function of laïcité.”107 In terms of the 
legislative function, this strong civic culture lends itself to the notion that the legislature 
not only has a right but a duty to pursue objectives for the public interest. What makes 
this conception of legislative competence different from other parliamentary democracies 
is the relatively broad construal that is given to the public interest. The doctrine of laïcité 
provides a good example of how that public interest is circumscribed as the content of 
legislative competence. In France, the public and private interests are clearly 
distinguished. 
In practice, the notion of civic virtue and laïcité gave rise to a comparatively rigid 
dichotomy between public and private spheres, and a far-reaching construal of the former 
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relative to the latter.108 In the private sphere, the individual incarnates. “natural and 
imprescriptible rights,” including to religious liberty.109 In the public sphere, she is called 
to be a “citoyenne,” engaged in “public reasoning,”110 as part of a formative, 
emancipatory project of democratic and egalitarian citizenship. Historically, laïcité 
developed as a tool for ensuring a neutral and non-sectarian public sphere. That civic 
space was and is thought by French republicans to be necessary in order to shore-up the 
fraternal, associative bond at the “heart of the republican pact.’111 With the incorporation 
of judicial review, French jurists have had to develop proportionality standards that in 
their application were able to account for this pub-priv. divide, so as not to unduly restrict 
the ability of the legislature to make law for the public sphere. 
 
xii) In France, Balancing Reflects a Legicentric Legal Culture 
 
It is important to recall that none of France’s four operative constitutional rights 
instruments contain a general limitations clause. The Constitutional Council infers the 
standard of review for limitations on constitutional rights from the text of the rights 
implicated in a given case. Accordingly, the standard is more or less rigorous depending 
on the constitutional principles engaged. While the way in which the standard is 
formulated varies from case to case, the objective of the Constitutional Council is always 
to ensure an “equilibrium” between conflicting values.112 Depending on the rights 
engaged, that may involve review for a “manifest error of appreciation,” a standard not 
unlike review for an insufficiently important objective in other jurisdictions. The council 
may add to that review for a rational connection and minimal impairment. Finally, it may 
apply a full proportionality test by adding an evaluation of the “possible consequences”113 
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of the legislation under review. Again, review for “possible consequences” is 
substantially similar to the proportionate effects test. 
Freedom of religion is guaranteed in Art. 10 of the DDHC which states that “no 
one shall be disturbed on account of his opinions, even religious ones, as long as the 
manifestation of such opinions does not interfere with the public order, as determined by 
law.” Again, because French rights adjudication focuses on abstract principles rather than 
discrete textual provisions, where an infringement of Art. 10 is under review, it usually is 
in conjunction with other articles relating to Art 10, such as Arts. 4 and 5. Those broad 
“liberty” rights provide that the “natural rights of man [have] no boundaries other than 
those to ensure to other members of society the same rights,” and that limits on rights are 
permissible where their exercise “harms others” or is “injurious to society.”114 It should 
be noted that each article speaks both to the right and to its justifiable limits. 
In the particular case of Loi n° 2010-1192 respecting concealment of the face in 
public, the standard of review was inferred by the council from the limiting language of 
Arts. 4, 5, and 10 of the DDHC and Art. 3 of the Preamble of the 1946 Constitution. 
According to the text of those provisions, the legislature has the right to limit individual 
freedoms in matters of religion where the exercise of those rights would be injurious to 
other rights-holders and to the public order. Art 3 of the 1946 preamble lends legitimacy 
to state initiatives aimed at advancing gender equality. These articles are substantively 
similar to what is found in rights instruments in other democratic jurisdictions. As this 
section will make clear, the formulation and application of a proportionality test to Loi n° 
2010-1192 turned largely on unarticulated normative considerations, which speak to the 
legicentric nature of French constitutional culture rather than the doctrine of laïcité per 
se. 
In Dec. 2007-555 DC respecting concealment of the face in public, no possible 
consequences test was applied. Again, taken together, the provisions cited in that case 
(Arts. 4, 5, and 10 of the DDHC), suggests a broad liberty right to autonomy and 
individual choice that can only be abridge by the legislature where its exercise is 
injurious to other rights-holders.  By virtue of Art 3 of the preamble of the Constitution of 
                                                          




1946, it is clear that harm of a gendered-nature may justify such limitations. In Dec. 
2007-555 DC, the Constitutional Council inferred from  these articles a manifest error 
test plus a means-end review, suggesting a robust role for the legislature in determining 
the role of religion in the public sphere. As suggested in the previous section, in 
constitutional rights adjudication, the interest of the “public sphere” are usually expressed 
as social or collective interests, juxtaposed against individual interests during the 
balancing stage of proportionality.  
It is critical to note, however, that where an inquiry into the “possible 
consequences” of a law is applied, it is done using legal rules that reflect the “legicentric” 
culture of French constitutionalism.115 As explained in the previous two chapters, 
proportionality was incorporated gradually into French law, and has been adapted to that 
end. This includes the judicially-developed legal rules of the test’s application, which in 
France have been formulated to reflect an historical commitment to the supremacy of 
statutory law. This does not mean that the interest of individual rights-holders are given 
sub-standard consideration. Rather, the concept of “légiscentrisme.” stands for the 
proposition that while individual rights are affirmed in the French constitution, it is in a 
context that recognizes a strong collective dimension to rights enjoyment. In France, the 
lack of a clear distinction between individual rights and the public interest is particularly 
evident at the proportionate effects stage of proportionality, because of the evaluative 
nature of that requirement. 
In Dec. 2007-555 DC, for instance, the Constitutional Council upheld legislation 
granting a tax credit for the acquisition of a primary residence as a justifiable limit on the 
principle of equality before public burdens.116 It applied a possible consequences or 
proportionate effects test. In doing so, it used legal rules indicating not judicial deference 
as it is understood in common law systems, but a judicial recognition that individual 
rights and the public interest do not exist in a sharp dichotomy. It noted the possible 
effects of the legislation, and evaluated those effects with reference to the requirements of 
a means and ends review. Specifically, it noted that the effects of the law were acceptable 
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in that they advanced “a purpose of general interest,” and then noted that the effects 
reflected “objective and rational standards with respect to the goal sought by the 
legislature.” Finally, it held that the law was not “a manifestly disproportionate tax 
benefit in light of its objective.” Reference to deleterious effects on affected persons was 
implicit, but the balancing exercise was structured around the competence of the 
legislature. 
The way in which the Constitutional Council relates balancing back to the 
objective and means chosen by the legislature is indicative of a culture of légicentrisme, 
as is its disinclination to engage in balancing at all in most cases. When the council 
declines to engage in the formulation of policy, or to exercise “a general power of 
appreciation”  akin to that of the legislature, it is not showing judicial “deference” as that 
concept is understood in common law jurisdictions. In common law jurisdictions it is 
assumed that courts exist to protect individuals from other branches of government, 
implying limits on legislative authority where individual rights are implicated. This 
conception presupposes that rights and the public interest can be clearly distinguished. It 
also presumes a sort of binary relationship where courts represent the interests of 
individual rights-holders and legislatures represent societal interests. This conception has 
historically not pertained in France. As a consequence, if the presumption of a dichotomy 
between the rights-holder and the public interest is beginning to set in, it remains far less 
rigid than in other jurisdictions. 
 
xiii) Conclusion  
 
In this chapter, it was suggested that, from a comparative standpoint, the 
proportionate effects or balancing stage of proportionality is the most important. This is 
because the proportionate effects stage of proportionality is evaluative rather than 
empirical, and as such, is able to give expression to value-laden considerations which are 
related to the constitutional culture of a given jurisdiction. The proportionate effects test 
is shaped by constitutional culture both in the conscious efforts of judges to interpret the 
meaning of the text of a constitution’s limitations provision, and the modes of legal 
reasoning that they bring to bear, often un-consciously, in applying that test. This chapter 
has leveraged the intellectual and culture history of the comparator jurisdictions to 
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explain interpretive patterns that are relevant to a comparative analysis of the 
proportionate effects test. In so doing, this chapter identified significant but often subtle 
or facially imperceptible differences in the constitutional cultures of the comparator 
states. 
The aspects of both constitutional cultures which were relevant to this chapter are 
those relating to the effect that the role of the legislature has on legal reasoning at its most 
basic level. In this narrow respect, it was suggested that Canada’s constitutional culture 
reflects the empiricism of the common law while France’s constitutional culture is 
imbued with the rationalism of the French Enlightenment. As a result, in the words of 
J.A. Talmon, the former is distinguished by a preference for “organic, slow, half-growth” 
while the latter embodies “doctrinaire deliberateness.”117 These cultural differences are 
responsible for divergent conceptions of the relationship of the individual rights-holder to 
the interests of the society of which he or she is a part. While Canadian constitutional 
culture conceives of a rigid binary between the individual and the collective as 
represented by the state’s legislative power, French constitutional culture is far more 
legicentric in the sense that the distinction between the freedom of the individual and the 
freedom of his society is less clear. 
Thus, in the case of restrictions on religious expression in the public sphere, 
divergent outcomes are due mainly to different cultural assumptions about the legitimate 
role of the legislature and less about different doctrines of secularism per se. Canadian 
secularism and French laïcité are substantively different doctrines; one is a theory of 
negative liberty based on the free exercise of religion, the other prescribes a neutral 
public sphere to ensure the full participation of individuals as “citizens” of a self-
governing republic. While in Canada secularism refers to a culture of negative liberty, in 
France it is a substantive doctrine that supports a legislature which was historically 
unfettered but for the influence of a culture of civic virtue intended to direct the 
behaviour of free people. Judicial review on a proportionality standard has been very 
recently grafted onto long-standing patterns in both countries. As this chapter has 
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Chater 5: Conclusion 
 
This thesis sought to shed light on the limits of proportionality’s potential as a 
vector for driving global convergence in rights norms. It was held that the migration of 
that legal standard across jurisdictions has yielded a high level of synchronization in the 
methodology of rights adjudication, but not a “universal” standard or an “ultimate rule of 
law.”1 It was argued that as a supra-national legal standard, proportionality is shaped in 
its operation by established modes of legal reasoning in the jurisdiction in which it is 
applied. To illustrate this point, the application of proportionality to particular legislative 
limitations on freedom of religion in Canada and the French Republic were analysed 
from a comparative standpoint. It was shown that divergences in the way in which that 
test operates are the result of different, historically-contingent interpretive perspectives. 
As a result, the culture of the constitution into which proportionality is incorporated is 
both discernable in the operation of that legal standard and determinative of its outcomes. 
The focus of this comparative analysis was on particular statutory restrictions on 
freedom of religion. Specifically, Canadian and French case law was analysed in order to 
shed light on each jurisdiction’s approach to constitutional review of statutory bans on 
public veiling. This analysis accordingly concentrated on the French Constitutional 
Council’s decision upholding the constitutionality of that country’s ban on concealment 
of the face in public and related decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada. Both 
jurisdictions conduct review of such rights-limitations with a standard of review based 
upon the requirements of proportionality as developed in the law of the European Court 
of Justice (the “ECJ”) and the European Court of Human Rights (the “ECHR”). That 
standard is, however, modified by the constitutional culture in which it is applied. 
In order to explain the ways in which constitutional culture affects the operation 
of proportionality, this thesis used a contextualist methodology based upon the precepts 
of legal historicism. Intellectual and cultural history was leveraged to account for 
differences in the way in which proportionality is applied. Specifically, historical 
discourses surrounding relevant aspects of legal reasoning in each of the comparator 
states were analysed to show how the way in which rights are balanced is influenced by 
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interpretive perspectives and “shared meanings” that are very much organic in the sense 
that they are historically-developed and socially-transmitted.2 Accordingly, the 
methodology of this thesis was not adopted to advance reform of the law, but with a view 
to enhancing understanding of the operation of superficially-similar legal standards 
across jurisdictions with a particular emphasis on the effect of constitutional culture. 
The first chapter of this thesis set the groundwork for a comparative analysis of 
legal doctrine by explaining why the application of proportionality looks different in each 
jurisdiction. It was noted that proportionality is a sort of “hybrid” test which involves 
both fact-dependent inductive reasoning, and deduction from general principles. As such, 
it can be incorporated with relative ease into both common law and civil law systems. But 
each system tends to stress facts or principles in applying proportionality in order to 
better comport with established practices of legal reasoning. The result is a difference in 
the way in which the test is articulated rather than a difference in requirements which are 
brought to bear, given that in either case, both facts and principles are inevitably engaged. 
Thus, in Canada, proportionality was shown in its operation to be fact-sensitive and 
discursive, while in France it is terse and syllogistic. It was argued that the extent to 
which each legal system acknowledges engagement with the factual matrix of a case can 
be explained by the historical development of discourses surrounding the notion of 
legislative supremacy in each country.  
In the second chapter, a full comparative analysis of the application of 
proportionality was undertaken, focusing on the French Constitutional Council’s decision 
respecting concealment of the face in public and related case law of the Supreme Court of 
Canada. It was shown that, in assessing such legislation for constitutionality, both legal 
systems make a preliminary inquiry into whether the law has a proper purpose, followed 
by a review for a rational connection between legislative means and ends, and for 
minimal impairment of the constitutional right. In Canada, constitutional review of 
alleged violations of freedom of religion, like reviews of other constitutionally protected 
rights, requires a balancing inquiry or requirement of “proportionate effects.” In France, 
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the nature of the balancing of “possible consequences” is heavily dependent upon the 
particular rights engaged. Generally, however, French balancing is more oriented to the 
legislature than Canadian balancing. 
The second chapter also suggested that when accounting for different results in 
the application of proportionality in Canada and the French Republic, the balancing test 
tends to be decisive. While the proper purpose, rational connection, and minimal 
impairment requirements are essentially empirical questions, the proportionate effects test 
is evaluative. That is, it is concerned with value judgments about what is good or 
acceptable in a democratic society. Accordingly, it tends to be the main venue for the 
expression of the cultural dimension of rights in a given jurisdiction. While Canadian 
balancing tends to give expression to a cultural notion of rights as concentrated in the 
individual, French balancing reflects an historical preoccupation with being free in a 
collective capacity. If balancing is undertaken at all, it is done so as not to represent 
individual and collective interests as being strictly divided and opposed. 
 The third chapter of this thesis was a concentrated analysis of the proportionate 
effects or balancing stage as a site for the expression of constitutional culture. It was 
noted that courts develop legal rules for the balancing inquiry that reflect their 
understanding of the normative standard against which limitations on rights must be 
justified based on the language of the limitations provisions of the constitution. It was 
proposed that in Canada the rules of balancing reflect a presumption that individual rights 
and the collective interests exist in a relatively strict dichotomy. For instance, the state is 
restricted in its ability to pursue abstract or symbolic initiatives, and the gravity of a 
limitation on a right tends to be measured with reference to individual autonomy. In 
France, individual and collective rights do not exist in as rigid a dichotomy. During 
balancing, harmful effects on individual rights are related back to the state’s ends and 
means, and assessed in light of state’s right to legislate in the public interest. 
 It was also suggested that this way of conceptualizing rights derives from very 
basic tendencies in legal reasoning. In Canada, constitutional review tends to be 
conducted empirically, focusing narrowly and non-speculatively on the concrete interests 
of a claimant. This is not a universal practice, but reflects the integration of rights 
adjudication into a common law culture. In the French Republic, the legal rules of 
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balancing relate individual rights back to the legislature, and the proper balance between 
the rights of the individual and the public interest are arrived in a rather more abstract 
way. That high degree of abstraction is a direct result of the relative lack of a clear 
distinction between the individual and the public interest historically. The French 
republican tradition confers on the legislature the right to make law prescriptively, with a 
view to securing the societal conditions necessary for individual liberty. Accordingly, the 
outcome of judicial review of statutory restrictions on religious expression in the public 
sphere does not turn on notions of secularism per se, but on divergent conceptions of 
legislative competence which find expression in the proportionate effects stage of 
proportionality. 
 As detailed in the third chapter, the influence of religion in society should not be 
thought of so much as an insular subject of inquiry within the law, but as a critical 
determinant in the growth of the law, shaping both the empiricism of the common law 
and the rationalism of French civil law. In relative terms, the history of the Protestant 
Reformation in England yielded a more dichotomous view of the individual’s 
relationship to the state, while France’s more homogenous religious make-up gave rise to 
a self-concept with a far more defiant collective dimension. French republicanism cannot 
be understood without reference to that country’s conflictual relationship to the Roman 
Catholic Church. By the late-eighteenth century, France’s unique history had yielded a 
conviction among influential actors that only a unitary, fraternal civic bond could be 
sufficiently strong to break the hold of feudal and religious inequity. It is for this reason 
that it may be said that liberty is not regarded by French republicans as a natural or 
historic given, but as a state of being that must be secured by the republic in its legislative 
capacity. 
By analysing law as embedded within a particular, organic historical context, a 
richer and more fulsome understanding of the law’s role in regulating contemporary 
human conduct can be achieved. Legal standards such as proportionality, which are 
substantially similar as a matter of positive law, are modified in their application by their 
interaction with entrenched norms and modes of reasoning. Accordingly, the extent to 
which proportionality is adapted should not be overshadowed by the apparent success of 
its migration. It is important not to allow a preoccupation with what are increasingly 
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presumed to be universal standards in rights protection to distract from the continued 
relevance of local, culturally-contingent norms and practices. To do so would both inhibit 
effective discourse in law and impair the development of self-knowledge, both of which 
are arguably the most important ends of comparative constitutional scholarship. This 
thesis has sought to re-situate rights adjudication within culture and to affect an 
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